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Abstract: 
The present dissertation is a compilation of three individual papers, and an 
introduction chapter. While the introduction lays out the theoretic backdrop of 
the project as a whole, the papers represent interventions into three specific 
dimensions of China’s Party-state order: structural organizational issues, 
decision-making institutions, and political economic dynamics. These three 
dimensions are presented as aspects of the same political organizational order, a 
Party-state order assembled around the hegemony of the Communist Party of 
China’s (CPC), conceptualized in the introduction using a Gramsci-inspired 
theory of the state. Employing a historical institutional approach, the three 
papers engage with specific strands of literatures of China Studies in a 
conceptual and theoretic manner, while also contributing with empirical 
findings. They discuss the concept of Fragmented Authoritarianism (FA), the 
organization and institutionalization of Leading Small Groups, and the social 
embeddedness of state-owned enterprise (SOE). FA has been an influential 
concept to explain structural issues of China’s bureaucracy, and with China’s 
energy administration as example, I review its value as a theoretic notion today, 
30 years after its inception. Discussing the growing importance of Leading Small 
Groups, the second paper addresses some of the institutional “fixes” to decision-
making and policy coordination, which have evolved in response to structural 
fault-lines described in the FA paper. The third paper takes the dissertation into 
the political economic dimension of the Party-state order, providing a case study 
of how China National Petroleum Corporation, a central, state-owned and CPC 
led SOE, is organizationally rooted in its local operations, remaining 
institutionally embedded in local society through its legacy as a socialist work 
unit (danwei). Using Polanyi’s concept of embeddedness, the paper reveals how 
SOEs are split into two tiers each tasked with the respective objectives of 
economic development and political stability, and thus as Party-state 
organizations are used to flexibly support CPC hegemony.   
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Abbreviations: 
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Introduction: Conceptualizing China as Party-state order 
 
 
 
“领导者...要有‘治大国如烹小鲜’的态度” 
      (Xi Jinping 2013) 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1
 Xi Jinping: “ruling a large country is like cooking small fish, this must be the conduct of leaders”, see: 
Xinhua 2013. He refers to a Lao Zi quote from the Dao De Jing: Ruling a large country is like cooking 
small fish, you fry it as a whole and don’t dissect it into parts. 
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Introduction and Research Motivation: 
 
The present dissertation is a collection of three independent but related articles, 
connected by their interest in the institutions and political organization of the 
Chinese Party-state order. The project takes its departure from research in China 
studies, but intersects with political science and political economics. One of the main 
interests of this body of research is the question how the Chinese political system, a 
Leninist party-state structure, has been able to maintain its stability, effectuate 
economic growth and development, and reform itself to adapt to the challenges 
brought about by social and economic development and globalization. The “China’s 
rise” narrative is often presented as a paradox, the puzzle being how China could 
avoid systemic convergence assumed to happen in the 1990s (Fukuyama 1991; 
Chang 2001; Guo 2003), and how a socialist system has been able to contain 
capitalist modes of production and the emergence of an increasingly affluent middle 
class, while keeping the power of the Communist Party of China (CPC) firmly in place, 
arguably even strengthen its organizational grasp over society. 
 Within this literature, there has been a relatively small but strong and 
growing group of China specialists, writing specifically about China’s administrative 
structure, decision-making mechanisms, CPC ideology, and political economic policy. 
Among this group of scholars, the relations between the particular bureaucratic 
setups of the Party-state (e.g.: Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Mertha 2009), history 
and institutional path-dependence (e.g.: Bian 2008; Zheng 2010), and CPC 
organization and ideology driven developments (e.g.: Schurmann 1968; Brødsgaard 
and Zheng (eds.) 2006) have been some of the major reoccurring themes.  
When Andrew Nathan (2003) stated that China’s Party-state 
represented a new form of resilient authoritarianism, he represented a changing 
perception towards the systems’ robustness, and today only the most ardent 
skeptics continue to predict imminent regime collapse (notably Gordon Chang and 
Minxin Pei) or democratization (Guo 2003). Weathering both the Asian financial 
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crisis (1997) and the global financial crisis (from 2009) better than most expected,2 
and in fact standing increasingly strong in international politics, security, and trade 
regimes today, the adaptive capacity of the political system of China, and especially 
the role of the CPC as its organizational core, has become one of the main issues 
China specialists are looking at.  
 The focus on the political system has since led to deeper insights into the CPC 
ideology and organization (this field of research has one of the longest tradition, 
dating back to “sinological times” of e.g. Franz Schurmann), the effects on society of 
an encroaching political organization centered around Party authority, and the 
statist features (state capitalism) of the Chinese political economy and its state-
owned enterprises (SOE).  
The motivation for this dissertation arises out of a still wanting insight 
into the logic of political organization of Chinese society around the CPC, i.e. Party-
state system and its role in social and economic developments and organization. It is 
also an attempt to combine methods and approaches from both Sinology and 
political sciences. This approach of using theories and methods from political 
economy and area studies (sinology) respectively, is chosen out of a conviction that 
certain aspects of China’s political organization, and in particular the central role of 
the CPC, is best understood through a non-comparative, qualitative, and historical 
approach. This approach aims at revealing the Party-state’s institutional logics by 
understanding the mechanisms and foundations it operates by. Here, this project 
applies a technique to better decode the Party-states organizational rationality, that 
is to “see like the CPC”, or in other words, to explore the Party-state as a 
purposefully and consciously designed system (order) by using its own meaningful 
conceptual framework as compass. Here the Marxism-inspired social theory which 
the CPC operates by plays in, which in many ways is a historic construct particular to 
China, and one of the reasons this project was designed as a non-comparative one. 
More specifically, it sets out to reveal three aspects of its institutional 
and organizational logic; bureaucratic fragmentation (centrifugal forces), 
coordinating and decision-making (centripetal forces), and the socially embedded 
                                                        
2
 Although the full fallout of the huge debt accumulation which came as a result of the financial 
stimuli reacting to the financial crisis remains to be seen. 
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nature of state-owned enterprise in China’s “socialist market economy” (tensions 
between accumulative and redistributive forces). These seemingly unrelated aspects 
are shown to share an important organizational logic, as they are distinct features of 
the hegemony of the CPC,3 which dominates political organization throughout 
Chinese society. While the three papers concern themselves with what could be 
called “organs of the state” (the central energy administration), “Party 
organizations” (leading small groups), and “the political economy” (State-owned 
enterprises), the hegemonic rule of the CPC integrates virtually all important 
organizations in state, economy and society under its institutional order. Therefore, 
the Chinese system, that is, the model of China’s political organization of society, is 
in this dissertation referred to as the Party-state order. The choice of “order” 
indicates that this dissertation does see political organization as a society-wide 
project, carried out by the power elites, which in contemporary China gravitates 
around the CPC.4 
 At a more abstract level, the three articles included in this dissertation are 
concerned with structural issues of the Chinese Party-state organization (article 1), 
with decision-making processes of this organizational field (article 2), and the 
dynamics the structural and decision-making patters lead to in the political economy 
over time and space (article 3). As such, the three articles also speak to slightly 
different literatures and academic discussions, albeit all within the field of China 
Studies. This introduction chapter will outline the dissertations’ theoretic, 
methodological, and conceptual foundations, and lay out the ontological 
considerations that bind together the three papers. This latter part will, while being 
an important part of the introduction, as it discusses some conceptual issues arising 
when studying political China using concepts and theories often developed outside 
of China, be largely restricted to the introduction. Future work will have to verify and 
advance our understanding of ontological and epistemological variations in the way 
                                                        
3
 A more detailed discussion of the concept of hegemony will be given below. Suffice to say here, that 
hegemony entails the ability of the political elite to define social norms and organization by way of 
coercion, but more importantly and predominantly, by way of establishing consent towards its goals 
as the common sense. See also Antonio Gramsci (1971). 
4
 Others have discussed the benefits of conceptualizing political organization not as closed units of 
“the state” or “the government”, but as an institutional order that inscribes its particular (political) 
organization on society. See e.g. Li Chen 2015. 
13 
 
fundamental concepts, such as the State, Civil Society, or the Political Party are 
understood. 
 
 
State of the Art and Contributions: 
 
Over the last decade it has become clear that China will not follow the path of the 
Soviet Union or former Eastern European countries, and an ever growing number of 
researchers from an increasingly diverse range of disciplines are interested in the 
institutional and organizational figurations of the Chinese Party-state. An 
increasingly rich and developed China, with an ever-growing influence 
internationally, has only increased the number of research from disciplines other 
than area studies and Sinology looking at China, a development that has had a strong 
impact on the ways we study and understand China today. Until the late 1980s 
Sinologists largely dominated academic research on China (e.g. Franz Schurmann; 
Alice Miller; Ezra Vogel; Orville Schell). Since then, China specialists trained in social 
sciences, in particular political science (e.g. Kenneth Lieberthal; Susan Shirk) but also 
sociology (e.g. Andrew Walder), economics (e.g. Barry Naughton; Nicholas Lardy) 
and other disciplines, have become the perhaps more influential voices on China-
related research.  
The effect of more and more researchers from social science applying 
their disciplines’ particular ontology and theory to China as a case, however, has led 
to a significant increase in the scope and quality of research on China. The rise of 
China in global politics and economy, and a growing realization that the Chinese 
communist regime showed remarkable resilience and adaptive capacity, naturally 
led to rising interest in and need for knowledge about China. The increase of social 
science disciplines and methods in China Studies has also meant that one of the 
most reoccurring general themes is the state’s role in social organization, and the 
political authority of the CPC. With a Party going into the 21st century stronger than 
ever, an increasing number of social scientists now focus on features of the Chinese 
socialist Party-state. This cross-fertilization of Sinology and social science disciplines 
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should very much be seen as strength of contemporary China Studies, which this 
project contributes to. 
Today, China is a major area of interest for scholars from a large variety 
of academic backgrounds. Large numbers of studies exist on her political system 
(e.g.: Lieberthal 1995; Heilmann 2001; Brødsgaard and Zheng (eds.) 2004), the 
Chinese economy (e.g.: Naughton 2007; Pettis 2013; Guo 2017), and social 
transformation during the post-1978 reform era (e.g.: Guo 2003; Lee 2007; Chan et 
al.2009). More recently, with growing knowledge about economic and political 
conditions in China, political economic approaches have been on the rise, reflecting 
an increasing interest in the inherently political rationality behind the (economic) 
decision-making in the Chinese Party-state.5  
The area focus of scholarly works on China at times make clear 
distinctions in terms of discipline somewhat problematic, as many sinologists also 
are trained in other disciplines, and both methods and theoretic outlooks are highly 
differentiated. China studies, in other words, has become a very interdisciplinary 
field, albeit with a gravitational center around theory and methods from history, 
political science (including political economy), and sociology. This dissertation falls 
within this general branch of literature, attempting to make visible the particular 
interdependence of political institutions, organization, and decision-making, but also 
developing a recently emerging approach viewing China’s political, economic, and 
social systems as dimensions of a general, societal order (e.g.: Li 2015; ten Brink 
2013; Zheng 2010). This view of China as one system presented in this introduction is 
also influenced by neo-Marxist theory, and not least the study of the Chinese Party-
state’s own state theory, the latter of which is a too seldom appreciated factor of 
how China is politically organized, and how CPC governance unfolds in practice.  
More specifically, this dissertation builds on theoretic insights from 
political economy (e.g. Karl Polanyi; Sarah Eaton), neo-Marxists (e.g. Antonio 
Gramsci), while as a whole locating itself within China Studies (drawing on e.g.: Franz 
Schurman; Zheng Yongnian; Kenneth Lieberthal; Li Chen; Harro von Senger; Kjeld Erik 
                                                        
5
 Two of the first to explicate the strongly political logic behind economic reforms were Stuart Schram 
(1984) and Susan Shirk (1993). 
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Brødsgaard).6 As such, it takes the stance of viewing China as a distinct social system, 
and that a certain knowledge about the specificities of this entity, in terms of 
historical, organizational, and institutional insights, are instrumental for its thorough 
understanding, and a prerequisite for comparative and theoretical work. It also 
works with an institutionalist understanding of social organization that opposes the 
strict separation of state, economy, and society into distinct and independent 
spheres. As a more general goal of this dissertation, I develop a reading of the 
political organization of the Chinese Party-state as an order, which avoids some of 
the shortcomings of a separate, dichotomous conceptualization of Party - state, and 
state - society relations (or: state – market relations). The following will briefly 
introduce the main strands of literatures and discussions this dissertation engages 
with. 
 
Literature on the Party-state Bureaucracy and Policy-making Processes 
 
Given its long existence, the structure of China’s bureaucracy more generally has 
naturally been subject to sinological research for many decades (early studies are 
e.g.: Fairbank 1960; Balazs 1967). With a few notable exceptions (Franz Schurmann, 
Doak Barnett, and John Lewis did pioneering work on the PRC’s bureaucratic and 
political organization), the political organizations of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), and with that the CPC, was little researched before the 1980s, not least 
because of the extremely limited access to information.  
 Perhaps because of the opaque and non-transparent nature of the CPC and 
decision-making processes especially at central level, the limited existing research on 
the organization of the Party has always enjoyed a relatively high status in the field 
of China Studies. Several scholars have written on the CPC and its institutional 
integration with the state apparatus (e.g.: Shambaugh 2008; Brødsgaard and Zheng 
(eds.) 2006; Zheng 2010; McGregor 2010), as well as elite politics (China Leadership 
Monitor; Li Cheng 2001; 2016), and even individual leaders (Brown 2012; 2016; Lam 
2015).  
                                                        
6
 Much of the literature is of course spanning across these crude categories of literature. 
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After opening up in the 1980s, researchers started to gain insights on 
the hitherto closed Chinese administration, and a number of groundbreaking studies 
were published. Michel Oksenberg and Kenneth Lieberthal (1988), and David 
Lampton and Kenneth Lieberthal (eds.) (1992) were some of the first to more 
systematically study post-reform Party-state bureaucracy and decision-making, 
coining the Fragmented Authoritarianism (FA) notion still used to describe China’s 
political structure today (e.g. Mertha 2009; Brødsgaard (ed.) 2016). Since then, the 
FA concept has been used by several scholars, looking mostly at fissures and 
bottlenecks of the Party-state’s policy-making and implementation structure (e.g.: 
Lema and Ruby 2007; Landry 2008; Mertha 2009).  
Also the energy sector has been subject to a large number of studies 
(both administration and the state-owned businesses dominating energy), mapping 
structure and institutions of China’s energy sector (e.g.: Andrews-Speed 2010; 
Arruda 2003; Downs 2008), and tracing the protracted reform process of the energy 
administration and its major SOEs (e.g.: Andrews-Speed 2000; Xu 2016). Two main 
questions are raised by this research. The main issue is the impact of structure on 
decision-making, that is, how bureaucratic and administrative organization aids or 
hampers efficient policy making and coordination both vertically and horizontally. 
The second issue pertains more specifically to the energy sector, which is one of the 
fields often used to show protracted reform and a high degree of governmental 
control in the industrial economy, where former industrial ministries have gradually 
become SOEs, and where the introduction of modern governance structures and the 
coordination of horizontal policy-making has proven to be hampered by exactly 
those structural features of the Chinese bureaucratic organization discussed in the 
FA literature (e.g.: Xu 2016; Downs 2008). With its paper on FA, I contribute to the 
literature on China’s structurally determined decision-making processes by providing 
an updated reading, and a conceptual discussion of the relevance of FA today, 
almost three decades since its inception, and not least after several rounds of 
restructuring and reform of the bureaucracy. 
 In the paper on leading small groups (LSG), the focus is taken away from 
centrifugal forces, and turns its attention to integrative mechanisms that have so far 
held the Chinese Party-state in place, and more importantly, flexible and capable of 
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overcoming the structural fault lines described by the FA literature.7 These groups 
have received growing attention, especially after the establishment of several 
central level groups of significant scope and authority under Xi Jinping (e.g.: Johnson 
and Kennedy 2015), however, little about their internal workings and their more 
general functions as Party-state organizations is known. 
Viewing LSGs as a centralizing and coordinating mechanism that has 
developed endogenously in the Party-state system, enabling horizontally 
coordinated decision-making in situations where vertical bureaucracies are in 
conflict over policy, is a new perspective on and a function of LSG as institution that 
has not been discussed before. Literature and detailed knowledge on LSG of even 
more general type is extremely scarce, and only very few scholars have written on 
the topic. Alice Miller (2008; 2014) is one of the few scholars who has written on the 
topic in English. Even in the Chinese literature only two scholars, Lai Jingping and 
Zhou Wang, have written more systematically on LSG. The dearth of literature is 
addressed by the LSG article, by reviewing the available policy and legislation since 
the establishment of the PRC, providing a detailed and systematic discussion of the 
development, function, and organizational structure of LSG in the Chinese system. 
Investigating the historical institutional development of leading small groups has not 
been done before this way, and this paper is an important contribution to the 
literature on the organizational and institutional structure of decision-making in the 
Chinese Party-state order. 
 
Literature on China’s Political Economy and the Public Sector 
 
                                                        
7
 This article is currently in r&r at The China Quarterly, the version included in this dissertation is a 
draft, and is currently undergoing changes according to the reviewers’ requests. The main ones are to 
1: include a more detailed and in-depth case study of a leading small group, favorably the new 
Leading Small Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reform, led by Xi Jinping himself. 2: Discuss LSG 
in relation to Chinese decision-making literature. I am currently working on satisfying both demands 
to the extent possible, especially the first one is challenging since, as I repeatedly mention in the 
article, it is extremely difficult to get access to information on these groups’  internal workings, and 
even more so in case of central level groups. Regarding the requests for reflections on decision-
making, the discussion will clarify the role of LSG as decision-making mechanisms in themselves, 
underlining their ability to act as flexible and both weak and strong organs embedded in a 
bureaucratic hierarchy.  
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Widening the gaze to include important institutions supporting the Party-state 
order, the third paper investigates state-owned enterprise and its embeddedness 
both as economic foundation of local China, but also as a historically rooted Party-
state institution of considerable ideological and socio-economic significance. Using 
the case of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), this article connects two 
strands of research: literature on state-owned enterprise, and literature on China’s 
(local) political economy. Both are fairly established research areas and literatures. 
The paper here, however, contributes a novel reading of SOEs as integrated 
organizations of the Party-state, embedded in local society and economy. SOEs are, 
in other words, viewed as Party-state organizations with economic objectives rather 
than economic enterprise captured by the state. They are therefore understood as 
working towards both political and ideological ends (being historically rooted 
institutions of socialist ideals of resource distribution), and serving as economic 
foundation of industrial centers.  
Research on China’s state-owned sector and SOEs forms its own body 
of literature. Early studies looked, among others, at sociological issues (e.g. Walder 
1986; 1991; 1995), and the restructuring of socialist industrial organization (e.g. 
Bjorklund 1986). Peter Nolan (2001; 2004) wrote on the establishment and reform of 
the ‘National Champions’, designated SOEs in strategic sectors that had government 
support and still remain some of the largest conglomerates today. John Hassard 
(2007; (ed.) 2010) has authored multiple studies looking at the state-owned sector 
and SOE reforms more generally, and more recently, scholars such as Zhang Jin 
(2004), Sarah Eaton (2015) and Xu Yi-Chong (2016) have focused on specific sectors 
and individual SOEs, providing in-depth studies of the political economy of industries 
and SOEs. China-based scholars have often discussed the benefits of a strong public 
economy, and influential voices such as Justin Yi-Fu Lin (2001) have written on 
China’s new structural economics, while some more critical voices have pointed out 
shortcomings in management (e.g.: Child 1994; World Bank 1995; Muira 2015), as 
well as more serious issues such as structural corruption and rent-seeking (Sheng 
and Zhao 2013). Over the last few years, also the role of the CPC in SOE management 
(and the role of SOEs for Party leadership) has become more widely discussed topics 
(e.g. Brødsgaard 2012).  
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There is, however, a dearth of literature on how SOEs actually are 
operating with both political and socio-economic objectives, especially at local level. 
This includes SOEs’ role as local foundations of the economy, which presents them 
with different sets of objectives, one central and one local. More precisely, this 
pertains to the question of the intended and de facto functions of SOEs in China’s 
political economy, and in more general terms, the social relations of Chinese 
capitalism (see also: Gallagher 2015). How these at times conflicting objectives of 
SOEs as variegated organizations are negotiated and structured, has so far been little 
researched, and it is here the third paper makes its main contribution. 
 
Method and Data: 
 
Doing research in China, and especially research on Party-state and its political 
economy can be challenging. For text-based desk studies, which have built the 
foundation of the dissertation, data access is the first major problem. Although 
Chinese statistical data and government information (laws and regulations, public 
speeches and Party documents) have become much more accessible over the last 
years, there are still many barriers to access of primary data. Qualitative approaches 
employing fieldwork are often necessary to verify or even obtain information, and 
here some limitations apply regarding access to ranking officials in Party-state or SOE 
organizations.  
Whereas State legislation is (mostly) publicly available,8 it is much more 
difficult to access CPC decisions and internal documents. Unfortunately, it is often 
these Party decisions that carry far-reaching implications for the way administrative 
regulation is unfolding, since they have normative and guiding authority for the 
formulation and implementation of regulation. For example, according to Party 
regulation (which trumps state regulation) the Party group of a SOE will discuss 
important issues before the board of managers of a SOE takes them up and decides 
                                                        
8
 “State legislation” refers to legislation passed not by CPC organs but by the state administration, i.e. 
the State Council and below. Laws and regulations are available online at national level on 
www.gov.cn. Also local level regulation issued by local governments is now more frequently available 
online. The same counts for central SOEs, which have updates on major decisions and activities on 
their homepages. 
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on them. This is not only one way by which CPC hegemony through formal authority 
structure is exercised, but it also sets limitations to research on these mechanisms, 
because Party group decisions almost always are classified, or “internal” (内部), and 
thus not available for outsiders. This forces researchers to opt for a second best 
approach, which effectively means working with an abductive approach, constantly 
trying to verify textual data and conclusions, and try to establish causal links by going 
forth and back from archival data and fieldwork data, as well as testing conclusions 
against statements and information obtained from various sources.  Given the non-
transparent nature of the Chinese system, also deductive research methods are 
useful, comparing textual fact against facts playing out in reality, or the lack thereof, 
as the paper on the National Energy Administration illustrates. Another well-known 
issue is the reliability of Chinese statistical material. Statistics are selectively 
available, and numbers are often disputed and may even contradict other official 
statistics issued by different organizations9. Official data is used as the best data 
available in this dissertation, and should in general be seen as a good indicator of 
real trends and actual conditions. 
A third and quite important issue when studying just about any topic in 
China, is language. Whenever possible written material used in this project were the 
original Chinese versions (legislation, speeches, CPC documents etc.),10 and most 
interviews were conducted in Chinese. Also Chinese language secondary literature 
(scholarly works) was consulted in order to gain insights not only into the Chinese 
discourse on the relevant topics, but also in order to understand the slightly 
different conceptual understanding of certain issues in administration, organization, 
and ideology (especially the papers on FA and China National Petroleum Corporation 
have benefitted from a close study of the official Chinese discourse). Nevertheless, 
this project and the conceptual issues touched upon in the introduction are only a 
starting point for a more nuanced look how Chinese conceptual understanding of 
                                                        
9
 Matthew Crabbe (2014) has penned a good discussion on the issue of usage and 
limitations of statistics in China.  
10 Whenever it makes sense for reasons of clarity and to avoid misunderstanding, or 
when longer quotes of Chinese text are given I have included pinyin (romanization), 
or added the Chinese original text. Chinese names are written the Chinese standard 
form, family name before given name. 
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social organization and political institutions (i.e. its social theory) is influenced by 
historical and philosophical references in ways that vary somewhat from e.g. the 
European history of thought.  
Lastly, the research process of the project as such as had important 
bearing for the chosen methods and theoretic approaches of the papers and the 
introduction. Starting out with a focus on central state-owned business groups (such 
as CNPC), I quickly discovered the difficulty of finding data on the internal 
organization of SOEs, as well as extremely vague information on the exercised 
degree of political control over company decision-making. General company data 
exists only for listed companies (at least available for researchers outside the 
system), and only few of the group members are usually listed. In the case of CNPC 
for example, the main holding company (i.e. CNPC) is not listed, and therefore we 
have only the superficial information provided in annual reports and official 
company press releases. Its main subsidiary PetroChina, on the other hand, is listed 
both in China and abroad, and all information required for listed companies can be 
found. However, how PetroChina is controlled, what decisions come from its owner 
CNPC, and what financial transaction it has with non-listed entities, again lies beyond 
the event horizon. The constraints on information, together with the lack of access 
to company officials for interviews (attempts to contact central SOE officials were 
unsuccessful), led to a refocusing on a more theoretic approach to SOEs as 
organizations embedded within the Party-state. 
What emerged during early stages of this project, was that SOEs are 
much more responsive to Party-state objectives than they were to economic 
reforms, in the sense that political goals always are the key driver behind 
institutional and organizational change in the state-owned sector.11 Therefore, I 
turned towards the Party-state structure as the institutional order of which SOEs 
(and state-ownership as institution) are a part of.  
                                                        
11
 Another reading is of course, that SOEs are to be seen as vested interest groups, resistant to the 
status quo merely out of an interest to maintain the rent-seeking opportunities in place, see e.g.: 
Sheng Hong and Zhao Nong (2013). This reading has some truth to it, but I have always been wary to 
accept a view that basically disregards ideological factors, and sees corruption as the only reason for 
the fact that the Party-state maintains a strong state-owned economy. 
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The two first papers (on FA in the energy administration and on the evolution of 
Leading Small Groups) are mainly desk studies, reviewing all the primary (Party 
decisions, legislation, official documents) and secondary data (academic literature 
and news reports), that was available in English, German and Chinese language. A 
number of interviews (around 20 semi-structured formal as well as informal) were 
conducted with officials in various positions in Chinese public organizations (SOEs, 
think tanks such as the Development Research Center, and Chinese academics), but 
in the end were not included in the two papers, because they either did not contain 
enough relevant information, or – this was mostly the case – simply repeated what 
was already learned from official Party-state discourse. In other words, when it 
comes to important decision-making in Party organs, state bureaucracy, or SOEs, the 
informants I had access to did either hide behind official boilerplate, or did 
themselves not know enough to be able to say anything insightful. This repetition of 
formal discourse is in itself a piece of important information, as it illustrates an 
important point made in the theoretic discussion of this introduction, which is the 
reproduction of the Party-state order by way of consent.  
Contrary to what might intuitively make sense, the effectiveness of 
Party hegemony does not mean that all officials believe in it. Reproduction of the 
Party-state’s desired order is based on compliance to it. Party-state ideology remains 
dominant by virtue of consent to its daily enactment by officials, and is indirectly 
supported by everybody who is not actively opposing it.  Hegemony as an act of 
(political) articulation (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 85-86), lies in the enactment of it, 
and whoever joins this act of articulation, be it by merely following suit or through 
social action, must be considered as agent of the hegemonic “class” or elite.  This 
means, that even though a given Party-state official does not believe in the Party’s 
program (the hegemonic project so to say), is irrelevant as long as he “does his job”, 
(re-)articulating the official language and organization structure, thus reproducing 
and supporting the Party-state’s hegemonic project, and its position in society. 
Considering this, I have not used the interviews simply repeating or contextualizing 
decision-making and organizational structure in those two papers. 
The third paper (on CNPC) has evolved differently, and was to some 
extent born out of the frustration with the lack of access to SOEs. Looking at an 
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opaque and incredibly complex SOE such as CNPC, I decided to “look up” instead of 
down, and assume a point of view that looks at its position from its local 
foundations. Doing fieldwork in both Beijing and Daqing, including interviews and 
visits at local CNPC subsidiaries in Daqing, revealed a very different set of social and 
political features of the “National Champion”. Only three employees at CNPC 
subsidiaries agreed to an interview, and felt uncomfortable with recording the 
interview. I took notes during and after the interviews, and tried to grasp the 
reoccurring themes and explanations. Apart from these semi-structured interviews, I 
had longer conversations with around a dozen or so residents of Daqing, working (or 
formerly doing so) in the oil sector. The information gleaned from these 
conversations is only used as anecdotal evidence, but it did serve me well as guide to 
asking more pointedly about the local Party-state-CNPC relations in the formal 
interviews. 
While the paper by no means is developed to its fullest, it does serve as 
the starting point for potential future work on the way local embeddedness of 
industrial SOEs plays out. It also raises questions about the social relations of China’s 
Spielart (mode) of Capitalism. More interviews and local fieldwork needs to be done, 
not only in Daqing but also in other localities with strong CNPC presence, in order to 
verify the “test drilling” done in Daqing, and in order to generalize about the way 
that industrial restructuring will change the institutions of state-ownership, and the 
modernization of the distribution of public goods connected with SOEs historically. 
 
The Historical Institutional Approach  
 
The general research approach taken throughout this project is a historical 
institutional approach. Understanding why social and political organization is shaped 
the way it is cannot be gained by ahistorical accounts that simply slice through time 
and describe a structure. Historical institutional approaches are well established 
(e.g.: North 1990; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (eds.) 2003; Mahoney and Thelen 
(eds.) 2010), and suitable for research that reveals institutional and organizational 
rationalities beyond simple phenotype autopsy, in which structure is shown without 
explanations of their origin and rationality as evolving social constructs. In order to 
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get beyond descriptive understanding of “how”, the historical nature of social, and 
with that the path-dependence also of political organization, needs to be taken into 
account especially when we try to make sense of the changes in the way social 
systems are organized. David Stark (1992) urges us to take path dependence in 
economic transformations seriously. The shift from communism to capitalism in 
Eastern Europe is, as he shows, not a transition, but a transformation. This process is 
highly influenced by institutions in place, and, as King and Szelényi (2005, p. 206) 
point out, a process where a new system is “built with the ruins of socialism”, rather 
than merely on top of it.  
Considering this contextually of the specifics of institutional change, it 
quite possibly makes sense to talk about a distinct “Chinese modernity”, which 
draws upon a particular historical experience and perception or interpretation 
thereof (Dirlik 2003; 2012). Methodologically, in more finely granulated studies, 
borrowing concepts and approaches from various schools of thought (Hall 2010: 
220), in the case of this project sinology, official Chinese discourse and political 
economy, is beneficial to research illuminating the institutional dynamics of the 
Chinese model. The articles included in project are aiming to achieve exactly that, by 
combining structural-organizational (FA article), historical institutional (institutional 
change in the LSG article), and contextual case-material (CNPC article) in order to 
discuss various origins of change in the organization of China’s Party-state order 
more generally.  
History and path-dependence do matter also in China. Traditional 
imperial (and republican) institutions predate the PRC, and which were partially 
absorbed by the Socialists (Bian 2015), remain part of the institutional landscape 
even today. Building with institutions, as pointed out by King and Szelény (2005) is 
not merely a passive, unconscious process, but also includes also deliberation and 
choice. Ideas and ideology play an important role in changing certain institutions and 
organization (von Senger 1996; Blyth 2002), and are to be seen as institutions 
themselves. In the case of China it is well documented how ideas and ideology has 
an important influence on institutional and organizational change (e.g. Holbig 2006; 
Bian 2008; Heilmann and Perry 2011). Sarah Eaton (2013) also shows how ideas are 
investigated and discussed within the Chinese political elite, deliberating 
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institutional change and political economic policy, leading to a rather organic 
adaptation rather than a wholesale introduction of “markets” or bottom-up 
capitalism. This view on institutional change and social organization has implications 
for research on and understanding of the Chinese political economy, for its formally 
stated regulatory goals, and the desired model of redistribution of resources.  
Lastly but importantly, historical institutionalism also provides a view 
on institutions as social artefacts that must be seen as being shaped by and shaping 
a social order, a view this project shares. This order, i.e. society at large, has several 
levels, which are organically connected and integrated with one another. John 
Ikenberry (1988: 226) famously identified three levels, from specific government 
institutions to general state structures, and lastly, “the nation’s normative social 
order”.12 This view on institutions and social order informs the ontology and the 
social theory of this dissertation (to be more precise, this dissertation’s view on how 
China as a social system is organized politically).It calls for a holistic approach to the 
analysis of social systems, including historical and contextual data, is also shared by 
the literature that forms the basis for the conceptualization of “the state” and the 
integrated or embedded nature of social order presented here (e.g.: Polanyi 1944 
[2001]; Zheng 2010; Li 2015). Reflecting Ikenberry’s three levels of institutional 
order, this dissertation includes an analysis of specific administrative mechanism, 
discusses some of the institutional dynamics of the Party-state, and lastly, presents a 
discussion of the social, political order more generally (below).13  
The historical institutional approach enables the researcher to view 
China not as unique, but as a distinct project of modernity (Dirlik 2003), similar to 
                                                        
12
 This third layer has been criticized as too vague and perhaps not of institutional character by 
Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo (1992:2). The ontology of viewing society as one system in which 
institutions, both formal and informal, permeate the entire system, however, remains valid, and is 
shared by the main works that have defined the social theory outlined in this project.  
13
 While I agree with Thelen and Steinmo on the potential vagueness of analysis of societal order in 
terms of institutions (see supra note), the articles in this dissertation clearly suggest that ”macro” 
institutions and organizations, such as CPC organization, ideology, and historically rooted norms on 
e.g. resource distribution (the danwei is a case in point here) do work society-wide, and therefore this 
third layer of general social order should be appreciated by any analysis of institutions and 
organizations also on the sub-layers. The ambiguity and potential for overstating (or 
underappreciation) of this general order and its implications for e.g. political organization (an 
example is how much CPC ideology actually influences decision-making, and how much other more 
immediate governance concerns do so), is also one of the weaknesses of this approach, and this 
dissertation (see also conclusion). 
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other societies in that its constitutive elements are the same,14 but with its own 
constellations and historic experience, giving it a distinct emancipatorial agenda, 
which can be referred to as the Chinese “model” of (Dirlik 2012). The short and blunt 
answer to the question of: “what China is a case of” would be, that China is a case of 
a human society, or what Lars Bo Kaspersen has called “survival unit” (Kaspersen 
2008). As such it is an internally stable political and social system, able to identify 
and protect itself against others within a system of survival units.15 The exact 
composition of political and social order within units, are historically and organically 
developed differently in any unit. It is the goal of this study to identify the specific 
permutations of social organization that define China’s political order, and its 
manifestation as a political system, and thus the political organization of society at 
large. The following section will outline the ontological and conceptual backdrop for 
the general outlook on how to study social and political systems, in the case of China 
based on the notion of the Party-state order.  
 
Ontology and Theoretic Considerations 
 
The conceptual view of the state employed by this dissertation builds on the work of 
both neo-Marxist thinkers and China specialists. At a general level, the state theory 
assumed by this project builds upon Antonio Gramsci’s concept of the state. Gramsci 
(1972) developed a notion of the state that defined it as the elite structure 
exercising political authority, both directly and indirectly (see below). Building on this 
understanding of the state and its political organization, Zheng Yongnian (2010) 
developed his reading of the CPC as the “organizational emperor”. Also others, such 
as Li Chen (2015), indirectly share this approach to China’s political and economic 
systems as one order rather than separate fields. Last but not least, ideology and 
discourse of China’s political core, the CPC itself, represents one of the clearest 
proponents of this ontology.16 To some extent, the CPC tries to do what Gramsci 
                                                        
14
 Such as capitalism, development of a certain state capacity, social development etc. It is not, in 
other words, dependent on culture or ”Chineseness”. See also: Arif Dirlik (1997). 
15
 Admittedly, the definition given here is a crude simplification of Kaspersen’s sophisticated theory.  
16
 It might seem odd to include official political documents as primary sources. This exercise of 
“seeing like a state” (Scott 1998), however, lets the observer understand a given political 
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envisioned, and the Chinese Party-state is probably the closest example of a 
“Gramscian state” in which formal administrative state organizations as well as social 
institutions are constantly scrutinized and adjusted in order to remain tuned in on 
Party hegemony.  
This approach of viewing society, the state, and a hegemonic CPC as 
being parts of one order rather than individual sectors or disparate fields, allows the 
individual papers to focus on distinct aspects of the Chinese Party-state individually, 
yet in reference to the main logic of the general hegemonic order. These sectors, e.g. 
the state apparatus, can be looked at separately for reasons of analysis of its internal 
features. Societal (political) order formally organized around the CPC as a main feat 
of the Chinese system is thus a matrix through which otherwise unrelated sectors 
are revealed to be shaped by and/or in dialectical relationships with the institutional 
push and pull factors of Party-state organization and ideology. Bureaucratic 
organization, decision-making institutions, and political economic dynamics of SOEs 
in local China all are central aspects of the same Party-state order. It is this order 
that is seen as the main force behind organization and political institutions in 
contemporary China, and which brings together these empirically different sites of 
academic investigation. When seen as one project, however, the three papers and 
introduction of this dissertation come to force by illuminating the Chinese order 
from different angles, and by unraveling some of the general organizational 
dynamics that define the Chinese Party-state and the institutional order it represents 
as a model.  
The Chinese Party-state’s own practice of strategic political control 
over society, including the economy, is clearly reflected – and in fact openly stated - 
in the CPC’s political program of establishing a socialist market economy. Here SOEs 
are a central element (Chan 2009), while state control and free markets are not 
irreconcilable opposites, but negotiable poles on a spectrum (Osburg 2013). With an 
conceptual outlook based on Chinese historic institutions and Marxist epistemology 
(Zheng 2010), it allows a different experimentation of state and market – as long as 
the overarching Party hegemony is not violated - blending market forces, 
                                                                                                                                                              
organization, and has been quite useful in the case of this project, as it has enabled a more nuanced 
understanding of the structural and ideological foundations of the Party-state. 
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monopolies, mixed ownership types, and political control of private actors (Perry 
1994; Huang 2012).  
Analysis conceptualizing state and society as two distinct “institutional 
spheres” with different logics (McNally 2015), creates a conceptual barrier to seeing 
the interconnected nature of institutions and organizations that span across the 
state – society (or state-market) divide. The state meddling in market transactions 
(e.g. subsidizing or establishing entry barriers), is criticized to be encroaching on 
another institutional sphere (Walter and Howie 2011). The Chinese Party-state, 
however, has no normative qualms about these transgressions because it attaches 
far less importance to them (if any at all), all being part of the one institutional 
structure of Party-state order.17 Also running for-profit enterprises owned by the 
state, or Party organizations active in managing civil society organizations is 
considered legitimate in the official Chinese discourse on the state (Huang 2012), in 
fact, ruling a society means exactly to have the ability to do so, in order to establish, 
support and protect your rule. 
This understanding of social organization not as segmented into a 
state-market, or state-society dichotomy, is shared by sociological institutional 
approaches, and indirectly historical institutionalism. Victor Nee and Paul Ingram 
(1989: 19) note, that an: “[…] institution is a web of interrelated norms – formal and 
informal – governing social relationships. It is by structuring social interactions that 
institutions produce group performance, in such primary groups as families and work 
units as well as social units as large as organizations and entire economies.” Here 
they indirectly acknowledge that institutions are social norms that structure not 
distinct and demarcated sectors of society, but are organizing societal order across 
conceptual divides of e.g. economy or state. Wolfgang Streeck (2011: 138) points 
out, how the political economy in fact is an artificially demarcated part of general 
social order, and views: “[…] society and economy together as densely intertwined 
and closely interdependent” [in which] “economic action is but a subtype of social 
action and must therefore be analyzed in basically the same way.” 
                                                        
17
 One of the clearest examples for this is the one-child policy, which had its own dedicated 
bureaucracy engaging in monitoring and interfering with the (female) population on a deeply 
personal and physical level. 
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The Chinese Party-state Order as a Gramscian State:  
 
Gramsci defined the state as “… the entire complex of practical and theoretical 
activities by which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but 
manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules …” (Gramsci 1971, p. 
244). Somewhat simplified, the State here is political society + civil society, although 
the relationship between them, and the degree of integration of political and civil 
society (meaning non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in a broader sense) varies, 
as his comparison between Russia and the West shows. The main point, however, is 
that social organization in its essence always is political, and as such organized under 
the aegis of the state as the highest order within a given society. This understanding 
of the intrinsically politically nature of social life engenders all social activities (be it 
art, associations, business etc.) as political acts, and in effect renders sociology a sub-
group of political science (ibid.). Social life at large is essentially political life, since it 
is relational, and always entangled directly or indirectly with the state (in other 
words the governmental apparatus of the ruling group). This relational, organic, and 
dialectical understanding again matches surprisingly well with the official view on 
society and state expressed by the CPC, and described here as the Party-state 
order.18  
What then constitutes the Chinese model, or the particularity of the 
Herrschaftssystem (Leese 2016) of the Party-state? 19  Building on Gramsci’s notion 
of hegemony, and developing a reading of the social theory and political philosophy 
expressed in the Chinese Party-state discourse. In the following, I formulate a more 
theoretic understanding of the political organization of Chinese society, centered on 
the Chinese Party-state.20 Zheng Yongnian’s (2010) work on the Communist Party of 
                                                        
18
 It also points back to the institutionalist view on the existence of a general social order, as 
expressed by Streek (2011) and Ikenberry (1988), and the existence of a Chinese model in the sense 
of a state project (Dirlik 2012). 
19
 Herrschaftssystem can be translated loosely as leadership system, or system of dominance.   
20
 The Gramscian concept of hegemony alluded to here is not to be conflated with more recently 
developed ones, used predominantly in International Relations. The concept Gramsci developed 
covers political organization of one society under one class, and the power relation between the 
dominant and dominated classes. Among these more recent, and not strictly Gramscian uses of 
hegemony, see e.g.: Liu (1997); Blecher (2002); Meyer-Clement (2015); Huang (2015). 
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China (CPC) as “organizational emperor” has shown, that using the Gramscian 
concept of hegemony is an apt way to grasp the logic of political organization of 
society under the Party. While Zheng focused his attention on explaining the CPC’s 
position in the state (see below), i.e. the politically dominant class and its 
bureaucracy, I think it is necessary to extend this view to society at large, and the 
political economy in particular. The implications of both the Gramscian reading of 
the CPC as hegemonic Party and the review of Chinese official thought on 
government are, that the CPC is not only claiming dominance in the state apparatus, 
but throughout society at large, in order to promote and defend its position as 
political, organizational, and ideological hegemon.  
An examination of the ontological foundations of the official CPC 
discourse on political philosophy and organization (Su 2011; Xie (ed.) 2013; also 
reiterated by: Xi 2014), reveals the absence, indeed opposition to liberal ideals of an 
arms-length separation of political leadership and society. On the contrary, the 
theory on social and political organization presented by the CPC clearly indicates the 
perceived necessity of society-wide integration, i.e. hegemony under Party 
leadership as a precondition for stable rule and national progress. This holistic 
approach to political organization includes all types of organization within a society 
as an integrated and interconnected political order. The Party-state is thus the 
gravitational center of political power, and the expansion of its hegemony is seen as 
necessary for both control and development of society as an order. The Party-state is 
thus not only the sum of CPC organs and state administration, but is a 
comprehensive Herrschafftssystem (Leese 2016), which projects its organizational 
and ideological agency on social organization more generally, by way of both formal 
legislation, but also by creating coercive mechanisms penalizing any opposition. The 
Party-state is a state-in-society rather than the administrative (state) apparatus of 
China. 
Figure 1 illustrates the state theory shining through the CPC discourse, 
and shows the similarity with the Gramscian view of state-society as dialectical set of 
forces, set within one system. The CPC builds the core of authority and political 
organization (or the ruling class in Gramsci’s terms). It has organized the state 
apparatus around its political rule, integrating administration under normative Party 
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politics and objectives. The vectors of control (hegemony) also radiate into society 
more generally, where CPC organization captures, and at the very least monitors and 
keeps veto rights over, important positions in economy, society, and other areas of 
political import. Society, or the Chinese nation, is conceptualized as one system, and 
ruling China therefore means control over all important aspects of that society, in 
order to be able to align the system with the preferences of the political project of 
the core: the Party-state.  
In simple terms, the praxis of political organization of society exercised 
by the Party-state is one of the Party-state as the power elite, or ruling class, and 
that of society ruled by it, one of commanding heights and one of society at large, 
i.e. the sum of all social action outside the Party-state. Society is to be integrated 
under Party-state authority and ideology as much as possible, and the Weberian 
separation or “disenchantment” of politics would be contradictory (and disastrous) 
to the hegemonic project the way Gramsci or the CPC understands it.  
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Figure 1: The Party-state order (author’s own illustration). 
 
The CPC must, according to this view and the Party’s claim to leadership, be firmly in 
place at the “commanding heights” of not only the political system and the 
economy, but control all major veto points with political relevance.  The hegemonic 
project (in terms of a “state-building” project), of the CPC revolves around this 
conception of political organization of society around a single political class (the 
Party), and the CPC’s position on the “commanding heights of society” is both raison 
d’etre and precondition of effective rule of society according to official PRC political 
organization and philosophy (see e.g.: Xi 2014). 
 A Gramscian view on the state, and the Marxist (and certainly the CPC’s) view 
on society at large as being a social order with constant internal contestation, where 
power relations and resource distribution change both as result of top-down 
organization (coercion), but also based on bottom-up resistance (revolution), and 
adaption of existing organization to changing needs (reform) by the State. While 
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Marx himself had a rather simple approach to the State as the set of coercive 
institutions by which the bourgeoisie controlled the proletariat (Hay 2008), the CPC 
conceptualizes the State as a constantly negotiated set of relations and forces, 
including human subjectivity, dominating society.  
Moreover, according to Gramsci it is not possible to dominate social 
order only by coercion, but if the State (or rather the dominating class) wants to 
keep and bolster its legitimate domination, it has to win “hearts and minds”, by 
establishing hegemony. For the State to maintain and solidify its rule over society, it 
needs to establish “hegemony protected by the armor of coercion” (Gramsci 1978: 
263), in other words legitimizing its domination by establishing consent to the 
reproduction of its preferred set of power relations and resource distribution, while 
controlling the means of violence to enforce this order if necessary. Important 
economic agents such as SOEs, or what would be considered civil society in other 
contexts, are as much “the state” as the formal state administration is, since they 
form the elite of society at large, and thus are reproducing the hegemonic project as 
defined by the political elite (Gramsci 1978). 
How does this unfold more concretely in the Chinese case? In his 
ingenious study of the CPC as “organizational emperor”, Zheng Yongnian (2010) 
shows how the CPC must be seen as a cultural artifact that has developed within a 
historical and distinctively Chinese setup of political and organizational institutions 
and norms.21 This setup, Zheng contends, has for millennia regarded political power 
and administration as inseparable; the emperor and his administration (the state) 
were always two sides of the same coin. A Weberian reading of the CPC as a political 
party filling the state apparatus with its agency does not hold in the Chinese case. 
Here, the state apparatus, that is institutions and bureaucratic organization, have 
been modeled around the CPC as its power core, and its legitimization (ibid.).  
Being the ruler, or ruling class, and establishing hegemony also requires the 
creation of a narrative that can include and persuade the not only members of the 
leading class (i.e. Party-state agents) but also general populace. Already Gramsci 
                                                        
21
 Already before Zheng Yongnian, Franz Schurmann named the CPC the “post-revolutionary 
successor to the gentry” (1968: 9), pointing out the similarity in the way organization and ideology 
revolve around the Party as the center of political organization. 
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stressed the need for the establishment of continuity, that is, actively engaging in 
shaping the “tradition” evolving around the “organising centre of a grouping” 
(Gramsci 1978: 195). He pointed out that the “organic development” of continuity 
under a grouping’s rule is a core problem, not least regarding the legitimacy of the 
group’s claim to rule. Moreover, this “juridical problem”, i.e. the problem of 
assimilating the entire grouping to its most advanced fraction is a problem of 
education of the masses, of their adaptation in accordance with requirements of the 
goal to be achieved.  
In fact, the CPC leadership has never made a secret of its attempt to control 
all positions of political influence in Chinese society, but has always had this as part 
of the official Party program. The claim is also included in the preamble of the 
constitution (NPC 2004), reading:  
 
Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China 
and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong 
Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important 
thought of Three Represents, the Chinese people of all 
nationalities will continue to adhere to the people’s 
democratic dictatorship [the CPC] and the socialist road 
[…]. 
 
The State, as the national administrative apparatus operates here under the 
guidance of the CPC, and serves the Party’s political rule. This conception of the 
State apparatus is underlined by a comment in the People’s Daily (1989).22 Here, the 
state is defined as the set of coercive institutions serving ruling class (the CPC) in its 
rule over other classes:  
 
Everybody knows that the State is organization of power 
safeguarding the rule of one class’ over another. Every 
                                                        
22
 People’s Daily is the official CPC mouthpiece, directly under the control of the Party’s Central 
Committee. It should be noted that the timing, exactly one month after the Tiananmen incident, is 
important for the militaristic tone in this definition. Its essence of a ruling class in charge of overall 
leadership of formal institutions has, as shown in illustration 1, not changed. 
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sovereign state needs a complete state apparatus, 
including military, police, courts, prisons and other 
coercive institutions, in order to protect the class’ rule 
and the security and interest of the state.23 
 
While the language shows a CPC still true to Marxist epistemology and ontology, the 
ideological underpinnings are a blend of Marxist, Leninist, and Chinese political 
thought (von Senger 1994). Discussing the CPC’s ideology and political theory, Franz 
Schurmann (1968: 45) notes: “[…] the Communist party plays the role of unified 
leadership and coordination in society […]. The Party is an organization that fulfills 
executive roles in society.”  
China’s contemporary Party-state therefore comes quite close to Gramsci’s 
conceptualization of the State in terms of being a coherent and coordinated political 
class, which by means of coercion and consent systematically tries to steer power 
relations and distribution of resources. Illustration 1 provides a graphic 
approximation of the way the CPC dominates political organization from the core to 
the periphery, integrating state institutions, administrative bureaucracy, and social 
and economic organizations. Also the economy, and even more so the public 
economy, is entangled and embedded in the Party-state order.  
It should be noted that, while it makes sense to call the Chinese state a 
Party-state, an important division of labor between CPC and state administration 
remains at both the conceptual and organizational levels. The state is a Party-state, 
in that it is constructed and integrated around Party rule, but the Party remains 
above the state. That is, while the state consists of the administrative apparatus, its 
administrative capacity is serving the general hegemonic project defined by the 
CPC.24 Within the CPC’s political philosophy and practical ideology, “reform” 
                                                        
23
 Original text: “大家知道, 国家是维护一个阶级对另一个阶级统治的强力组织”, see: People’s 
Daily (1989). 
24
 In this conceptual relationship between Party, state, and society, it is hard to underestimate the 
role of ideology, not only as ideal type set of goals or utopia, but more importantly as operational 
guideline, in form of a practical ideology. Franz Schurmann (1968: 108) has pointed out that: “If the 
Communist party plays the role of unified leadership and coordination in society, then it is only the 
ideology, ultimately, which provides the cement for such unity. The Party is an organization that 
fulfills executive roles in society. […] The more unified such decision-making is supposed to be, the 
greater number of discrete units it involves, the more important are values and norms. The 
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therefore means the constant adaptive change of the Party-state, in order to upkeep 
and improve the capacity to govern society at large. This control is important not 
only for the sake of power alone, but is seen as prerequisite for the ability of the 
Party-state to direct social progress towards desired ends. These ends are both 
captured by the vague and lofty goals stated in e.g. the CPC constitution, but also 
concrete developmental goals stated in five-year plans and economic policy. 
 
The Commanding Heights of the Economy and National Champions: 
 
For the public economy (and SOEs), the concept of a Party-state order means that 
certainly all those organizations overseen and owned by the Party-state must also be 
seen as extension of the state.  SOEs constitute the “commanding heights of the 
economy” (经济制高点), doubling as a potential vehicle for supporting Party-state 
hegemony. Strategic state-owned enterprises (SOE) are identified as “important 
backbone companies” (重要骨干企业), today consisting of 15 financial enterprises 
and 53 central SOEs (Xinhua 2015), and are called the ”lifeline of the economy” (经
济命脉). These SOEs, controlled by the central Party-state and their leadership 
appointed by the CPC Organization Department (Brødsgaard 2012a), are part of the 
”National Team” (国家队) (Sutherland 2001), dominating (or monopolizing) strategic 
sectors and industries, while combining economic and political objectives as shown 
in paper three. Main objective of the public economy (that is the state-owned 
sector), is to maintain its position as the “main part” (主体) of the economy, in order 
to earn profit the state can tax, but also to work as transmission belts for the ruling 
party’s socio-economic plans (CPC 2013).  
The continued strategic Party control via state-ownership has been an 
unbroken constant, and is clearly outlined key Party documents, such as Jiang 
Zemin’s report to the 14th CPC Congress in 1992, (Jiang 1992), the Decision on 
establishing a “Socialist Market Economy System” adopted a year later (CPC 1993), 
the earmarking of seven sectors for strong state control (State Council 2006), and 
                                                                                                                                                              
maintenance of ideology is therefore crucial to executive function and the continued role of a 
Communist Party.” 
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most recently, the Decisions adopted at the third Plenum of the 18th CPC Congress in 
2013 (CPC 2013).  
While efficiency, streamlining, and a growing role of the market are 
among the priorities of the general reform agenda, it is equally clear that the ability 
to maintain control over political goals are of overarching importance also in 
economic policy. Accordingly, while “separation of company and administration”, 
and modern corporate governance systems are important goals, the role of Party 
groups in SOEs as political guides, as well as the monopoly positions of strategic 
“extra-large enterprises”, and the ability to exercise “macro-economic adjustment” 
through SOEs, are mentioned in tandem in many key policy documents (e.g.: State 
Council 1998:14; CPC 1999). 
Economic reform and political economic organization as part of ruling a 
society at large is of central concern to the CPC, rather than an arms-length 
regulation of the “economic realm” by a state administration. Rather than pushing 
only efficiency and depoliticized SOE management, “SOE reform and development is 
a complex, social system project”, and “Upholding the Party’s leadership role [in 
SOEs] is a major principle” (CPC 1999). Overall, a clear hierarchy of objectives looms 
behind the policy, from CPC hegemony, to concrete national or economic interest, to 
company performance, a logic clearly emerging from the CNPC case discussed in 
paper 3.  
There are, however, qualitative differences between SOEs of different 
sectors and industries. The ‘National Champions’, or ‘economic lifeline’ (经济命脉) 
in strategic industries (including CNPC), operating in what Margaret Pearson (2011) 
calls the “top tier”, are here considered to be the ‘commanding heights’, 
economically protected and politically integrated by Party-state systems.  Large 
central level SOEs such as CNPC represent a sophisticated integration of commercial 
entities and interests, and a parallel potential as politico-economic organizations of 
support to the Party-state’s broader  socio-economic and political interests (i.e. 
hegemonic project).In absolute numbers, there are far more SOEs in the middle and 
bottom tier, but the top tier remains closely integrated with the Party-state (e.g. 
direct oversight by the State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration 
Commission, leaders appointed by the central Organization Department, quasi-
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monopolies in their respective industries).25 The degree of strategic importance the 
Party-state ascribes to a company/industry, or proximity to the center as in figure 1, 
translates into degrees of state-ownership and control (see figure 2). Sectors in 
which state-ownership is dominant, such as Oil, are characterized by very high 
degree of state-ownership (close to 100%), while less important sectors are allowed 
to be privately owned, and less connected with Party-state authority systems. 
 
 
 
figure 2: Relation between ownership and Party authority. 
  
Studies disregarding the complex and variegated structure of China’s endogenous 
political and economic institutions, at times remains locked in a binary conception of 
development as either top-down and bottom-up, contrasting the big bang approach 
of the former Soviet Union with China’s gradual market liberalization (e.g. Huang 
2008; Nee and Opper 2012).  This linear view on political (and societal) organization 
                                                        
25
 Industries considered of the least direct political relevance are e.g. in 
manufacturing and retail, and private companies have largely taken over this bottom 
tier. 
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and development falls short of convincingly explaining China’s political order, 
because it oversimplifies state and market into independent entities. Within the 
paradigm of the Party-state as an order, or Herrschaftssystem, the political-economic 
field is governed and organized as part of societal order at large, under the general, 
society-wide hegemonic project of the CPC. Epistemologically, the social theory 
behind political organization and governance of the economy as one facet of social 
action, regards a holistic control over all social action as necessary foundation of 
sovereignty. Therefore, even at a conceptual level, the separation of political control 
and economic forces (and vice versa) are impossible in the CPC’s formal political 
philosophy. The “encroachment,” or advance of the state onto the economy is 
therefore in the natural interest of the ruling class/party (Eaton 2015), since it is 
vitally necessary in order to carry out general and society-wide governing, that is, the 
hegemonic project. 
The notion of the Party-state order, and its integration of economic activity under 
political organization, stands in contrast to some well-known accounts on the 
Chinese economy, where so-called state-intervention is in the way of efficient 
allocation of resources, and where the market, as an idealized regulative stand in a 
zero-sum game over regulatory power in the economy (Osburg 2013).  
Analyses conflating the complex order of institutions and organizations 
of China’s political economy into one linear development logic (i.e. liberalizing vs. 
statist, or 国进民退 vs. 民进国退), have difficulty to fully grasp this complexity. As Li 
Chen (2015: 15) notes: “neoclassical economics and many proponents of statist 
industrial policy assume there is a clear-cut organizational and functional boundaries 
between the state, firm and market, or between ‘hierarchy’ and ‘market’.” Huang 
Yasheng (2008), for example, presents a view on post-reform China where the 
unleashed force of small entrepreneurs, finally unshackled of state control, are the 
driver behind economic growth and social development. In a similar vein, Walter and 
Fraser (2011) assess that China’s success hinges upon more market and less state, 
and potential systemic risks – even financial crisis – are best avoided by less state 
intervention and economic regulation. Edward Steinfeld (2010) goes even further, 
claiming that China already is “Playing our game”, and that deregulation is 
unavoidably the main driver of growth.  
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Here two highly abstract and undefined versions of the concepts of 
state and market are presented as standing in contest over influence over the 
economy, where market logic equals rational decision-making, and state 
intervention leads to inefficiency and waste, at best (World Bank 1995; Sheng and 
Zhao 2012). While these assessments may or may not be correct, what is strikingly 
evident is the epistemological rift between approaches mentioned above on the one 
hand, and the official Chinese thought on political organization on the other. State 
intervention and market logic, in this latter view, have two fundamentally different 
objectives, and are in fact conceptually different to a degree where the juxtaposition 
of the two is meaningless. The state, as the umbrella of political power and 
organization, as well as the market, as a particular logic for capital (resource) 
distribution, are two different units of analysis, and while the former can use the 
other, the market can never trump the state.  
 The conceptual separation of economy, state, and Party has at times led to 
some misunderstanding, or biased evaluation of the economic reforms after 1978. 
Confusion about these intended ends of Chinese economic policy after 1978 had 
already been observed by Start Schram in 1984, who pointed out that understanding 
the post-78 reforms without seeing them within the larger ideological and 
theoretical framework of the CPC is futile (Schram 1984). Economic reform was not a 
paradigmatic shift in the sense that the CPC started to break down its hegemony or 
even detach itself and retract from the economy, it was, however, a new approach 
to reach economic goals, i.e. an inclusion of new means to the same ends. Party 
hegemony itself was never questioned.26  
Schram also pointed out how “reform” (as in opening up and reform, or 
改革开放) never was meant as change of the political system, but as “learning from 
practice”, and the dialectic adaption of the Party to new economic (material) 
realities. Party hegemony, in other words, was never up for discussion (Schram 1984: 
428; von Senger 1994). It was in fact fiercely debated how far economic opening 
should be permitted, underlining the fact that post-1978 reforms never were 
                                                        
26
 Of course there was debate and conflicting opinions about this in society and within the Party, it 
seems clear though that leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun never questioned the central 
role of the CPC in politics, and party-building as constant and necessary undertaking. See also: Ezra 
Vogel (2011).  
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intended as a turn towards liberal capitalism and limits to Party control over state 
and society. Thus, while economic modernization and development was the main 
agenda after 1978 (and arguably has been until Xi), ideology and Party hegemony 
was never questioned as the foundation of political organization. Quite on the 
contrary, the institutional logic with the Party-state at the core shown in illustration 
1 has repeatedly been underlined as basic political organizational principle. The 
Party as organizational emperor, and a unitary concept of the state in society, has 
been a constant. In the words of Schram (1984: 461):  
 
“It can be argued that, neither in the realm of organization nor in that 
of ideology and culture would Mao and his successors have striven so 
hard to promote uniformity if the unitary nature of the state had not 
been accepted, for the past two thousand years, as both natural and 
right.”  
 
 
Concluding Remarks: 
 
This introduction has presented the dissertation’s underlying understanding of 
China’s political system as a Party-state order, in which the CPC constitutes the 
institutional power core and in which administration and the general political 
organization of society is aligned to CPC hegemony. Apart from bringing a new 
perspective to the study of China’s political system, it also forms the wider circle 
around the project as one investigating said system as having three main features, 
which individually are knows to the literature, but which seem to contradict each 
other when looked at isolated. First, China’s state bureaucracy has been described as 
fragmented and ridden with systemic roadblocks hampering efficient policy-making 
and implementation. At the same time, research more recently has started to look 
more carefully at a second feature; the adaptive and resilient capacities of the Party-
state. A third and more recent branch of literature has been looking at these 
capacities more specifically in the economy, and especially in the case of state-
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owned enterprise. Here, I show how the complex embeddedness of SOEs in society 
and the political system unfolds in local China, where economic, social, and political 
goals are negotiated in ways that are invisible to analyses looking only at SOE 
headquarters and national level policy-making. 
 While all parts of the dissertation speak for themselves, I hope that this 
introduction serves as a starting point for a new approach to study some of the 
institutional dynamics and the organizational and ideological features of the Chinese 
Party-state. As an ontological foundation, it also connects the three papers around 
the shared interest in political order of China as society, and CPC hegemony as 
crucial factor for its understanding. 
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Revisiting Fragmented Authoritarianism in China’s 
Central Energy Administration27 
       
 
Introduction: 
The concept of Fragmented Authoritarianism (FA), outlined during the broad 
restructuring of China’s industrial and bureaucratic systems during the 1980s, sought 
to explain the interrelation of bureaucratic decision-making processes and China’s 
institutional structure, i.e. the bureaucratic Party-state structure. FA became an 
important contribution to the study of China’s political economy, showing how the 
rationality of policymaking and restructuring in post-1978 China was highly 
influenced by formal institutional structures. Introduced in the ground-breaking 
volume Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes by Kenneth 
Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg (1988), the model laid an important foundation for 
our understanding of China’s disjointed bureaucracy, the policy- and decision-
making processes taking place within and across them, and the central vertical and 
horizontal mechanisms at work in the Chinese system.  
A few years later in 1992, the seminal volume Bureaucracy, Politics, 
and Decision Making in Post-Mao China was published. This volume built upon the 
growing body of works on the centralization-decentralization forces triggered by 
post-1978 reforms (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Lampton 1987a), and reflected 
on the FA model by testing its application to various levels and bureaucratic clusters 
of the Chinese system, trying to gauge its value as a more general model for 
bureaucratic policymaking processes. Focusing on the effects of increased 
decentralization during the 1980s, a major concern was the (re-)distribution of 
resources and authority and the decision-making processes that underpinned this. 
Seeing how ideology had taken a step back in favour of politico-economic goals and 
                                                        
27 This article has been published in: Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard (ed.) (2017) Chinese Politics as 
Fragmented Authoritarianism: Earthquakes, Energy and Environment, London and New York: 
Routledge, and is included in this thesis courtesy of Routledge.  
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priorities, the FA model aimed to assess the underlying logic of a changing, 
experimenting and opening China. The FA model viewed bureaucratic authority as 
“fragmented and disjointed”, and this fragmentation could lead to situations “in 
which it is often necessary to achieve an agreement among an array of bodies, 
where no single body has authority over the others”, thus requiring “bureaucratic 
entrepreneurship” and bargaining (Lieberthal 1992:8-9). Arguing that rational-actor 
and power models were not sufficient to explain the decision-making processes in 
contemporary China, the FA model pointed towards structural features of the 
bureaucracy and the particular processes they lead to in decision-making and 
implementation. In short, the decentralizing reforms after 1978 reshaped the 
bargaining and opportunity constellation through institutional restructuring, 
changing and diversifying authority over budgets and resources vertically and 
horizontally, and across bureaucratic systems and constituencies.  
Contemporary China’s bureaucratic missions and policy agendas are, 
with few exceptions, very different from those of the 1980s. Nevertheless, as will be 
argued, the FA model has not altogether lost its value as an analytical framework to 
describe the important structural features and operational mechanisms of China’s 
political system. While political, economic and social realities are vastly different 
from those when the FA model was introduced, a time when China's reform and 
opening-up period was hardly a decade into its unfolding, the two basic components 
of the FA model – ‘fragmentation’ and ‘authority’ –remain two of the defining 
features of the political setup. More recently, Andrew Mertha (2009) further 
developed the conceptual inventory of the FA framework. Pointing out that in 
today’s far more plural and responsive (official) China, bargaining still plays an 
important role for decision-making. Mertha shows how this takes place between 
bureaucracies and state agencies, but new actors have also joined the bargaining 
table. Increasingly, techniques of ‘issue framing’ and individual or groups of ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’ are pushing agendas and specific outcomes.28 This development 
towards a more plural and somewhat more inclusive governance of the increasingly 
politically aware and engaged society was also noted by He and Thøgersen (2010), 
                                                        
28 A feature that was briefly touched upon, but not fully examined, in Lampton - presented here as: 
”Whipping up Support and Faits Accomplis” by local leaders (1992:55). 
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who argued that an increasing variety of policy entrepreneurs (NGOs, the media, etc.) 
are able to actively influence policymaking. Others have since referred to the 
concept of FA, pointing out the successful combination of decentralization and 
authoritarianism through elite integration by the CPC as the integrative agent, 
working against the centrifugal forces of fragmentation (Landry 2008; Brødsgaard 
2012), and even the conscious utilization of fragmentation as opportunity, or 
“experimentation under hierarchy”, for regionally adjusted yet coordinated 
policymaking (Heilmann 2008: 2).  
While only making use of the FA model indirectly, these approaches 
agree on its key features, namely the central roles of authority (in the form of CPC 
leadership) and structural fragmentation, rendering policy- and decision-making a 
complex process played out among multiple actors of different kinds. While the 
position of the Party as the overarching authority in the “Chinese model” is hardly 
disputed by anyone, much more has been said about the fragmenting forces. 
Institutionally, the built-in fault lines of the Chinese system run both horizontally 
across organs at the same level/rank (kuai) leading to bargaining over resources (e.g. 
the finance department and the NDRC office of a provincial government, or 
competing provincial governments), and vertically (tiao) within bureaucratic systems 
or levels of local governments. Looking at these structural fault lines, the FA model, 
or rather the institutional rationality it describes, lingers on today even though China 
has reformed its Party-state structures several times. Given these continued 
similarities in spite of structural and institutional changes, a review of the analytical 
value of the FA model today seems adequate. This is even more the case, since the 
early work mostly focused on the centrifugal force of decentralization and the 
disruptive effects of bargaining among bureaucracies, while more recent research is 
trying to understand the integrative, centripetal mechanisms keeping China from 
falling apart (i.e. Zheng 2009; Brødsgaard 2012). Moreover, Leading Small Groups 
are moving into the focus, as they represent and illustrate the system’s reliance on 
vertical (CPC) authority as kick-starters for decision-making, and the structural “fix” 
against horizontal fragmentation and implementation biases.  
This chapter will progress as follows: important bureaucratic 
institutions in charge of energy policymaking will be presented against the backdrop 
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of China’s energy administration and the reforms it has undergone up until the time 
of writing.29. The case of the 2010 National Energy Commission will be presented to 
illustrate how fragmentation and uncertain outcomes of bureaucratic bargaining 
seem to persist. Lastly, a range of more methodological and theoretical issues 
surrounding the FA model will be discussed, in order to assess the validity and value 
of the FA model for academic research today. 
 
Fragmented Authoritarianism in China’s Energy Sector: 
 
China’s vast energy sector - the main field of research of Lieberthal and Oksenberg’s 
1988 volume - continues to draw attention from scholars trying to dissect the 
institutions, policies and development pathways of the various organs populating 
the sector (e.g. Andrews-Speed 2010; 2012; Arruda 2003; Downs 2008; 2008a; Lim 
2012; Xu 2010). With few exceptions, a select group of powerful institutions stand at 
the centre of most studies, and of national policymaking and strategic coordination 
as well. First and foremost, the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) exercises far-reaching control over long-term planning, pricing, large 
investments and tendering, and other central issues for policymaking in energy. 
Under the roof of the NDRC, the National Energy Administration (NEA) is the main 
organ in charge of energy issues, dealing with the more concrete policymaking, 
regulation, planning and research. Another important organ is the National Leading 
Small Group for Addressing Climate Change and Energy Conservation and Emission 
Reduction Work (Guojia yingdui qihou bianhua ji jieneng jian pai gongzuo lingdao 
xiaozu, hereafter: NLSG), which through its high-ranking members and bureaucratic 
affiliation with both the State Council and the NDRC is an influential discussion 
platform for strategic decisions across bureaucracies. Additionally, the central state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) in the energy sector (two grid operators, three oil 
companies, and five generation companies) are an important group. SOEs have to 
comply with policies and regulations in the energy industries, such as new industry 
standards and energy development plans. At the same time these corporations are 
                                                        
29 The time of writing was 2014, with a few additions made in early 2015. 
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urged to become efficient for-profit companies, and this tension between industrial 
policy on the one hand and profitability on the other creates its own stresses, even 
at the downstream ends of energy policy.  
Adding another player to these well-established institutions, the 
National Energy Commission (NEC) was set up in 2010. It is a bureaucratic addition 
that will be used in this chapter to illustrate how China’s energy administration still 
suffers from some of the same challenges described by the FA model. Revisiting the 
energy administration, and analysing it through the lens of the FA model, suggests 
that the NEC succumbed to the “bargaining treadmill” (Lampton 1987), leaving it as a 
“super ministry” on paper, yet offering an empty shell in reality. Moreover, 
institutionalizing the state of exception, leading small groups emerge as the real 
‘fixers’ when formal, specialized Party-state institutions fail to effect authoritative 
decisions.  
 
 
The Bumpy Road to NEA and NEC 
 
On January 27th 2010, the State Council (SC) announced the establishment of the 
National Energy Commission (NEC). Initially planned in 2008 (State Council 2008), it 
was chaired by then Premier Wen Jiabao and Vice-Premier Li Keqiang (as Vice 
Chairman), reporting directly to the SC. The daily management was situated within 
the National Energy Administration /NEA), then headed by Liu Tienan (State Council 
2010). The NEC was praised as an effort to enhance the central administration’s 
authority over the strategic energy sector, bolster the coordination of policymaking, 
and increase planning and coordination efficiency (China Daily 2010). The fact that 
the NEC was headed by the Premier, and had 21 members from various – mainly 
ministerial rank – organs in state, China’s Communist Party (CPC), and the People´s 
Liberation Army (PLA), justified the assumption that the NEC was an ambitious effort 
to reform the energy sector. Some observers praised the new “Super Ministry” (ibid.) 
as a quasi-Ministry of Energy that could supervise and coordinate important policy 
across the fragmented and ill-coordinated energy sector (Hong 2010; Cai 2010). 
Given the persistence of fragmented authority and bargaining among the 
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bureaucracies as described by the FA literature (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; 
Lieberthal and Lampton 1992; Mertha 2009), especially in the important energy 
sector, this overdue consolidation of administrative authority at the central level 
seemed logical.  
Others were not so optimistic. They questioned the actual novelty of 
the NEC (Downs 2008), and with its office placed under the NEA, itself under the 
NDRC, energy insiders such as Zhang Guobao (former director of the NEA and 
director of the Energy Experts Advisory Commission) and Li Junfeng (vice-director of 
the Energy Research Institute, a key think tank under the NDRC) remained sceptical 
of the NEC having any real authority vis-à-vis other powerful and well-established 
organs (Energynet 2010; Xinhua 2010). Even though a top-level discussion platform 
had been formally created with the NEC, they both pointed out that placing the 
NEC’s daily-work responsibility under the NEA would in fact boost the NEA’s clout, 
rather than creating an authoritative NEC.  
The sceptics were correct in their doubts about the NEC. It has 
produced no visible output, in stark contrast to ‘rival’ organs sharing authority over 
energy issues, such as the NDRC (and the NEA), the NLSG, and even the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF). No official press releases by or about the NEC have been issued since 
2010, apart from a personnel update after the leadership change at the People’s 
Congress in March 2013 (NEA 2013). Two main points regarding the weakness of the 
NEC vis-à-vis other institutions are particularly important. One is that the NEC is a 
different type of organization to other established organs, an important fact that will 
be discussed later in the chapter. More immediate, though, is the observation that 
the ‘failure’ of the NEC appears to be the consequence of the very problem it was 
meant to resolve: the fragmentation of authority over energy issues dispersed 
among established bureaucratic organizations that continue to resist sharing or 
ceding their authority over energy.  
The establishment and failure of China’s NEC seems less surprising 
when seen in the perspective of a series of unsuccessful attempts to create a central 
organ in charge of the comprehensive and integrated administration and supervision 
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of the energy sector. 30 Shortly after the founding of the People’s Republic of China 
in 1949, the Ministry of Fuel Industry was established and given broad authority over 
the energy industries. The ministry was dismantled in 1955, and split up into three 
ministries, one for coal, oil, and electrical power, respectively (Arruda 2003). The 
years between1955 and the start of the reform era saw several rather erratic 
restructurings of the energy sector, a shrinking of the entire government during the 
Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, and finally the return to centrally 
orchestrated and more coordinated capacity building after 1978 (Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg 1988; Yang et al. 1994).  
In order to build an efficient central administration, in 1980 the 
National Energy Commission (same name, different organization) was established as 
a strategic coordinator for the sector, a function it never was able to exercise until it 
was abolished again only two years later (Bo 2010). The next round of restructuring 
in 1988 saw the Ministries of Coal, Nuclear Industry, and Water Resource 
Conservancy merged into the Ministry of Energy (MoE), a setup that lasted until 
1993. Overshadowed by the powerful State Planning Commission (renamed State 
Development and Planning Commission (SDPC) in the same year) as guiding 
authority, the MoE never assumed real administrative authority and the energy 
administration was once again separated into various organs (Yang et al. 1994; 
Arruda 2003). Also in 1993, the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) was 
established, absorbing the Ministries of Coal and Electric Power in 1997, which in 
2003 merged with the SDPC to form the NDRC.31   
Certainly one of the most far-reaching changes, the merger of the SDPC 
and the SETC, created a substantial concentration of administrative authority in the 
NDRC, which still exercises authority over a wide array of issues, including the energy 
sector. Housed within the NDRC, the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) 
was established in 2003 as independent electricity regulator (Hu 2009). Furthermore, 
in 2005 the Energy Bureau was formed, also under the roof of the NDRC, to officially 
                                                        
30 The process of restructurings here only sketched out briefly, for a more comprehensive overview see 
Fuqiang Yang et al. (1994);  Arruda (2003); Yu (2010); Zhao et al. (2011); Wu (2003);Andrews-Speed 
et al. (2000). 
31 The SPC/SDPC proved to be one of the most persistent organs in the history of the PRC, being 
established already in 1952, and serving as long-term planning authority until its merger with the SETC 
to form the NDRC. 
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manage concrete energy-related planning, even though some areas, such as hydro 
power, still were governed by other ministries and commissions (Yu 2010).  The most 
recent reshuffle came in 2008, establishing the administrative bureaucratic setup 
still in place, with only a few minor changes, in 2015. The Energy Bureau was 
upgraded to vice-ministry level, renamed National Energy Administration (NEA), and 
equipped with nine departments, each taking over responsibilities from various 
areas within the energy sector, such as coal, renewable energy and international 
cooperation. During this process, the National Energy Leading Group (established 
under the SC in 2005 to support the Energy Bureau), unable to assert real influence 
in energy issues, was disbanded and all its responsibilities transferred to the NEA 
(Downs 2008a). Bolstering the NEA as a bureaucratic institution, the SERC was 
placed under the NEA after the most recent restructurings following the National 
People’s Congress meeting in March 2013. Wu Xinxiong, former head of the SERC, 
took over as head of the NEA (Xinhua 2013). 
Also the energy industries were subjected to substantial restructurings 
throughout the 1980s and 90s. After the disbandment of the Ministry of Energy in 
1993, and Ministry of Coal and Ministry of Electric Power both in 1997, the State 
Power Corporation was formed in 1997 as a ministry-level organ in charge of 
overseeing electricity generation and grid operation. This professionalization of 
energy industries away from industrial ministries and towards corporatization had 
already started in the oil sector in 1982, with the creation of China National Offshore 
Oil Corporation (CNOOC), and the China Petro-Chemical Corporation in 1983 
(restructured in 1998 to form the today’s China Petrochemical Corporation, or 
Sinopec Group which is parent of the Sinopec Corporation established in 2000). The 
third ‘oil champion’, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was established 
in 1988, with its main subsidiary PetroChina established in late 1999. By 
restructuring ministries into large SOEs, Beijing extended the general SOE reform 
programme of 1997/98, known as ‘grasp the large and release the small’ (zhua da 
fang xiao), into the energy sector. This effort was further deepened with the 
landmark reforms of 2002, when transmission and generation were separated, with 
five ‘energy giants’ (Huaneng, Guodian, Huadian, Datang and China Power 
Investment Corp.) and two grid companies (State Grid and Southern Grid) carved out 
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of the State Power Corporation (Arruda 2003; Yu 2010). In 2003, the State-Owned 
Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) was established to 
represent the government as the formal owner/investor of the 196 SOEs (reduced to 
112 at the time of writing), including the energy SOEs, pushing corporatization and 
keeping an eye on efficiency and profitability (Naughton 2004; 2006). 
If nothing else, this continuous restructuring illustrates the continuous 
protracted and ncremental nature of reforms in the energy sector and the way the 
Chinese government struggles to consolidate a central energy administration, 
including the NEC. Clearly, some institutions are more powerful than others and 
these stand out by marshalling the most important aspects of decision-making 
processes in energy policy, as shown in the following section.  
 
The NDRC 
The NDRC is probably the most powerful of all the ministry-level organizations, even 
bearing the moniker ‘small State Council’ because of its broad mandate. With long-
term planning (including drafting of five-year plans), electricity pricing authority, and 
the influential NEA under its roof, the NDRC stands out as the real ‘super ministry’ 
and has little incentive to give away its powers (Yeo 2010). Importantly, the office of 
the NEC lies within the NEA and, as such, under the authority of the NDRC. This 
means that the NEC is positioned under the NDRC and NEA. Moreover, given that 
the NEA, the NEC, and the NLSG all are located under the roof of the NDRC, the NEC 
might simply be seen as an obsolete organ, since it does not offer institutional 
capacities the existing organizations cannot provide, be it daily administration or 
connectedness with top-level decision-makers.  
 
Besides housing central energy-related organs, the NDRC has been able to assert its 
inherited influence in the energy sector, especially since energy was earmarked by 
Beijing as a strategic sector (NPC 2011), and with its mission to oversee large 
investments and national tendering. The NDRC’s 32 departments and bureaus cover 
virtually every policy area, from overseas investments, pricing policies, to resource 
conservation and retired officials. Most departments have vice-ministry rank, while 
five (vice-) Chairmen hold ministerial ranks, up from three prior to 2012, each 
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overseeing powerful bureaucratic systems (NDRC 2012. The NDRC has played a 
major role in planning, approval and assessment of energy projects, such as 
renewable energy tender bidding (e.g. the seven national wind power bases; see Li 
et al. 2010), electricity pricing, and the broader energy planning and investment 
strategy formulation. As such, the NDRC remains a central actor in policymaking on 
both macro- and meso-plan, overriding most other institutions with its influence 
(NDRC 2015). Its broad mandate seems to be both a blessing and a curse, since its 
high concentration of power means that its policy output has significant political 
weight throughout the system (mirror institutions of the NDRC exist at most local 
levels, except villages) and across bureaucratic clusters. At the same time, the 
NDRC’s strong and concentrated mandate weakens other department’s policy 
coordination in those energy related issues stretching beyond the NDRC’s own 
bureaucratic mission. 
  
The NLSG 
 
Another important organization of high relevance for strategic energy planning is the 
National Leading Small Group on Climate Change (NLSG, see above). This organ has 
received very limited attention, in spite of its high-level involvement in policy 
discussions, strategic planning and especially international cooperation on climate 
and emission policy. As with all Leading Small Groups (lingdao xiaozu), internal 
discussions and influence over policymaking processes are even more opaque than 
in regular state institutions. Solid research, official press releases, and even 
anecdotal evidence are only thinly spread. .32 Under the Xi Jinping administration 
some first official news about Leading Small Groups (LSG) started to appear, 
including the disbandment of 130,000 leadership groups in a step against the 
counterproductive “mountain of documents and ocean of meetings” (wenshan 
huihai) they create (Xinhua 2014). The large number of leadership groups suggests 
how extensively this type of institution is used as an important forum for negotiation 
and decision-making, gathering various horizontally related organizations under a 
                                                        
32 The only scholars presenting more systematic research on small leading groups’ structure and 
functions are Zhou (2010; 2015) and Lai (2014). 
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higher ranked authority (e.g. the CPC secretary of a local government), thereby 
enabling it to override potential stalemates between equally ranked parties in 
conflict over authorities or resources. There has been a string of new leading small 
groups at the central level under Xi Jinping, targeting important political agendas of 
his administration, such as reform implementation, security issues and SOE reforms. 
Apart from showcasing Xi’s resolve and his stern intention to push his reform agenda, 
the necessity to establish leading small groups in order to actually push reforms 
certainly underlines the fact that bureaucratic bargaining and negotiations over 
resources, and authority between interest groups, remains a real problem. 
More generally, leading small groups mostly meet on an ad hoc basis, 
formed by (internal) decree outside the normal Party-state bianzhi (NFZM 2012). 
They include the leading cadres of the organs related to the group’s policy area in a 
quasi-formal organization that cuts horizontally across ministries and departments at 
the same level (State Council 1997; 2007b).33 The first national LSG were established 
in 1957/5834 and, since being placed directly under the leadership of the SC and/or 
the CPC Politburo, has held significant influence over policy coordination as well as 
more strategic planning (Zhou 2010; 2015; Lai 2014; Miller 2008). Currently the the 
SC oversees around 21 LSG, while the Politburo overseas 24 groups, such as the 
Finance and Economy LSG and the new leading small group for comprehensively 
deepening reform, headed by Xi Jinping. Xi himself is the leader of nine groups, an 
unprecedented centralization in post-reform China.35  
There are three different kinds of small groups: permanently 
established, term-based, and short-term leading small groups. These exist at all 
levels  in the state and Party system (Zhou 2010). Permanent  groups aremostly 
located under central CPC organs (such as the Finance and Economy LSG), While 
term-based and short-term groups are established to address specific tasks or 
problems and are far more common throughout the system,  Leading Small Groups 
                                                        
33 Formal authority of LSGs to serve as cross-ministerial discussion and coordination organs was 
endowed to them by Article 6 of State Council Decree No. 227 (State Council 1997). 
34 Being a spin-off of the 1949 ‘Central Commission for Finance and Economics’, the first LSG was 
the ‘Central Five Person Small Group for Economic Work’ (Zhongyang jingji gongzuo wuren xiaozu), 
set up with Chen Yun as Chairman, becoming the still existing and highly influential Leading Small 
Group for Financial and Economic Affairs (Zhongyang caijing xiaozu) a year later (see: State Council 
1957; 1958). 
35 See Nis Grünberg, “The Rise of Leading Small Group Governance” (forthcoming). 
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under the SC are formally classified as one of three forms of “discussion and 
coordination organs” (yishi xietiao jigou), the others being commissions (weiyuanhui) 
and directing departments (zhihuibu) (State Council 1997; 2008).36 Such central LSGs 
have high rank, given that their members mostly are at ministry level, and chairmen 
are Politburo or Politburo Standing Committee members As for the NLSG, Premier Li 
Keqiang, Vice-Premier Zhang Gaoli, and State Councillor Yang Jiechi enhance its 
formal bureaucratic authority by serving as chairman and vicechairmen, while its 
daily office is placed under the NDRC, with (NDRC vice-chairman) Xie Zhenhua as its 
director.37  
As an established type of quasi-formal organization binding together 
the Party-state, leading small groups have undergone a continous development of 
formalization and institutionalization. Initially only counting five groups consisting of 
a handful of top leaders in 1958 (CPC 1958), they became more numerous and more 
important during the 1980s, when they were first accepted as part of the formal 
system as “as hoc organs” (State Council 1988). Later, in 1993, they became so 
important as flexible additions to the rigid Party-state bureaucracy, that they were 
fomalized as institutions under the State Council, and given their current name as 
“discussion and coordination organs” (State Council 1993). In 1997, the State Council 
(State Council 1997) confirmed these organs as formal part of the system. Since then, 
leading small groups have proliferated and become important problem solvers to 
fragmentation of authority, illustrated by their rise as important political, central-
level organs under Xi Jinping. 
The composition and bureaucratic positioning of the NEC and the NLSG 
show significant overlap (see table 2.2 and 2.3). Including chairman Li Keqiang and 
vice chairman Zhang Gaoli, 16 members, including some of the most powerful 
ministers and top-level polititians, such as Xu Shaoshi (NDRC Chairman), Xiao Jie 
(Deputy Director-General of the State Council), Luo Jiwei (Minister of Finance) and 
Wang Yi (Foreign Minister), are members of both the NLSG and the NEC. One 
                                                        
36 Because of the lack of consistent information, this paper will treat state and party LSGs as the same. 
There seems to be the usual division of labor, with government functions coordinated under State 
Council LSGs, and the more ideologically loaded ones under the CPC. More research is clearly needed, 
to give some clarity and proof to these assumptions. 
37 Xie retired in February 2015 from his post at the NDRC, but was shortly thereafter posted to the 
United Nations as a special representative for climate change issues. 
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difference is that the PLA is represented in the NEC. Both the NLSG and the NEC 
share the administrative status of Commission/LSG under the SC (they are both 
described as “discussion and coordination organs”) and this formally renders them 
with similar authority over cross-ministerial coordination of energy issues. 
 
<Table 2.2 and 2.3 approximately here> 
 
However, in spite of shared qualities in terms of structural form and membership 
profiles, the NLSG is considerably more visible and has produced far more activities 
and policy output than the NEC. Part of the explanation may lies in a subtle 
difference to their bureaucratic mission and organizational structure, specifically the 
double function of the NLSG. One function or subgroup is the National Leading 
Group to Address Climate Change for international cooperation on climate change, 
and the other is the State Council Leading Group for Energy Conservation and 
Emission Reduction, the latter mostly being a domestic platform. Curiously, both l 
subgroups have their own secretariat, both with the Premier as chairman, Xu 
Shaoshi (director of the NDRC) as director, and Xie Zhenhua (also chief negotiator on 
international climate summits) as vice-director. Additionally and importantly, Xie 
Zhenhua oversees both groups from the group’s office placed under the NDRC (Zhu 
2010). 
The strong cross-ministerial influence of the NLSG is bolstered by the 
fact that the member ministries of the NLSG are required to establish coordinating 
offices (work groups), in order to implement the group’s decisions across their 
respective vertical departments (State Council 2011; Hubei Daily 2011; Ministry of 
Agriculture (MOA) 2011). In other words, the NLSG is institutionally integrated both 
horizontally and vertically, with its apex under the daily leadership of an influential 
minister-level official. Given its strong record and deep cross-ministerial integration, 
the NLSG can push and coordinate its activities more effectively than the NEC, and 
perhaps even the NEA, when it comes to matters within its broad mandate over 
climate-related policy. Its task to coordinate and guide decision-making in cases 
where multiple ministries are involved, serving as a seemingly neutral forum to 
discuss strategic energy planning, renders the NLSG a highly influential and well-
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connected organ central to the energy sector (NFZM 2012; inewsweek 2013). It is 
integrated directly under the NDRC – the most important organization for energy 
related work -, and has a director, Xie Zhenhua, who enjoys high standing among 
China’s leaders, not least in his double role as top climate official and outspoken 
chief negotiator for China on international climate issues (Bloomberg 2009; Delman 
2011). He has long been the go-to person for climate issues at the UN, as 
demonstrated by his high status posting as special representative at the United 
Nations. The NLSG has acquired significant influence under Xie’s leadership.  
 
Central Energy SOEs 
 
The central energy SOEs (the three oil corporations, the five ‘energy giants’, and the 
two grid companies), all of which are the offspring of former industrial ministries, 
still have an influential voice in Beijing. Some of their chairmen are alternate 
members of sthe CPC’s Central Committee, and all the 112 SASAC companies’ 
chairmen have departmental or vice-ministerial (tingji or fubuji) rank (Xinhuanet 
2012; Brødsgaard 2012). The combination of their monopoly in energy markets, the 
nation’s dependence on stable and predictable growth of generation capacity, and 
functional, stable grids to fuel the nation’s economic and social development 
renders energy SOEs powerful interest groups (Andrews-Speed 2010). Given the 
fundamental role these central corporations (also called China’s economic lifeline, 
jingji mingmai) in strategic sectors play in the general development of the Chinese 
economy, and boosted by the political legitimacy of the CPC these central SOEs 
(yangqi) have become “too big to fail” (Walder 2011: 18). To some extent, the 
Chinese government sits in a position of mutual dependence with the big energy 
SOEs. They hold tremendous political capital, both as a side-effect of the 
government’s reliance on their success, but also as a deliberate result of the SOEs’ 
hold over ‘natural monopolies’ (i.e. energy), thus protecting the “national champions” 
from competition (Nee and Opper 2010; Sheng and Zhao 2012). Strategic sectors 
such as energy do not qualify as market economies, but still form a tightly controlled 
state corporatist environment beyond the reach of anti-monopoly laws, and 
64 
 
favoured by government procurement rules (Pearson 2012; Fox 2007; Matechak and 
Gerson 2010).  
The most important factor, however, may be the political integration of 
SOEs through the CPC. Their relationship is cemented by the approval of leading 
executives and board members by the CPC Organization Department, and in the case 
of the top 53 central SOEs (the ‘wushisan da’, also including the energy SOEs) by 
direct appointment, a mechanism through which the CPC maintains the ultimate 
authority over these strategic businesses. Nevertheless, these leaders,  including 
Party secretaries, are able to drive or block reforms within the companies, and the 
energy industry is especially susceptible to slow reform implementation, e.g. 
corporate governance reform. Close government-SOE relations and political 
priorities regarding development and energy security mean that the central SOEs 
have thus far been able to resist a ‘downgrading’ into public service units (shiye 
danwei) (Tsai 2011).38 In other words, the central SOEs in energy can – by virtue of 
rank and position in the political system – leverage their status, economic influence 
and, in some cases, the personal interests of their leaders,39 in order to negotiate 
and lobby policy-makers.  
Additionally, central institutions often rely on SOEs for their expertise, 
industry and market information, and economic muscle (Downs 2008a). This reliance 
on SOEs for cooperation and information exchange seems even more important 
given the critical understaffing of key administrations such as the NEA. Although the 
NEA is the main organ in charge of daily work, former NEA director Zhang Guobao 
notes that it has just over 100 personnel, compared to the US energy administration, 
which has a staff in excess of 10,000 (dongfang Zaobao 2012).40 Especially at local 
levels, where SOEs do the actual work of fulfilling development plans, constructing 
infrastructure and implementing industrial policy, they can potentially exert 
                                                        
38 All the energy corporations and groups mentioned in this paper are central SOEs, being listed on 
both the SASAC list of 113 central SOEs, as well as on the CPC nomenklatura list of 53 most 
important corporations managed by the CPC Central Organization Department, see Brødsgaard (2012). 
39 The Zhou Yongkang/CNPC case is a good example, although of more extreme character. Still, it 
shows the many potential influence SOEs can wield also on the local level through their linkages with 
the political sphere. For a sum-up of the case see e.g.: http://www.scmp.com/topics/zhou-
yongkang (accessed  August 18, 2014]. 
40 This number doubled after merging with SERC, still it is significantly smaller than equivalent organs 
even in small countries; Denmark has over 300 people in the ministry. 
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considerable influence, largely unmatched by most local administrative-regulatory 
institutions (Lin and Purra 2010; Tsai 2011). There are occasional reports of internal 
debates on a further consolidation of the SOEs, especially at the central level, 
including a merger of the already huge energy corporations, but this has not so far 
materialized. The reports seem to suggest, however, that the energy sector will see 
continued restructuring, especially given Xi Jinping’s revitalized reform drive. 
 
Apart from the three main groups discussed above, other influential institutions 
include the MOF, which remains in charge of a number of financing mechanisms 
such as subsidies (i.e. in the strategic renewable energy sector), tax and accounting 
(State Council 2008; MOF 2009; DANIDA 2010), and the Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology (MIIT), which among others absorbed the Commission of 
Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (COSTIND) in 2008, increasing 
its clout over central industry policy (Yeo 2010; State Council 2008). For energy 
policy alone, there are 80 organs with partial authority over energy issues (see Table 
2.1 for the most important central-level institutions). 41  
 
<Table 2.1 approximately here> 
 
Although there is a certain spread, authority appears highly concentrated in the few 
institutional ‘powerhouses’ presented above. In principle, the 2010 NEC should have 
moved to the top of this hierarchy of energy governance, since the leaders of all the 
key offices are NEC members. In practice, however, other institutions that deal with 
energy issues are more powerful and have been reluctant to give away or share their 
authority over this strategic sector with the NEC. With the Premier as chairman, the 
NEC formally ranks at the same level as the NDRC, yet the latter commands greater 
resources and authority and is therefore the de facto superior organ. The NEC has 
remained a paper tiger rather than the “discussing and coordinating organ” it was 
designed to be. The fact that not one single meeting has been held there since its 
                                                        
41 One example is the feed-in tariff for solar and wind power, which was set by the MOF, although 
negotiated (as one would suspect when wearing FA glasses) with the Ministry of Science and 
Technology and the NEA. See MOF 2009. 
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establishment perhaps serves as the best illustration of its failure as “super ministry”, 
according to one NEA employee (author’s own interview)42. The case of the NEC, 
seen in the light of the continuous existence of powerful institutions involved in 
energy policy, serves as case in point for the value and validity of the FA model for 
describing cross-institutional and bureaucratic processes. Nevertheless, the model 
has some limitations, as laid out in the following section. 
 
The NEC and Fragmented Authoritarianism:  
 
China’s energy administration is currently more concentrated and institutionally 
consolidated than ever before, facilitating a significantly more efficient and 
coordinated policy process than seen in the 1980s. Yet, as the review of the energy 
administration and the case of the NEC illustrate, the notion of FA is still broadly 
applicable to the Chinese system. Moreover, the authoritarian solution to this 
fragmentation – top-down intervention to reach final decisions – attests that FA in 
many ways still describes one mode of governance in the Chinese Party-state 
bureaucracy. Decades of shunting authority back and forth among ministries, the 
continued absence of one consolidated, unified energy administration, and the rise 
of professional, corporatized SOEs have seemingly solidified the existing setup of a 
few powerful institutions at the top with multiple actors negotiating the policy 
implementation downstream. The 1997-98 and 2002-03 restructurings pushed 
modernization and professionalization of the energy industries and the development 
of a regulatory state-type administration (Zhang and Heller 2004; Pearson 2012; 
Hsueh 2012), with reforms such as ‘zheng qi fenkai’ and ‘zheng jian fenli’ (‘separation 
of government and businesses’ and ‘separation of governance and regulation’). Still, 
powerful agencies are able to keep influencing all spheres of the Chinese polity: 
business, the CPC, and state agencies (Tsai 2011). Institutional inertia and vested 
interests have so far prevented the materializing of a full consolidation in energy 
governance. This is nowhere more visible than in the poorly supervised monopoly 
over energy held by SOEs, directly challenging other parts of the political system and 
                                                        
42 The interview was held in Beijing on April 11th 2014. 
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society at large, leading to rent-seeking behaviour, inefficiency and the exclusion of 
competition (Sheng and Zhao 2012). 
The continuous restructuring of the energy administration suggests 
that Beijing clearly recognizes the symptomatic fault-lines in the political system, 
namely the scattering of authorities throughout horizontal and vertical systems, 
leading to a system of FA over policy-spheres. Beijing struggles with the fact that 
efficient supervision and oversight by one specialized ministry is next to impossible 
without simultaneously dissolving authority over similar policy spheres in other 
firmly established organs. So far all attempts to create a unified administration 
covering the energy sector, such as the 1980 NEC and the 1988 MoE, and even the 
Energy Leading Group under (then) Premier Wen, failed to assume authority over 
their institutional competitors in bureaucracy and industry (Yeo 2009). In the light of 
this, the more recent intention to push for a ‘super ministry reform’ (dabuzhi 
gaige),43 with ministries powerful enough to take over and centralize authority, 
seems to be a case of wishful thinking. Rumours of the creation of such an energy 
ministry exist (China Daily 2010), but the systemic roadblocks - explained by the FA 
model - have so far blocked a more radical restructuring. As the historical review 
shows, the trend is geared towards consolidation, streamlining and a more efficient 
administration. According to scientific advisor to both the NEC and the NLSG Lin 
Boqiang, there was an “unprecedented drive” to press for a new Energy Ministry by 
2013, he acknowledges that the main question remains how to extract the relevant 
authority from the NDRC (Dongfang zaobao 2012). A functional, autonomous Energy 
Ministry would only be possible after a consistent effort to strip the NDRC of its 
energy-authorities, including either the abolishment of the NEA and probably the 
NLSG, or a transfer of their offices and authority into any new entity.  
One crucial point remains to be underlined. Even though all the 
presented groups form powerful ‘opponents’ to the NEC in energy politics, the Party 
remains in key positions. The CPC secretaries at all times hold the highest rank in any 
bureaucratic organization, and Party secretaries outrank directors (or CEOs) in 
                                                        
43 Other sectors, such as finance and banking, have a similar history of comprehensive but powerless 
regulators, and have also seen calls for a ‘super coordinating commission’, which could gather all 
regulatory authorities, see: Walter and Howie (2012).  
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organizations. The deep integration throughout the system cements the CPC’s role 
as the chief “unifying or articulating instrument” (Andrews-Speed 2010: 24) of power, 
and the Party and its cadre management system form the backbone of authority 
throughout the system. This leads to the question of the role of secretaries in the 
bargaining, sabotaging or blocking of policies and reforms. The Party is in itself a 
plural entity and it also seems to struggle with internal coherence and fragmentation. 
The recent campaign against corruption, led by Xi Jinping and chief discipline 
watchdog Wang Qishan, must also be viewed as a concerted effort to deal with the 
problem of principal-agent issues and policy compliance in a horizontally and 
vertically unaligned incentive structure, and structurally enabled rent-seeking 
behaviour.  
The main challenge with regard to the central energy SOEs remains the 
establishment of an independent regulatory authority to aid supervision of their 
operation, especially at local levels. The integration of Party officials on the boards of 
central SOEs can, however, also be turned around and seen as a co-opting of 
businesses by the Party. The precise degree of SOE autonomy and the vectors of 
influence between SOEs and the CPC are unclear, with some arguing that SOEs have 
significant autonomy and power (Cunningham 2007; Sheng and Zhao 2012), while 
other voices (especially from within the system) state that SOEs are ultimately 
towing the line when ministries or central CPC organs step in (author’s interviews 
with SASAC and SOE officials). Nevertheless, central SOEs clearly remain powerful 
actors opposing any change to the status quo brought about by newly established, 
higher ranking organizations. Here a careful reservation should be noted. Applying 
the FA lens in SOE-state relations can be theoretically crude, since it discounts their 
commercial rationality in favour of a political, institutional perspective. Other 
approaches that look at industrial relations, state capture or corporatism, for 
example, are probably equally suited to analysing the complex field of Party-state 
and SOE relations. The set up of state-led capitalism in China generates a certain 
type of horizontal competition for vertical authority, which is not squarely captured 
by the structure-process rationality inherent to the FA framework. 
Given the above review, it seems justified to talk about continuing 
fragmentation since Lieberthal and Oksenberg wrote their seminal study in 1988, 
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albeit with more specialized and diversified organizations in recent years. Moreover, 
it seems not only that the rationale of bargaining described by Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg remains in place, but that the entrepreneurial nature of the incentive 
contracts between the different stakeholders described by later contributions 
building on the FA model (Mertha 2009) have in fact increased, as have the number 
of interests influencing the policy process. While the streamlining of the central 
government over the past three decades has reduced the number of ministries from 
over 60 to 23, this has - in the energy sector - led to the existence of only slightly 
fewer, albeit more powerful, institutions. Adding the corporatized SOEs to the mix 
(in the 1980s many of them were still branches of industrial ministries), what 
presents itself is a number of diverse interest groups negotiating policymaking and 
concrete implementation. Calls for an energy super ministry did not materialize, 
suggesting that opposition to reform by a few strong actors at central level renders 
authority fragmentation an unresolved problem.  
Quite possibly, consolidated and unified energy governance in one 
single organ may not be something the administration wants in the first place, since 
a certain degree of fragmentation is viewed as the better overall governance 
solution. The single Energy Ministry model (as seen in the US) might not be what 
China’s leadership is opting for, fearing the risk of enhanced rent-seeking in total 
administrative monopoly over energy, but also acknowledging regional differences, 
and policy experimentation and entrepreneurship, which have long become the 
accepted repertoire for decision- and policymaking (Heilmann 2008; Heilmann and 
Perry 2011). We are left to ponder these questions, working with the sparse 
information that trickles out of Beijing. 
 
Conclusion - FA 3.0?: 
 
Given the significant changes in the Party-state system and the wider society, the 
toolbox of the FA model needs to be updated if it is to be used meaningfully today. 
The ways in which politics and decision-making take place is constantly changing in 
response to changing socioeconomic and political realities. The updated Fragmented 
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Authoritarianism “2.0” introduced by Andrew Mertha (2009) was a timely and 
necessary revitalization of the concept. Contemporary China’s pluralizing society, 
modernized and differentiated SOEs, and the increasingly sophisticated Party-state 
administration make it necessary to re-examine our theoretical and conceptual 
approaches. Although certain logics and structural features persist, any significant 
change in reality should translate into a review and, if needed, adjustments of theory. 
In the scholarship on China’s political system, ‘integration’ rather than fragmentation 
has found its way into the theoretical lexicon. When it became clear that the Party-
system not was going to “wither away” or collapse, its “resilience” (Nathan 2003), 
and the forces that keep China together were examined more carefully (Brødsgaard 
and Zheng 2006; Tsai 2006; Brødsgaard 2012a). As a key integrative force, the CPC 
permeates virtually all horizontal and vertical levels of the administration, from the 
centre of authority in the Politburo’s Standing Committee down to village level units. 
Horizontally the integration mechanisms exist through CPC groups in all 
organizations in the state apparatus, SOEs, social organizations and even in many 
private businesses. CPC integration has become a major force in efforts to tackle 
fragmentation, while simultaneously positioning the party in the sole position to 
influence all decisions at all levels.   
This addiction to authority for integration is most clearly visible in the 
important role of leading small groups for decision-making. Leading small groups 
have developed a special quality as focused and often task-based organizations 
across bureaucratic divides, adding a flexible, yet authority-based organizational 
mechanism to the rigid and fragmented bureaucratic structure. Although it 
increasingly appears to be an important factor behind the Party-state’s ability to 
function despite all the issues pointed out by the FA literature, this quality of being a 
top-down mechanism for facilitating decision-making in the Chinese authority-
centred system has been overlooked by scholars in the field. The leading small 
groups serve as key Party organizations that connect the CPC’s political agenda 
setting with the general state administration, interlocking normally horizontally 
fragmented bureaucracies under a centralizing and coordinating authority. Leading 
small groups are the “authority fix” to structural problems that arise because of the 
71 
 
very system’s addiction to vertical authority, and thus is a natural institutional 
response to many of the issues described by the FA model. 
With these conceptual additions of (CPC) integration, pluralization of 
interest groups, changing policy processes, and the constant streamlining of the 
public sector, the FA model remains useful for building an understanding of the real 
changes that happen within the Chinese administrative apparatus. Conversely, 
concepts such as pluralization or integration can be enriched through  the insights 
provided by the FA model about the logic of decision-making and institutional 
change in the bureaucracy. The strength of the model fully comes to light when 
viewing pluralization and integration as mutually complementary concepts, 
representing distinct features of the same system. Embracing the seemingly 
paradoxical nature of the Chinese system, and focusing on the dynamic process of 
decision-making influenced by structural factors is exactly what constitutes the value 
of a FA-informed analysis. The open and generic nature (critics might call it 
imprecision) of the FA model also points to the flexibility of the Chinese system itself. 
As masterfully illustrated by Kellee Tsai (2006), Sebastian Heilmann (2008), Andrew 
Mertha (2009), and others, mechanisms that some consider to be fragmented and 
disruptive also prove to be assets to the system, integrating and reacting to 
pressures from both within and outside the formal institutional structure in an 
organic way.  
At times China appears to be an integrated collection of fragments, 
rather than a fragmented unity. The flipside of the FA model, which was originally 
developed to show the centrifugal forces of decentralization and bureaucratic in-
fighting, is a focus on the CPC’s authority as an integrative, centripetal force, for 
better or worse. This perspective has been under-utilized, and is now slowly 
emerging in the literature (see Brødsgaard 2012a). China has not collapsed as some 
predicted (and continue to predict), and although challenges to the current system 
are amassing, nothing – arguably - points to life-threatening crisis more immediate 
than it did in 1989 or the late 1990s. What makes the FA concept so durable is its 
generic nature and flexible, almost system-wide, applicability. Therefore, FA as basic 
framework to understand the Chinese system remains valid if seen as exactly that: a 
basic framework that needs additional ‘filling’ and context. Trying to describe 
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something as complex as China’s political system under one simple concept has 
obvious limitations, one must not forget that a coin has two sides. The focus on 
centrifugal and disruptive forces in the structure must therefore only be viewed as 
one side of the coin, and the integrative, cohesive mechanisms should be examined 
equally carefully. This task has, started by the string of works cited above, both in 
direct and indirect reference to the FA framework. 
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The rise of “leading small group governance”: evidence of 
fragmentation or source of resilience?   
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
After Xi Jinping took office in 2012, powerful Leading Small Groups (LSG) have been 
established, most prominently the Leading Small Group for Comprehensively 
Deepening Reforms. These groups have been viewed as symptoms of centralization 
and concentration of power under Xi Jinping, and the emphasized “top-level design”. 
However, LSGs are not new to China’s political system, but have existed in growing 
numbers ever since the 1950s. While only five groups existed in the 1950s, today 
thousands of LSGs exist at all levels, having become common organizations in the 
Chinese political system. This paper traces the historical development of LSGs as a 
distinct type of organization of the Chinese Party-state, and discusses their role as a 
governance institution. It argues that LSGs should not merely be seen as power 
concentrators, since they seem to be an endogenous fix for governance issues 
stemming from structural features of the Party-state. They do so through their ability 
to coordinate fragmented bureaucracies, serving both consultative and decisive 
functions in policy-making processes. Research on their operation and utility for the 
political system remains very limited, and by reviewing extant Chinese and English 
sources, this paper hopes to motivate a more thorough and empirically backed 
investigation of LSGs.  
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Introduction: 
 
In late 2013, at the 3rd Plenum of the 18th CPC Congress, the establishment of the 
Leading Small Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reform (hereafter: LSGCDR) 
was announced. A few weeks later, on January 22nd, the new group held its first 
meeting, boasting an impressive list of officials including Xi Jinping as group leader. 
Since then, a trend in the Xi administration to increasingly rely on more centralized 
and concentrated governance has been be observed, including the establishment 
and reliance on leading small groups (LSGs), which appear to be important vehicles 
for Xi Jinping’s policy agenda. The LSGCDR has since its establishment (and by time of 
writing) met 27 times,44 almost once a month, underlining its importance as a core 
governance organization of the Xi administration. Since 2013, 16 LSGs have been 
established at central level (including the LSGCDR), some of them with extremely 
broad and strategic policy mandates, as well as specifically task-oriented ones. 
Strengthened LSGs at the central level seem to be part of Xi’s strategy to overcome 
resistance to his ambitious reform package from so-called vested interests in the 
party-state system, as well as a way to consolidate and centralize authority of the 
party-state at large, as well as the center’s effective governance reach within the 
Communist Party of China (CPC).  
However, LSGs in themselves are not a particularly new type of 
organization in the Chinese political system, but appear to be an endogenous 
organizational response to some of the party-state’s structural challenges. In fact, 
they are so common in the party-state system, their number and frequent 
establishment has become a problem itself. During the latest “clean up” in 2014, the 
State Council announced the disbandment of over 130.000 small groups and 
“coordinating organs” that were clogging the system with “mountains of documents 
and an ocean of meetings” (wenshan huihai文山会海). 45 Their number had been 
                                                        
44
 People’s Daily (2016) “Tu jie: 159 ge zi! Zhongyang zheyang pingjia shiba jie san zhong quanhui yilai 
gaige chengxiao” (“图解：159个字！中央这样评价十八届三中全会以来改革成效”), available 
online: http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0902/c1001-28687171.html. 
45
 Xin Jing Bao (2014) “Quanguo kandiao mantou ban deng 13 wan ge “”lingdao xiaozu (“全国砍掉馒
头办等 13万个”领导小组””).  
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swelling over the years up to 2014, all originally established to address temporary 
tasks and local projects, but never shut down after completion of their mandates. 
Although LSGs have only received wider attention after Xi Jinping took office, this 
immense number of LSG illustrates the importance of these somewhat quasi-formal 
organs for decision-making throughout the Chinese system. They fulfill an important 
role as a particular type of organization within the Chinese political system. They also 
serve as reminder of how important formal authority, and with that the Communist 
Party of China (CPC), remains the core of decision-making in China’s party-state 
bureaucracy.  
LSGs seem to be important for solving governance problems brought 
about by the very structure of the system, some of which described by e.g. the 
“fragmented authoritarianism” concept,46 but also known from the Chinese 
discourse on governance, e.g. “zhongyang difang maodun” (中央地方矛盾), “shan 
gao huangdi yuan” (山高皇帝远), duikou (对口) etc. These issues have been widely 
discussed in research on China’s political system, pointing at implementation 
problems and weak coordination within and among bureaucratic organizations as 
structural weakness of the party-state. LSGs seen to be an endogenous mechanism 
the Chinese system uses to tackle some of these structural problems. They serve a 
governance-aiding purpose by establishing a horizontally coordinating and binding 
authority over specific policy-areas, based on vertical (Party) authority. In a 
bureaucratic system ridden with bargaining for recourses and poor inter-
departmental coordination of tasks, they work as integrating agent for policy 
deliberation through their ability to endow decisions with binding formal authority 
for the group’s affiliated organs. This is important in cases where policies can lead to 
increased costs or disadvantageous outcomes for stakeholders, who might otherwise 
ignore, sabotage, or distort these policies.  
As a type of organization, all LSGs (regardless of their specific task or 
administrative level), share this functionality, although higher-ranking groups 
naturally have wider reach and authority. While there certainly are differences 
                                                        
46
 See e.g.: Lieberthal, K. G. and Oksenberg, M. (1988) Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and 
Processes, Princeton: Princeton University Press; Lieberthal, K. G. and Lampton, D. M. (eds.) (1992) 
Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China, Berkeley and L.A.: University of 
California Press; Brødsgaard (ed.) (2017). 
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between central-level Party groups and sub-national LSGs below (and to some 
extent also between CPC and state LSG), their utility for the system and role as 
organizations is here regarded to be of similar nature. Central LSGs such as the 
groups for Economy and Finance decide on issues with systemic implications, while 
local level groups deal with implementation and coordination of policy and individual 
tasks. More generally though, as type of organization LSGs can provide a missing 
“joint” that connects otherwise “fragmented and disjointed” bureaucracy,47 adding 
an authority-induced flexibility in important - or dead-locked - decision-making 
processes.48 As such, they can bridge gaps between party-state departments and, 
under a clearly defined leadership, work out an interdepartmental policy task of the 
respective LSG. This is not to say they are a silver bullet absolving the system from all 
its structural problems, and many implementation problems remain unsolved. 
Considering the constant reiteration of the necessity to stick to the reforms in state 
media,49 many implementation problems seem to remain unsolved even with the 
centralized governance style of the Xi administration, and its stronger emphasis on 
central LSGs.  
One somewhat unclear feature is the difference (if at all measurable) 
between LSGs based in the state, and groups based in CPC organs, especially after 
Xi’s boost of central CPC authorities. While they are similar in organization and 
function, the more politically heavy and strategically oriented groups are the CPC 
LSGs, while many State Council (and state apparatus) based groups are of a more 
task-based, even technical nature, suggesting a division of labor among state 
(coordinating policy implementation and administration) and CPC (coordinating 
policy making and norm setting) groups. This would reflect the relationship between 
                                                        
47 Lieberthal, K. G. and Lampton, D. M. (eds.) (1992), pp. 8. 
48 Zhou Wang (2011) “Zhongguo zhengfu jigou zhong de danxing yaosu – jiyu yishi xietiao jigou de yi 
xiang fenxi” (“中国政府机构中的弹性要素 – 基于议事协调机构的一项分析”), in: Sichuan 
xingzheng xueyuan xuebao (四川行政学院学报), No. 5, pp. 5-8. 
49 E.g.: People’s Daily (2016) “Jianding buyi ba quanmian shenhua gaige tuixiang 
qianjin” (“坚定不移把全面深化改革推向前进”), 31-08-2016, p. 1; People’s Net 
(2016) “Xin yi lun guoqi gaige jinru “shigongqi” duo xiang shidian jiasu tuijin” (“新一
轮国企改革进入“施工期” 多项试点加速推进”), available on: 
http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0901/c1001-28683069.html [accessed on 14-
09-2016]. 
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CPC and state apparatus, which to a certain extent goes along the same lines.50 
Nevertheless, in both Party and state these groups do share their integrative 
function of facilitating the decision-making process in policy areas involving multiple 
departments.  
Surprisingly, Western literature on LSG is rare, and what little has been 
written has mostly been anecdotal and partial, limited by the very scarce 
documentation of LSGs and their work.51 Serving as an illustrative example of the 
dearth of knowledge and attention to LSGs, at least in Western academia, one recent 
textbook on China’s political system spends hardly a page on them, referring to only 
one single article on the topic.52 In Chinese scholarly literature there are a few 
detailed and more systematic publications, even though here too the discussion is 
quite limited.53 And while LSG have existed ever since the 1950s, little to nothing 
about their inner workings, and the extent of their use is usually communicated to 
the outside.  
                                                        
50
 Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Zheng Yongnian (eds.) (2006) The Chinese Communist Party in reform, 
London: Routledge; Zheng Yongnian (2008) The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor, 
London: Routledge. 
51 Some of the few existing works are e.g. Alice Miller (2008) “The CCP Central Committee’s Leading 
Small Groups”, in: China Leadership Monitor, No. 26; (2014) “More Already on the Central 
Committee’s Leading Small Groups, in: China Leadership Monitor, No. 44; Russel Hsiao (2013) 
“Taiwan Work Leading Small Group under Xi Jinping”, China Brief, 13(12). 
52
 William Joseph (ed.) (2014) Politics in China: An Introduction, Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
53 Main contribution to knowledge about LSGs is the research by Zhou Wang and Lai Jingping, who 
provide a more systematic and empirically rich material. See: Zhou Wang (2010) 中国“小组机制”研
究, Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Press; (2010) “Zhongguo “xiaozu” zhengzhi moshi jiexi” (“中国”小组”政治
模式解析”), in: Yunnan Shekexue (云南社科学), No. 3, pp. 14-18; (2011) “ Yishi xietiao jigou gaige de 
sikao” (”议事协调机构改革的思考”), in: Zhonggong zhejiang shengwei dangxiao xuebao (中共浙江
省委党校学报), No. 4, pp. 18-22; (2011) “Zhongguo zhengfu jigou zhong de danxing yaosu – jiyu yishi 
xietiao jigou de yi xiang fenxi” (“中国政府机构中的弹性要素 – 基于议事协调机构的一项分析”), in: 
Sichuan xingzheng xueyuan xuebao (四川行政学院学报), No. 5, pp. 5-8; (2015) “”lingdao xiaozu” 
ruhe lingdao? – dui “zhongyang lingdao xiaozu” de yi xiang zhengtixing fenxi” (““领导小组”如何领导
? – 对“中央领导小组”的一项整体性分析”), in: Lilun yu gaige (理论与改革), No. 1, pp. 95-99; Lai 
Jingping and Liu Hui (2011) “Zhiduhua yu youxiaoxing de pingheng – lingdaoxiaozu yu zhengfu bumen 
xietiao jizhi yanjiu” (“制度化与有效性的平衡 – 领导小组与政府部门协调机制研究”), in: Zhongguo 
xingzheng guanli (中国行政管理), No 8, pp. 22-26; Lai Jingping (2012) “Lingdao xiaozu zhidu de 
jiangou, yanxu yu bianqian – yi zhongyang fangzhi xuexichong bing gongzuo lingdao xiaozu wei gean” 
(“领导小组制度的建构，延续与变迁 – 以中央防治血吸虫病工作领导小组为个案”), in: Gaige yu 
fazhan (改革与发展), No.  1, pp. 62-66; (2014) “Dangdai zhongguo lingdao xiaozu leixing de kuozhan 
yu xiandai guojia chengzhang” (“当代中国领导小组类型的扩展与现代国家成长”), in: Zhonggong 
dangshi yanjiu (中共党史研究), No. 10, pp. 49-59. 
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This article will try to flesh out the more general governance purpose of 
LSGs, which has so far been overlooked and underappreciated in the literature on 
the Chinese political system. Considering the influential role of the new central-level 
LSG established under Xi, and regarding that they are common organizations 
throughout the entire political system, more systematic and theory-driven research 
seems to be justified. Hoping to contribute to this task, I will first look at the LSGs 
development as organizations in the PRC, and then move on to present a discussion 
on some of the more general governance functions of LSGs in the party-state 
system, assuming that they do serve a particular purpose as a type of organization. 
This latter part mainly builds upon the literature on the Chinese bureaucracy and 
CPC-state relations. Moreover, this chapter also presents LSGs as a source of 
institutional resilience of the party-state, which has proven to be more flexible than 
expected, considering all the pitfalls of bureaucratic bargaining, competition, 
compliance issues etc., as described in e.g. the literature on Fragmented 
Authoritarianism.  While not going as far as presenting a theory of LSG governance, it 
seems justified to take a closer look at leading small groups as an institution in the 
Chinese political system, and even draw some more general conclusions. In the 
future, much more empirical work and analysis is needed to solidify the arguments 
presented in this chapter. 
 
 
Development and Structure of LSGs: 
 
Looking at the historical development of LSGs as party-state organizations, a trend of 
steady institutionalization and formalization emerges. Initially counting five elite 
committees of top-leaders for discussing strategic issues in the 1950, LSGs have since 
become recognized as ad hoc organs in 1988, became part of the formal portfolio of 
types of state organizations in 1993, and finally rose to prominence as central Party-
state institutions under Xi (see table 1). Their role as a particular type of organization 
has, in other words, gone from obscure elite forum to important governance organs 
since 1949, in a process of institutionalization as organizations of the Chinese party-
state. 
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The first central LSGs were formally established in 1957-58 (LSG for 
Finance and Economy; Foreign Affairs; Science and Technology; Governance and 
Law; Culture and Education), and bureaucratic offspring of these early groups still 
exist today.54 Before that, only local LSG had existed to combat more specific 
problems.55 These first central-level LSG were placed directly under the leadership of 
the CPC Politburo and Standing Committee, wielding significant influence over 
strategic policy planning and coordination.56 The extent and influence of LSGs during 
the 1960s and 70s is unclear and documentation is extremely scarce, but it seems 
that, apart from a hand full of central groups, LSGs only started to pop up more 
frequently throughout the party-state after 1978.57 In 1986 a State Council notice 
called for a clean-up among the “ad hoc organs” (fei changshe jigou, 非常设机构), 
demanding for them to pass through the State Council bianwei (the department 
responsible for drafting human resource allocation in the party-state, working 
together with the CPC’c organization department) for formal verification and 
establishment.58 In 1988, the State Council issued another notice listing 48 central-
level ad hoc organs in an attempt to clarify their responsible ministries, including 11 
LSGs and six “coordinating small groups” (xietiao xiaozu, 协调小组).59 In 1993, 
during another round of government restructuring, the ad hoc organs were given 
their current classification of “discussion and coordination organs” (yishi xietiao 
jigou, 议事协调机构), indicating a formalization of the LSG as a particular type of 
organization within the Chinese system of political organization.60 The 1993 notice 
also included a list of 85 existing central groups within this category, disbanding 59 
                                                        
54 Zhonggong Zhongyang (1958) “Guanyu chengli caijing, zhengfa, waishi, kexue, wenjiao xiaozu de 
tongzhi” (“关于成立财经、政法、外事、科学、文教小组的通知”).  
55
 See: Lai Jingping and Liu Hui (2011) and Lai Jingping (2012). 
56 Miller (2008), Pearson, Margaret M. (2005) ‘The Business of Governing Business in China’, in: 
World Politics, 57 (2), pp. 296-322. 
57
 Lai Jingping (2014). 
58
 State Council (1986) Guofa Nr. 100: Guowuyuan guanyu qinglifei changshe jigou de tongzhi (国发 
100号：国务院关于清理非常设机构的通知)。 
59
 State Council (1988) Guofa Nr. 7: Guanyu yishi xietiao jigou (国发 7号 关于议事协调机构); State 
Council (1988) Guofa Nr. 56: Guowuyuan guanyu fei changshe jigou shezhi wenti de tongzhi (国发 56
号：国务院关于非常设机构设置问题的通知). 
60
 State Council (1993) Guofa Nr. 27: Guanyu Guowuyuan yishi xietiao jigou he jianshi jigou shezhi de 
tongzhi (国发 27号：关于国务院议事协调机构和临时机构设置的通知).  
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of them. Similar notices followed in 1998, 2003, and 2008, disbanding hundreds of 
groups that had become obsolete.  
The gradual institutionalization of LSGs as “normal” organizations 
became obvious when the State Council began issuing notices on their formal 
establishment as “discussion and coordination organs” in the early 1990s. However, 
their role as a particular structural mechanism for solving governance problems has 
not been discussed more theoretically. After Xi Jinping took office in 2012, Chinese 
media suddenly started to report on them, mentioning individual meetings in the 
state broadcaster CCTV’s national news, and presenting infographics about them in 
the People’s Daily.61 Foreign observers too have picked up on this new stream of 
information,62 which, although still selectively and anecdotal, has started to show a 
clearer picture of the role LSGs play in the party-state system. The formalization of 
LSGs as organizations (rather than being last-resort exceptions) for smooth 
functioning of the party-state, has become more obvious. Moreover, their potential 
as political ‘power tool’ is prominently shown by Xi, who in an attempt to break 
resistance to reform, employs them to work around the established bureaucratic 
structure of the party-state.  
In 1997 (and for local levels in 2007), it was confirmed by that 
“discussion and coordination organs” needed the approval of the State Council when 
establishing their inter-ministerial organizations, showing the status of LSGs as a 
formal institution in the state.63  
 
                                                        
61 E.g.: People’s Net (2013) “Yi zhang tu rang nin liaojie lingdao xiaozu” shi ruhe yunxing de” (“一张图
让您了解”领导小组”是如何运行的”), available on: 
http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/0708/c99014-22112002.html; People’s Net (2014) “Tu jie 
zhongyang quanmian shenhua gaige lingdao xiaozu” (“图解中央全面深化改革领导小组”), available 
on: http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/0123/c164113-24208994.html.   
62 See e.g.: Christopher Johnson and Scott Kennedy (2015) “The Un-separation of Powers: the blurred 
Lines  of Party and Government”, in: Foreign Affairs, July 24th; Chris Buckley (2015) “Q. and A.: 
Christopher K. Johnson on the Heavy Thumb of Xi Jinping”, in: NYT, July 28th; Cary Huang (2014) How 
leading small groups help Xi Jinping and other party leaders exert power”, in: South China Morning 
Post, January 20
th
. 
63 Formalization of LSGs as cross-ministerial discussion and coordination organs was 
strengthened by the State Council: (1997) Guofa Nr. 227: Guowuyuan xingzheng jigou shezhi 
he bianzhiguanli tiaoli (国发 (1997) 227号 国务院行政机构设置和编制管理条列); (2007) 
Guofa Nr. 486: Difang ge ji renmin zhengfu jigou shezhi he bianzhi guanli tiaoli (国发(2007) 
486号 地方各级人民政府机构设置和编制管理条列).  
88 
 
 
Table 1: Institutionalization stages of LSG: 
 
Year: 
1958 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1986-88 
 
 
 
 
 
1993 
 
 
 
 
 
1997 
 
 
 
2013-15 
                  Change of status 
Formal establishment of LSGs (LSG 
for Finance and Economy, Foreign 
Affairs, Science and Technology, 
Governance and Law, and Culture 
and Education). 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgement of the existence 
of “ad hoc organizations” in the 
party-state apparatus, and their need 
to undergo bianzhi scrutiny. 
 
 
Formalization of LSG as particular 
form of discussion and coordination 
organizations. New central LSGs to 
be announced by State Council 
notice. 
 
Discussion and coordination 
organizations as formal organizations 
under the State Council. 
 
3rd Central Committee of the 18th CPC 
Congress establishes the LSGCDR, 
several central-level LSG of 
significant scope and size follow in 
the months after. 
Document/decision 
CPC Central Committee (1958) 
“Notice regarding the 
establishment of small groups for 
Finance and Economy, Political 
Legal, International Relations, 
Science and Technology, and 
Culture and Education” (see note 
11). 
 
State Council (1986) Notice No. 
100; State Council (1988) Notice 
No. 7; State Council (1988) Notice 
No. 56 (see notes 15 and 16). 
 
 
State Council (1993) Notice No. 27 
(see note 17).  
 
 
 
 
State Council (1997) Notice No. 
227 (see note 20). 
 
 
CPC Central Committee (2013) 
Decisions (see note 28); see also 
table 2 and 3. 
Source: Author’s own compilation. 
 
 
While the category of “discussing and coordinating organs” includes other 
organizations, notably the commission (weiyuanhui, 委员会) and the directing 
department (zhihuibu, 指挥部), LSGs set themselves apart by their number and 
frequency of use. When it comes to authority of an organization, rank and influence 
of its head still remains the main cue to look for, regardless of its title. Here, apart 
from a few central Commissions (e.g. the National Development and Reform 
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Commission or the Political Legal Commissions (zhengfawei, 政法委)) LSGs appear as 
the most important ones, not least because of their role as vertical authority axis 
under a group leader, including integrative horizontal arms. The titles of some 
organs included in this paper being “commission” (not to be confused with the 
ministerial organizations such as the National Development and Reform 
Commission), or “coordinating group” (xietiao xiaozu, 协调小组) are few, and 
therefore these exceptions of discussion and coordination organs de facto working 
like LSGs (such as the State Security Committee), are included under the term LSG.64  
Several scholars have attempted to establish taxonomic systems of 
LSGs, pointing out different types in terms of horizontal and vertical structure, and 
based on their task. According to Zhou Wang’s (2010) often cited typology, 
permanent groups (常设型) are the most important ones, acting as strategic, policy-
guiding organs, and overseen by CPC top-leaders (e.g. the LSG for Economy and 
Finance, and likely the new State Security Committee). Period- or term-based LSG (
阶段型) have the task to oversee more specific policy agendas and projects, after 
which completion the LSG is to be disbanded (e.g. the LSG for the 3rd National 
economic consensus, and in principal also the LSGCDR). Lastly, there are the short-
term LSGs (短期型), established to deal with specific events or projects of relatively 
short duration (e.g. the already disbanded LSG for the Olympic Games, or the 
Wenchuan Earthquake group). This last type is the most numerous one, and most of 
the thousands of groups disbanded in 2014 were short-term left in place after the 
completion of their original task.65 While there certainly is value in these fine-grained 
descriptions, the more general question of their raison d’etre of LSG and their 
underlying utility as formal, organization and institution of the party-state has not 
been discussed.  
Apart from the State Council small groups, which today are announced 
by formal notice, LSGs are established by internal decree outside the bianzhi (编制) 
                                                        
64
 Another “commission” LSG not mentioned in this paper is the National Energy Commission, 
established in 2010. This LSG was dysfunctional from its establishment, and can serve as an example 
for a failed attempt of establishing a coordinating LSG at the top level, see: Nis Grünberg (2017) 
“Revisiting Fragmented Authoritarianism in China’s Central Energy Administration”, in: Brødsgaard 
(ed.) (2017) Chinese Politics as Fragmented Authoritarianism, London: Routledge. 
65
 See Lai Jingping (2014) for a good overview of these various categorizations, and not least, her own 
sophisticated taxonomy. 
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system.66 They include the leading cadres of the organs related to the group’s policy 
area in a quasi-formal organization that cuts horizontally across ministries and 
departments under the leadership of a higher-ranking group leader (figure 1).  
 
 
 
Figure 1: LSG general structure: 
 
Source: Zhou Wang (2010). 
 
 
In terms of their organizational structure, LSGs consist of two main components: its 
vertical axis, and the horizontally attached organizations (figure 1).67 These latter 
organizations are those included in the group, i.e. organizations affiliated with the 
group participating in meetings, constituted by all those departments relevant for its 
mandated policy area, e.g. the ministries represented in the LSGCDR. The central axis 
is the authority core of the group, consisting of the leader and vice Leader (zuzhang, 
组长 and fu zuzhang, 副组长), and the Director in charge of the group’s office 
(zhuren, 主任 or ban zhuren, 办主任). In larger, central LSGs there may be (as is the 
case with the LSGCDR) additional work offices. The Director usually is a leading cadre 
of the organization housing the group’s office, and is ranked lower than the formal 
leader of the group. For example, while State Councilor Ma Kai is leader of the LSG 
                                                        
66 NFZM (2012) (Lingdao xiaozu zenme lingdao?” (”领导小组怎么领导? ”), available on: 
http://www.infzm.com/content/80226 [accessed on: 5-08-2014]; Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard (2002) 
“Institutional Reform and the Bianzhi System in China”, The China Quarterly, No . 137, pp. 35-52.  
67
 Zhou Wang (2010) “Zhongguo “xiaozu” zhengzhi moshi jiexi” (“中国“小组”政治模式解析”), in: 
Yunnan shekexue (云南社科学), no. 3, pp. 14-18. 
LSG Leader 
Affiliated 
organ 1 
Affiliated 
organ 2 
Coordinating 
organ 
LSG Office 
Affiliated 
organ 3 
Affiliated 
organ 4 
91 
 
for SOE Reform, the Director of its office based in the State-owned Asset Supervision 
and Administration Commission (SASAC), is SASAC’s Director Xiao Yaqing. In case of 
the LSGCDR, Xi Jinping is the leader, while Li Keqiang, Liu Yunshan, and Zhang Gaoli 
are deputy leaders. Director of the group’s office is Wang Huning. In a provincial LSG, 
the governor or Party secretary might serve as leader, while a bureau-level (juji, 局级
) chief of the department housing the LSG office serves as Director. Thus endowed 
by its leader, the LSG has higher bureaucratic rank than the horizontally attached 
organizations at the administrative level where the LSG operates. Theoretically, this 
enables the system to overcome horizontal fragmentation of authority, and can 
override gridlocks brought about by resistance to policies, and competition for 
resources among equally ranked organizations. Bridging this fragmentation and 
circumventing the “bargaining mill”,68 LSG can work as integrating agent where weak 
coordination or interest conflicts emerge.   
By time of writing and given that the available information is complete, 
22 Leading Small Groups were placed directly under the State Council, while the 
Politburo (and Standing Committee) oversees 24, with eight directly under Xi Jinping 
(see table 2 and 3).69 It is noteworthy that 17 of these groups have been established 
after Xi took office, and two of them (LSGCDR, and the State Security Committee) are 
of a new quality in terms of size, scope, and authority.  
 
Xi’s Reform Agenda and Implementation Push through LSGs: 
 
When Xi Jinping and his administration took office, it soon became clear that 
economic reforms and even some structural changes were high on the agenda. 
However, how exactly to realize the announced reform package, which among 
others openly addressed structural issues in the state-owned sector, or “public 
economy”, was not so clear. Here reforms had been announced before, yielding 
modest results, since local governments and ministerial departments enjoyed 
significant leeway in terms of implementation. Also state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
had long been able to shirk policy considered detrimental to their business interests, 
                                                        
68
 Lampton and Lieberthal (1992). 
69 These numbers are based on my own counting, and are probably not exhaustive. Especially the 
number of State Council LSGs is most likely larger, as many task-specific LSG exist at ministerial level.  
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due to their bureaucratic rank within the party-state system and by way of CPC 
integration.70 Reforms in the economic sector, and especially SOEs, had largely 
stalled during the latter half of the Hu and Wen administration, which in 2003 had 
started out with calls to create a more efficient public economy with modern, 
international corporations, among others the establishment of SASAC. With the 
Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Regarding Major 
Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform (from hereon: Decisions) 
adopted at the 3rd Plenum in 2013,71 reform was put high on the agenda again.  
Looking back, the Xi administration has already been able to push the 
reform agenda much farther than was thought possible prior to 2013, both in 
discourse and in practice. Take the SOE sector. Mergers of central business groups 
intended to boost competitiveness and efficiency, renewed calls to establish boards 
of directors for better corporate governance in SOEs,72 and repeated call for 
reduction of overcapacity all indicate how serious the reforms are meant.73 On the 
other hand, also the current administration faces resistance, and many of the 
planned steps have yet to fully materialize.74 Also numerous new regulations in the 
financial industries, legal reforms, significant changes is the CPC’s own guidelines, 
and a string of new laws and regulation in cultural and social areas all are footprints 
of a more efficient decision-making process. While actual results in many of the 
addressed areas remain to be evaluated, many of the reforms have been launched 
                                                        
70
 Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard (2012) ”Politics and Business Group Formation in China: the Party in 
Control?”, in: The China Quarterly, No. 211, pp. 624-648; Ciqi Mei and Margaret M. Pearson (2014) 
“Killing a Chicken to Scare the Monkey? Deterrence Failure and Local Defiance in China”, in: The China 
Journal, No. 72, pp. 75-97; Tucker van Aken and Orion A. Lewis (2015) “The Political Economy of 
Noncompliance in China: The Case of Industrial Energy Policy”, in: Journal of Contemporary China, 24 
(95), pp. 789-822; Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard (2012). 
71
 Zhonggong zhongyang (2013) Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian shenhua gaige ruogan 
zhongda wenti de jueding (中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定). 
72 State Council (2015) “Li Keqiang: yi shenhua gaige de hongli zengqiang guoqi huoli he jingzheng li 
zai tuidong wo guo jingji tizhi zengxiao zhong shixian shengji fazhan” (”李克强：以深化改革的红利
增强国企活力和竞争力在推动我国经济提质增效中实现升级发展”), available online: 
http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2015-09/20/content_2935535.htm; Reuters (2015) ”UPDATE 1-
COSCO, China Shipping Group in merger talks – source”, available online: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/11/china-shipping-merger-idUSL3N10M31U20150811.   
73
 Caixin (2016) “China Behind on Plans to Trim Overcapacity”, available online: 
http://english.caixin.com/2016-08-16/100978359.html.  
74
 State Council (2015a) “Zhonggong zhongyang, Guowuyuan guanyu shenhua guoyou qiye gaige de 
zhidao yijian” (“中共中央、国务院关于深化国有企业改革的指导意见”), available online: 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2015-09/13/content_2930440.htm [accessed on: 12-09-2016]. 
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by new LSGs, most importantly the LSGCDR, which so far has issued 172 policy 
documents.75 
When the LSGCDR was announced in the 3rd Plenums Decisions, this 
indicated the urgency the Xi administration attaches to reforms. Tasked with the 
implementation of the points announced in the Decisions, this LSG also marked the 
beginning of an increased, LSG-enabled centralization of authority of the Politburo 
and Xi Jinping’s closest aides. Shortly after the LSGCDR, the State Security Committee 
was announced, almost equally comprehensive and broad in scope. Also the 
establishment of the LSGs for National Defense and Troop Reform, and the LSG for 
State-owned Enterprise Reform in late 2014 indicated an emphasis on centralized 
top-down decision-making in prioritized issues. As such, the new groups are central 
part of the programmatic ”top-level design” (dingceng sheji, 顶层设计), by which 
the Xi administration aims to force its mode of pushing its reforms of both the 
hardware (organizational structure) and the software (official’s work ethics and 
attitude) of the Chinese polity, top-down 
The LSGCDR is emblematic for this development. Since its 
establishment (and by time of writing), 27 meetings had been held by the group, 
issuing central level policy across an extremely broad array of areas, including Party 
building, SOE reform, rural development, environmental policy, legal reform etc. Its 
core group has 23 members, while the entire group including the sub-groups has 
many more (43 at least) (see table 4). Perhaps even more significantly, although 
even the group’s six work offices each have a Politburo-level Director, meetings are 
usually chaired by Xi Jinping himself, underlining the importance of the LSGCDR for 
Xi’s reform agenda and vice versa.76 With a rarely seen publicizing of its activity, the 
LSGCDR 172 policies have been issued addressing the programmatic points outlined 
in the Decisions.77 Wang Huning, close aide of Xi and Director of the CPC Policy 
                                                        
75 See supra note 1. 
76
 People’s Daily (2015) “Pandian zhongyang shengai xiaozu 17 ci huiyi shenyi 80 yu fen wenjian” (”盘
点中央深改小组 17次会议 审议 80余份文件(表)”), available online: 
http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2015/1014/c1001-27695137.html.  
77
 See: supra note 32. 
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Research Office, is the group’s General Director. Under him, six work-groups each 
have their respective policy areas of: 78  
 
 Economic System and Ecological Civilization Reform 
 Democratic and Legal System Reform  
 Cultural System Reform 
 Social System Reform 
 Party-Building System Reform 
 Discipline Inspection System Reform 
 
All of the Decisions’ 336 policy initiatives are supposed to be taken up by the 
LSGCDR, and delegated to the work-groups. Bearing the bulk of the tasks, the sub-
group on Economic System and Ecological Civilization Reform is headed by Liu He 
(Director of the LSG for Finance and Economy, and vice Chair of the NDRC) and Xu 
Shaoshi (Chairman of the NDRC).79 All provinces and most municipalities and 
prefectures have also established branches of the LSGCDR, in order to implement 
the group’s decisions and extent its organizational reach at local level. Also the local 
branches have their respective highest-ranking official (CPC secretary) as leader, 
emulating the structure of the central level.80 Compared to many other central CPC 
groups, the LSGCDR has a remarkably broad mission, including structural and 
technical policy, topics otherwise often left to the State Council. Moreover, the 
impressive activity undoubtedly demands a lot of resources, and the LSGCDR has 
been given the authority to request assistance from other organizations.81 Given the 
breadth, frequency of meetings, and its organizational integration also at local levels, 
the group is in fact similar to a small State Council, or a “reform Xitong”.  
                                                        
78  CPC (2015) “Zhongyang quanmian shenhua gaige lingdao xiaozu xia she 6 ge zhuanxiang xiaozu” (“
中央全面深化改革领导小组下设 6个专项小组”), available online: 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/0123/c164113-24203585.html. 
79
 Mathew Goodman and Andrew Parker (2015) Navigating Choppy Waters – China’s Economic 
Decisionmaking at a Time of Transition, Lanham and Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, p. 95. 
80
 CPC (2014) “Xi Jinping: Ge sheng qu shi yao jinkuai jianli quanmian shenhua gaige lingdao xiaozu” (“
习近平：各省区市要尽快建立全面深化改革领导小组”), available online: 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/0123/c164113-24204561.html [accessed 2.8.2015]; 
81
 See supra note 33. 
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The LSGCDR illustrates the way the Xi Jinping administrations is pushing 
centralized small group governance as part of the ”top-level design” program, which 
critics might characterize as LSG rule at the expense of established party-state 
bureaucracy. With the new groups, and in particular the LSGCDR, Xi Jinping has 
established a strong vertical line of formal authority extending from him to the main 
departments in charge of pushing the reforms, circumventing or overriding the 
organizations and posts that until 2013 had been in charge of these tasks. These 
organs, such as the NDRC, SASAC, the Ministry of Finance etc. all are part and parcel 
of the LSGCDR, but the latter has become the agenda-setting authority, coordinating 
implementation of its decisions in a centralized structure overseen directly by Xi 
Jinping and his close allies.  
The LSGCDR has already become a central part of the administration, 
not only coordinating policy making, but also reacting to major events in the political 
and economic spheres. As such, it has become a governance organ taking over 
functions from the state apparatus normally in charge of addressing these events. An 
example is the concerted effort to stabilize the faltering stock market in summer 
2015, where various organizations simultaneously and jointly issued statements 
about stabilizing measures. This indicates a coordination of measures to react in a 
certain way within the top-level, very likely concerted by the LSGCDR, in order to 
prevent paralysis by fragmented interests and unclear authorities over potentially 
disruptive decisions. To be fair, how much the LSGCDR can, and is willing to 
intervene in ongoing events remains speculative, yet it is exactly in these cases 
where quick and coordinated action is made possible by LSGs.  
Overall and except for the new central-level groups, LSGs have 
increasingly becoming core parts of the party-state system, and for a good reason. 
They provide the otherwise rigid and horizontally fragmented structure of the party-
state with flexibility, joining various bureaucracies around a vertical authority 
channel to push specific policy issues or projects. They are widely used for this 
purpose, and for the same reason some scholars have proposed their 
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institutionalization into regular state organizations, in order to boost their efficiency 
and increase system stability.82 
 
Small Group Governance or Small Group Rule?: 
 
For the central-level groups led by Politburo members (including State Council 
groups), the most powerful mechanism is their flexible integration capacity, giving 
them strategic influence over a designated bureaucratic field. In case of LSGs at 
ministerial/provincial level and above, these can establish corresponding groups 
nested in their attached organizations, at times even vertically at local levels. 
Examples are the LSGCDR, but also other groups with broad policy agendas, such as 
the LSG for Addressing Climate Change, Emission Reduction and Resource 
Conservation (chaired by Li Keqiang and its office under the National Development 
and Reform Commission, which has established liaison departments in the attached 
organizations, and corresponding small groups in the provinces and even some 
district-level cities). This vertical integration of attached organizations under the 
guidance of a LSG is central to Xi Jinping’s reliance on “small group governance”, 
made especially clear with the LSGCDR.83  
Looking at LSGs more generally, two of their main features as a type of 
governance institution are obvious. First, the already discussed integrative 
mechanism, enabling them to tie departments together, and align them over specific 
policy agendas under a unified leadership. This means that LSGs serve as 
transmission belts, aligning horizontally fragmented departments for policy making 
and coordination, and thus facilitating decision-making when the ordinarily existing 
bureaucracy is unable to overcome departmental fragmentation and/or resistance 
to policy implementation. Equally important however, is a LSG’s unique nature in 
terms of its easy and only quasi-formal establishment without the otherwise 
necessary fiscal and personnel allocation procedures, and their flexibly defined 
bureaucratic jurisdiction. These qualities of the LSGs to solve structural problems 
inherent to the Chinese system have become an important and common feature of 
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 Lai Jingping and Liu Hui (2011), p. 24. 
83 See:  supra note 37; CPC (2015) “Zhongyang quanmian shenhua gaige lingdao xiaozu xia she 6 ge 
zhuanxiang xiaozu” (“中央全面深化改革领导小组下设 6个专项小组”), on: 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/0123/c164113-24203585.html [accessed 2.8.2015]. 
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the party-state as a system, not least indicated by their number. Therefore, Beijing’s 
increased reliance on LSGs also suggests a focused attempt to push its agenda 
compared to the previous Hu-Wen administration.  
On the other side, however, this necessity of LSGs for pushing policy 
implementation even at central level shows that reform has become extremely 
difficult to achieve through the existing system, and that top-level (Party) authority 
vested in LSGs has become the only thing able to align bureaucracies. Resistance to 
the status quo seems to have reached levels where any change in policy needs to be 
forced through by the very top of the CPC, and pushed forcefully throughout the 
system - yet around the existing bureaucracy - by means of the described LSG 
mechanism of overriding horizontally diverging interests, aligning them under a 
higher-ranking leader. In other words, LSGs establish a new “1st hand” (di yi ba shou, 
第一把手) for the designated policy task of the respective group, shifting discretion 
over decisions from the leading cadres of individual and fragmented departments to 
the LSG Director, who answers to the LSG leader. This upward shift in decision-
making authority, ideally speaking, can increase deterrence of non-compliance and 
policy-shirking among the LSGs affiliated organizations, while also simply aligning the 
departments in order to enable better coordinated policy making capacity. Its 
necessity, however, also indicates a governance crisis in the existing organizational 
structure, or at least a strong inertia against changes to the status quo. 
Looking at this theoretically, in ideal type terms, LSGs are adding organizational 
flexibility (弹性) to the rigid and departmentalized “tiao-kuai” (条-块) structure of 
the Chinese system, balancing the centralization-decentralization paradox. LSGs 
bank on cadres’ compliance to higher-ranked authority even when it is not 
organizationally present at all times. However, an LSG’s ability to actually push 
decisions as discussed above, also hinges upon the rank and influence of its Leader 
and Director. The “interdependence of real and imagined”, the constantly looming 
potential of authority behind LSG’s decisions (“xu shi xiang yi”, “虚实相依”), is 
paired with the function of LSGs to expand and contract authoritative decision-
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making power at the discretion of the Leader (“peiliang zeng jian”, “倍量增减”). 84 
By doing so, (still talking in ideal types) LSGs can ensure that a decision made by the 
higher-ranking leader of the LSG is binding to all horizontally affiliated organizations, 
and is implemented vertically within them even though there are no extraordinary 
supervision mechanisms in place. For example, when a provincial branch of the 
LSGCDR, with a province’s Party Secretary as leader, issues a policy, it becomes 
binding to all affiliated departments even though it doesn’t come from the 
departments’ own leadership. Any decision made by the local LSGCDR branch, in 
other words, is Provincial level policy by virtue of its leader.  
Xi’s strong personal presence in the LSGCDR’s activity makes the groups quite 
unique in terms of authority. This is even more so, since all its work groups are 
headed by Politburo members of high status in the Xi administration, strengthening 
Xi’s influence on the operational layer of the group even more. This type of top-
down integration of fragmented units is known also in business organization, here as 
so-called ambidextrous organizational designs:  
 
“[…] the top management team serves as the point of integration 
between these contrasting agendas. It is the top management team that 
makes the decisions regarding organizational forms, cultures, and 
resource allocation processes, such that their firms can both explore and 
exploit […]. An important function of the senior team is therefore to 
create meaning in the context of contradiction and to extract the 
benefits associated with contradictory strategic agendas” 85 
 
The surprising similarity to LSGs’ utility in the Chinese party-state is obvious, and 
further illustrates that the LSG type of agenda-integrating organization indeed can 
boost governance efficiency throughout a system.  
Still, however beneficial LSGs might be for alleviating structural 
bottlenecks for their respective tasks in theory, there also are risks that the 
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 Zhou Wang (2011) “Zhongguo zhengfu jigou zhong de danxing yaosu – jiyu yishi xietiao jigou de yi 
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 Wendy Smith and Michael Tushman (2005) “Managing Strategic Contradictions: A Top 
Management Model for Managing Innovation Streams”, in: Organization Science 16(5), p.: 524. 
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increased reliance on “small group rule” under one leader turns into a more 
permanent power block. The apparent need to push reforms from outside and 
above existing administrative organs, and the rise of individual LSG rule can also 
serve as potent argument by those pointing at structural problems of the Chinese 
system. It also confirms that very strong opposition to reform exists in the Chinese 
party-state bureaucracy, reluctant to accept any change of the status quo that could 
change the distribution of resources, and thus alter benefits and rents that, both 
legally and illegally, can be extracted by officials and organizations. LSGs certainly are 
a viable solution to push these kinds of changes through, but there are also risks of a 
normalization of the use of LSGs for decision-making on a regular basis. This could 
have the effect of weakening the “normal” bureaucratic structure (ministries, 
departments etc.), leading to an extremely concentrated authority structure. In this 
scenario, communication and coordination among ministries cannot take place on a 
normal basis without LSGs as middlemen, and decisions only can be made by small 
groups, slowing the overall efficiency of the system.86 LSG would fall prey to the very 
authority fragmentation and contestation they were meant to resolve.  
This danger is normally averted by defining LSGs as term- or task-
based. In fact, their ability to serve as kick-starters and drivers for decision-making, 
hinges upon the balance between centralization and decentralization of the 
decision-making authority, or the ability to expand and contract it capacities and 
authority (“peiliang zheng jian”, "倍量增减”).87 In other words, LSGs are good for 
initiating and aligning policy-making, but when nothing gets done without an 
authoritative decision made by a higher-level official (the LSG leader), the design 
defeats its purpose, creating simply a new type of gridlock. It also remains to be seen 
how effective normalized policy making by LSGs is. So far, it seems, arriving at a 
decision through the forceful voice of a LSG’s leader is one thing, implementing it 
throughout the bureaucracy is another. In the long run, the balance of centralized 
decisions for coordination and alignment at Leader/Director level and the 
decentralized implementation, hinges upon the leadership’s ability to convince 
rather than coerce group affiliates. A LSG’s success is thus strongly dependent on the 
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 See Lai Jingping (2014). 
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 See supra note 39. 
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compliance of the leading cadres in the LSG affiliated departments. Here, typical 
principal-agent problems of compliance and information asymmetry remain 
unsolved as such, since, apart from facilitating decision-making, there are no 
additional mechanisms attached to LSG that can ensure compliance to the decisions 
made in LSG. As one SOE official notes regarding the LSGCDR implication for his local 
SOE: “Something will happen, but what exactly and for how long remains to be 
seen”.88 In other words, even though Xi Jinping heads the LSGCDR, the implications 
at e.g. city-level are unclear, and at sub-provincial local levels the implementation 
issues mentioned above might remain unaffected altogether.  
Nevertheless, the forced structural changes so far are hurting the 
“vested interests” by changing the distribution of resources. The new top-level LSGs 
are driving the Xi administration’s reform agenda further than many had thought 
possible, even though this process also has shown how severe the resistance is. The 
parallel anti-corruption drive sends a clear signal to follow the central policies, at 
least the prioritized ones. As one commentator points out, “There will be disputes 
everywhere since the plan will change the current distribution of power, money and 
resources. […] There are disputes between state departments, within SOE 
management, between government agencies, and between central and local state-
owned enterprises.”89  
 
Conclusion: 
 
As type of organizations in the party-state system, LSGs have undergone a 
remarkable development. From their initial status as small elite groups of leaders (5 
to 10 top-level CPC top-level cadres in the first 5 groups of 1958), to become large 
and powerful central-level organizations in charge of both restarting the reform 
process at large, and driving specific policy in particular under Xi Jinping. Their 
historical development shows a clear trend toward their institutionalization as 
governance organizations (in the Chinese discourse described as “going from 
informal to formal” (tuo fei ru zheng, 脱非入正) or ”leaving inferiority entering the 
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 Authors own interview of a SAIC official, Shanghai 2015. 
89 Li Jin, of China Enterprises Reform and Development Research Association quoted from: Keira Lu 
Huang (2015)  
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formal” (tuo ya ru zheng, 脱亚入正)),90 and today they are fully integrated and 
formalized as specialized party-state organizations. Yet, they have retained a special 
quality of being more focused and task-based in their mission, adding an 
ambidextrous, authority-based organizational design to the otherwise rigid and 
fragmented bureaucratic apparatus. This quality of being a top-down mechanism for 
facilitating decision-making in an authoritarian system that is, by nature, 
overwhelmingly based on authority, may prove key to effectuate Xi Jinping’s reform 
agenda. Rather than merely being a new way of centralizing power (which they 
certainly also are, and whether or not if they will turn out as means or ends is still 
open), they are far more common and supplemental to the party-state system’s 
governance at large than the dearth of research on them suggests.  
Although the “top-level design” de facto is driving a more centralized 
rule under the Xi administration, and largely through the new central LSGs, it 
remains to be seen if this will be a permanent governance mode. Looking from the 
more theoretic perspective of LSG’s governance utility outlined in this paper, it 
seems that the LSGs’ ability to effectuate the Xi administration’s reform agenda, and 
after that, a return to the governance of the “normal” institutional structure, will be 
the decisive factor defining their long-term success. In other words, a return from 
the ”top-level design” to a more sustainable, decentralized governance that does not 
require permanent leveraging by a strong central leader such as Xi Jinping (who 
naturally must step down at some point) will be necessary at some point. Perhaps 
the time frame set for the LSGCDR, with its task formally ending in 2020 when the 
completion of the Decisions of the 3rd Plenum of the 18th CPC congress is set to be 
achieved, is a realistic point at which the effect of such centralization can be 
assessed.  
Looked as in ideal type terms, LSGs certainly have evolved to become 
an important integrative mechanism, and a flexibility-inducing institution used to 
facilitate decision-making in an authority-based system. Still, as the number of 
disbanded LSGs indicates, they can themselves become institutional flotsam, 
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especially at local levels.91 Especially the new, large central LSGs are themselves 
byzantine constructs, exceedingly large and powerful, evolving to become more 
ministerial in scope and power, and working counter a unified and formalized 
governance mode even at the central level. Without more thorough insights, so far it 
is up to the observer to decide whether they are to be seen as symptoms of 
structural weakness, vehicle for centralization of power under a handful of allied 
leaders, or as the party-state’s endogenous fix evolved to overcome its weak spots 
of horizontal coordination and bureaucratic fragmentation, balancing its addiction to 
authority and hierarchy in decision-making processes. 
Many questions remain, such as the difference between state-based 
LSG and CPC-based LSG. They certainly work as integration of the administration 
under the political leadership of the Party, but their general and intended function 
extends beyond that, being a mechanism for “getting things done”. On a more 
theoretic level, much more research is needed, and their governance function and 
institutional qualities need to be better understood. Even though one can detect a 
qualitative difference between the new top-level LSGs and the many thousand 
groups at local levels, I hold it is important to look at LSGs as type of organization, 
one that has become important as an institution of the formal bureaucratic structure 
of the party-state. This chapter hopefully can serve as starting point to this task, 
putting forward some claims to be tested, as much more empirical work needs to 
follow up on the points raised in this paper. 
 
 
Table 2: (stars mark groups established after 2013, and dotted lines mark the break 
between Politburo-level leaders and below) 
Central-level CPC LSG:  Chinese Name:       Head: 
 
Comprehensive Deepening Reform*  中央全面深化改革领导小组       Xi Jinping 
 
State Security Committee*   中央国家安全委员会        Xi Jinping 
 
Internet Security and Informatization*  中央网络安全和信息化领导小组       Xi Jinping 
 
United Front work*    统一战线工作领导小组        Xi Jinping 
 
Economy and Finance    中央财经领导小组        Xi Jinping 
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Foreign Affairs (National Security) 中央外事工作 (国家安全) 领导小组       Xi Jinping 
 
Taiwan Affairs    中央对台工作领导小组            Xi Jinping 
 
Nat. Defense and Troop Reform* 中央军委深化国防和军队改革领导小组       Xi Jinping 
 
Tibet Affairs   中央西藏工作协调小组        Yu Zhengsheng 
 
Xinjiang Affairs   中央新疆工作协调小组        Yu Zhengsheng 
 
Party Building*   中央党的建设工作领导小组            Liu Yunshan 
 
Mass Line Education and  
Experience*    中央党的群众路线教育实践活动领导小组 Liu Yunshan 
 
Propaganda and thought work 中央宣传思想工作领导小组             Liu Yunshan 
 
Hong Kong and Macau  中央 港澳工作领导小组        Zhang Dejiang 
 
One Belt One Road*  一带一路(工作)领导小组         Zhang Gaoli 
 
Central Supervision  中央巡视工作领导小组         Wang Qishan 
-   
Culture System Reform and 
Development   中央 文化体制改革和发展工作领导小组       Liu Qibao 
 
Agriculture and Villages  中央农村工作领导小组         Wang Yang 
 
Prevention and Handling of the  
Problem of Religious Sects  中央防范和处理邪教问题领导小组 Meng Jianzhu 
 
Comprehensive Govern Public  
Security    中央社会治安综合治理委员会  Meng Jianzhu 
 
Stability Maintenance  中央维护稳定工作领导小组       Meng Jianzhu 
 
Judicial System Reform  中央司法体制改革领导小组       Meng Jianzhu 
 
Talent development work  中央人才工作协调小组         Zhao Leji 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------
--------------------- 
 
Encryption Work  中央密码工作领导小组         Zhang Yanzhen 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
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Table 3: (dotted lines mark the break between Politburo-level leaders and below) 
 
Central-level LSG under the State Council: Chinese Name:   Head: 
 
 
Science and Technology Education    国家科技教育领导小组   Li Keqiang 
 
Informatization    国家信息化领导小组   Li Keqiang 
 
Addressing Climate Change and Resource Conservation    Li Keqiang 
国家应对气候变化及节能减排工作领导小组 
 
Institutional Organization Commission 中央机构编制委员会                  Li Keqiang 
 
Northeast Industrial Base Revitalization 振兴东北地区等老工业基地领导小组 Li Keqiang 
 
Western China Development  西部地区开发领导小组   Li Keqiang 
 
Third National Economic Consensus*  第三次全国经济普查领导小组  Zhang Gaoli 
 
Jing-Jin-Ji Integration*   京津冀协同发展领导小组  Zhang Gaoli 
 
First National Geographic Consensus* 第一次全国地理国情普查领导小组 Zhang Gaoli 
 
Migrant Workers Work*   农民工工作领导小组   Ma Kai 
   
Integrated Circuits*    国家集成电路产业发展领导小组  Ma Kai 
   
SOE Reform*    国企改革领导小组   Ma Kai 
 
National Manufacturing Development  国家制造强国建设领导小组  Ma Kai 
 
Small and Medium Enterprise Promotion 促进中小企业发展工作领导小组  Ma Kai  
 
Deepening Reform of Pharmaceutics and Health Care System    Liu Yandong 
深化医药卫生体制改革领导小组 
 
Soccer Reform*    中国足球改革领导小组   Liu Yandong 
 
Education System Reform   国家教育体制改革领导小组  Liu Yandong 
 
Poverty Alleviation   扶贫开发领导小组   Wang Yang 
 
Third National Agriculture Consensus* 第三次全国农业普查领导小组  Wang Yang 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------
---------------------- 
 
Oil and Gas Pipeline Security Reform* 油气输送管道隐患整改工作领导小组 Wang Yong 
 
Industry Associations, Chambers of Commerce and Administrative Units Integration work*  
行业协会商会与行政机关脱钩联合工作组     Wang Yong 
 
Strengthen Civil-Military relations  全国双拥工作领导小组   Wang Yong 
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Resettlement of Demobilized Officers 全国退役士兵安置工作领导小组  Yin Weimin 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: LSG for Comprehensively Deepening Reform members: 
 
Leader: Name of affiliated organization(s), other known LSG memberships 
Xi Jinping 
--------------------- 
Li Keqiang  
 
Liu Yunshan 
 
Zhang Gaoli 
--------------------- 
Wang Huning  
 
Ma Kai 
 
Liu Yandong 
 
Liu Qibao 
 
Xu Qiliang 
 
Li Jianguo 
 
Wang Yang 
 
Meng Jianzhu 
 
Zhao Leji 
 
Li Zhanshu 
 
 
Du Qinglin 
 
Zhao Hongzhu 
 
Wang Chen 
 
Guo Shengkun 
 
CPC Chairman, President (LSGCDR Head) 
 
Vice-Chairman, Prime Minister (LSGCDR Vice- Head) 
 
Politburo standing committee, director of secretariat (LSGCDR Vice- Head) 
 
Politburo standing committee, Vice-Premier (LSGCDR Vice- Head) 
 
Director, Central Policy Research Center (LSGCDR Director) 
 
Vice-Premier, Leader of LSG for SOE Reform  
 
Vice-Premier 
 
Minister of Publicity 
 
CMC Vice-secretary 
 
First NPC Vice-chairman, All-China Federation of Trade Unions Chairman 
 
Vice-Premier 
 
Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Committee 
 
Central Organization Department 
 
Director of CPC General Office, Director of the State Security Committee’s 
general office 
 
First Vice-chairman of CPPCC 
 
First Vice-secretary of CCDI 
 
Vice-Chairman of NPC Standing Committee and Secretary-general 
 
Minister of Public Security 
 
106 
 
Zhou Qiang 
 
Cao Jianming 
 
Zhang Qingli 
 
Wang Zhengwei 
 
Zhou Xiaochuan 
 
Xu Shaoshi 
 
Yuan Guiren 
 
Wang Zhigang 
 
 
Miao Wei 
 
Lou Jiwei 
 
Yin Weimin 
 
Han Changfu 
 
Zhou Shengxian 
 
Gao Hucheng 
 
Li Bin 
 
Huang Shuxian 
 
Li Yufu 
 
Zhang Jun 
 
Chen Wenqing 
 
Luo Shugang 
 
Liu He 
 
Chen Xiwen 
 
 
Zhang Yi 
Secretary and President of the Supreme Court 
 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate Attorney 
 
Vice-chairman of CPPCC 
 
Vice-chairman of CPPCC, Director of State ethnic Affairs Committee 
 
Vice-chairman of CPPCC, Governor of People’s Bank 
 
Director of NDRC 
 
Minister of Education 
 
Secretary of Ministry of Science and Technology (Minister Wan Gang is not a 
Party-member and cannot serve in the LSG apparently) 
 
Minister of Industry Information 
 
Minister of Finance 
 
Minister of Human Resources and Social Security 
 
Minister of Agriculture 
 
Minister of Environmental Protection 
 
Minister of Commerce 
 
Chairwoman of National Population and Family Planning Commission 
 
Vice-secretary of CCDI, Minister of Supervision 
 
Vice-secretary of CCDI 
 
Vice-secretary of CCDI 
 
Vice-secretary of CCDI 
 
Vice-Minister of Publicity 
 
Vice-director of NDRC, Secretary-general of LSG for Finance and Economy 
 
Vice-secretary of LSG for Finance and Economy, Secretary-general of LSG for 
Agriculture and Villages 
 
Director of SASAC 
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Mu Hong 
 
Pan Shengzhou 
 
Vice-Director of NDRC 
 
Vice-director of Central Policy Research Center 
Source: Author’s own compilation. Sources used for compilation in tables 2-4 are the 
Chinese official media reports quoted throughout the paper. This list is based on the 
reported physical presence of officials at the group’s meetings in late 2015, and 
might not be exhaustive. 
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Learning From Daqing – Again: The local embeddedness of a National 
Champion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Chinese propaganda poster “Industry Learning from Daqing”) 
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Abstract: 
 
This paper uses a “test drilling” case study method to reveal the socially embedded 
nature of industrial State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in local China. SOEs are 
conceptualized as Party-state organizations, however, given their operations located 
in local areas, where cities such as Daqing developed around present day SOE’s 
organizational ancestors, the danwei, they remain often entangled in their legacy as 
public service institutions, and still today are deeply embedded in local economy and 
society. This puts “National Champions” such as China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) in a position where they as organizations have to negotiate their 
economic objective of generating profit for their owner, the state, but also work as 
local public institutions, putting stabilizing objectives such as local employment 
safety before economic objectives. This double layer has split industrial SOEs into two 
tiers, one operating with economic objectives in mind, and one as caretaker of its 
legacy organizations economic. Using a framework inspired By Gramscian reading of 
the state, and the Polnyian concepts of embeddedness, this paper reveals how the 
local embeddedness of SOEs is a symptom of the Party-state’s order to put hegemony 
and stability before efficiency and profitability of industrial SOEs. 
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Introduction: 
 
Far up in China’s North-East lies Daqing, an unspectacular Prefecture-level city of 2.9 
million people, spread out in the desolate prairie of Heilongjiang Province’s South-
West. The name Daqing, which means “big celebration”, was given to the place 
where oil was struck in 1959,92 and as an oil field, production unit, and later as a city 
it quickly became a symbol of China’s ambitions in national industrial development. 
The city’s growth and status was fueled by the large quantities of oil in the ground, 
estimated at over 2 billion tons, and the flood of eager workers coming to be part of 
the “Learning Industry from Daqing” experience. Almost six decades later, even with 
the revolutionary gleam of industrialization long gone, in China Daqing is still widely 
known as the nation’s oil capital.  
 Today, Daqing’s oil industry is managed by the giant State-owned Enterprise 
(SOE) China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), a vast business group formally 
owned by the Chinese state, but with a substantial footprint in local production 
centers such as Daqing. As a city, as a society, and as an economy, this has meant for 
Daqing that it went from being a large a work unit organized along socialist 
principles (in Chinese: danwei), to a city that economically remains largely 
dependent on the corporatized inheritor of the former danwei’s industrial assets, 
today managed by the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) group. Today, 
while the CNPC headquarter in Beijing oversees a number of production bases that 
all went from being small danwei societies to become branches of corporatized 
business, attention has shifted towards economic growth, efficiency, and 
internationalization.  
 The radical change of Daqing’s oil industry from being self-contained, socialist 
danwei society to become a branch of a global, profit-oriented business group, has 
had profound impact on both the local society of Daqing, but also on CNPC as a SOE 
with assets located within the city of Daqing. This development is not unique to 
Daqing, however, as virtually all industrial SOEs underwent the same transformation 
after China gradually reformed and modernized its economy after 1978, and many 
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 Daqing became the name for the place, and formally only became a municipality in 1981. Before 
that, it was administratively under Anda municipality. 
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other areas with large heavy industry presence are in similar situations. While this 
economic development has been well researched, the fact that state-ownership 
remains a strong institution has somewhat been ignored as a conscious choice, and 
has mostly been discussed as hindrance for real reform. The political logic, and the 
rationality of the Party-state to maintain SOEs also as political instruments, either 
because of political strategy or for historical reasons, has not yet been examined 
thoroughly in the literature. In order to understand SOEs, I argue, we need to add to 
economic analysis a better understanding of their role as Party-state organizations, 
the still ongoing organizational change from danwei to corporation, and their 
continuously strong role as socioeconomic institutions in local China.   
Research on China’s state-owned sector and SOEs is rich, and has over 
the last decades formed its own bulk of literature, albeit a very heterogeneous one, 
approaching the topic from different disciplines and methodological directions. Early 
studies shortly after the policy shift of opening up and reform (gaige kaifang) 
focused on the restructuring of the institutions of an hitherto entirely state-owned 
economy (e.g.: Walder 1986; 1991; 1995; Tálas 1991; Walder and Oi (eds.) 1999; Oi 
1992; Hu 2000; Lin 2001), and later focused on the development of SOEs reform in 
China (Sutherland 2003; Hassard et al. 2006; 2007; 2010; Liu 2006; Chan 2009; 
Naughton and Tsai (eds.) 2016; Jefferson forthcoming; Li 2015). Extensive research 
has looked at changing management and corporate governance practices in the 
state-owned sector (e.g.: Jackson 1986; Lockett 1988; Child 1994; Lü and Perry (eds.) 
1997; Locket and Littler 1983; Tsui and Lau (eds.) 2002; Qiang 2003; Lu and Yao 
2006; Shi 2010; Mattlin 2009; Walder 2010), and the restructuring of state-owned 
assets into business groups (e.g.: Fischer 1998; Keister 2001; Eaton 2013). There is 
also a small but detailed literature on the integration of SOE leaders with the Party-
state, among others through the appointing of Party Secretaries at the top of SOE 
management (Brødsgaard 2012; 2012a; Lin, Nan 2010; Yang et al. 2012; Li 2016). 
 Numerous studies have pointed out the strategic internationalization drive of 
SOEs (Nolan 2001; 2004; Child and Rodrigues 2005; Sutherland 2009; Gonzalez-
Vicente 2011; Li et al. 2014; Wei et al. 2015; Song et al. 2011). There is also a 
considerable amount of studies on specifically the development of the strategic 
energy sector (Arruda 2003; Andrews-Speed 2004; 2011; Kambara and Howe 2007; 
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Downs 2004; Eaton 2015; Li 2015), and the political economy of energy SOEs (Zhang 
2004; Downs 2008; Shi 2010; Taylor 2012; 2014; Xu 2017). Finally, although there is a 
number of detailed SOE studies, including CNPC (Zhang 2004; Jiang 2012; Sheng and 
Zhao 2013; Li 2015; Hassard et al. 2007), what has been missing are in-depth studies 
of how SOEs actually are integrated with the political and socio-economic objectives 
of the Party-state, especially at local level.  
While a small number of studies acknowledges the complexity of SOEs in 
China (e.g.: Zhang 2004; Li 2014; Xu 2015; 2017), especially given their historical 
legacy as danwei, many studies today adopt an ahistorical view, and some observers 
see SOEs merely as “Dinosaurs” (Ralston 2006), feeding a popular narrative of SOEs 
able resist reform (World Bank 1995; Broadman 2001; Cunningham 2007; Miura 
2015). Here, SOE have become “Zombies” under the “shelter” of bureaucrats 
resisting the abolishment of SOEs as inefficient form of business (Wildau 2016; FT 
2017), the bastion of crony capitalism (Pei 2016).  
When reading official Chinese material on the desired political outcomes and 
economic rationales for the state-owned sector, however, a different narrative 
emerges (e.g.: Xi 2014; People’s Daily commentary; CPC 2013; CPC and State Council 
2015). Even though the problems of SOE resistance to reform, and the existence of 
“zombie firms” are problems Chinese leaders themselves acknowledge (Li 2015; Fu 
2017), the non-economic objectives of state-owned capital and SOEs clearly loom 
through the official discourse, rendering SOEs as complex organizations which fulfil 
more purposes than maximizing profit as firms. This public administration dimension 
of SOEs is especially important at local levels, where local SOEs are utilized to offset 
socioeconomic pressures. The overarching objective of SOEs are thus two-fold: 
maintaining and increasing the value of state-owned assets, but also to support 
Party-state hegemony, meaning that SOEs at time have to offset economic policy in 
favor of other priorities deemed more important to the political elite, quasi state-
building, such as infrastructure or employment and social stability.  
In other words, while the economic nature of SOEs is hardly disputed, 
literature focusing on this aspect has difficulties in explaining the persistence, or 
institutional choice, to keep state-ownership as the “backbone” of the economy, 
since it makes no economic “sense” to keep poorly performing SOEs. Literature 
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looking at the economics of SOEs, simply put, is somewhat blind towards the political 
and ideological aspects behind the Party-state’s favoritism of SOEs in certain sectors. 
And even though China by any counts has embraced capitalism, Tsai and Naughton 
(2015: 3) rightly point out that public ownership still has “enduring political and 
ideological factors”, and the strategic sectors are openly favored and used for 
political goals (Hsue 2016). 
Even less research exists on the political logic of integration (or lack thereof) 
of the vertical, internal SOE relationships, and the horizontal SOE-local Party-state 
relationship, especially at the sub-national level.  Industrial SOEs in particular have a 
tremendous role to bear as employers and owners/operators of public services, and 
the enduring policy burden of supporting local economies, and thus the local Party-
state.93 Here, this paper will add empirical data and suggest theoretical 
considerations for a better understanding of the still poorly researched SOE-Party-
state nexus (Brødsgaard (2012). 
Some scholars have pointed at an important ontological difference 
between Western state theory and the Party’s view on state-market and state-
society relations (see intro chapter, and: Perry 1994; von Senger 1996; Huang 2012; 
ten Brink and Nolke 2013).94 And even though the Chinese leadership clearly thinks 
of state intervention in the economy as entirely legitimate and as an integral part of 
statecraft and governance (see e.g. Xi 2014; Xie 2013), there is a dearth of systematic 
research regarding the political and socioeconomic functions of SOEs claimed by this 
conceptual outlook. As has been argued in the introduction chapter, the CPC’s 
ideology on political organization seeks strategic control over the economy’s and 
society’s “commanding heights”, and the SOE sector is exactly this; it constitutes the 
macro-economic and socio-economic levers necessary for influence over economic 
and economy-related issues. The leadership thus has at its hands two conflicting 
tasks, one of economic growth and one of political and societal management, which 
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 The work on Danwei (see below in the text), and especially the works of Andrew Walder and Jean 
Oi are some of the few studies on the interrelated nature of enterprise organization, sociopolitical 
forces, and Party-state actors.  
94
 Also Deng Xiaoping’s comment on markets and plan being mere tools rather than defining logics of 
a system (Deng Xiaoping 1993), illustrate this readiness of the Chinese Party-state to allow varying 
permutations of state-market relations within the system. 
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it claims to be able to balance through CPC integrated leadership in government and 
business. 
Using a case study method, this paper is thought as a “test drilling”, or 
plausibility probe, exploring the deeper levels of entanglement between the SOEs 
and the Party-state, and going beyond merely seeing SOEs as a macroeconomic 
function. By looking at the state in state-owned enterprise, this paper aims at 
showing how historical legacy, local socio-economic issues, and the Party integrated 
leadership system (see below) of China’s economy renders SOEs as being not only 
businesses, but also Party-state organizations. As local governments struggle with 
their specific socio-economic issues, the Party-state integration of the local assets 
under central SOEs renders these places the heartlands of the “national champions”, 
global giants deeply entangled in policy burdens inherited from the former danwei 
system throughout China. The integration of SOEs economic goals with the Party-
state social and political objectives is very close to Polanyi’s concept of 
“embeddedness” (Polanyi [1944] 2001; Barber 1995), or the integration of markets 
under society, i.e. economics embedded in social and political relations, as will be 
discussed below.  
This paper is in large part the result of an extensive study of archival 
material and secondary literature on the oil sector, SOEs, and the political economy 
of the Party-state. Many of the points risen are based on the cumulative knowledge 
gained through the research done for the other papers of this PhD project. Its main 
findings, however, are the result of fieldwork, including interaction and interviews 
with Chinese Party-state and SOE officials, which have revealed the complex realities 
and thought processes behind the otherwise hardly animated study of policy 
documents and official discourse. Interviews used in this paper were undertaken in 
Beijing and Daqing on several research stays between 2014 – 2016. While the 
number of interviews I have been able to conduct (i.e. in Daqing and of CNPC 
officials and employees) is very limited, they nevertheless have contributed 
significant insights into the local organization and the political economy of CNPC and 
Daqing city. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that longer fieldwork and more 
interviews both in Daqing, and in the central units of CNPC would enhance this 
article. This has to be done in the future in order to support the arguments discussed 
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here, but also to shed more light into the organization of CNPC and the many 
intricate ways it is organically embedded in the political economy of Daqing.  
The same should also be done for other local branches of CNPC, e.g. in 
Liaoning or Xinjiang, where former danwei have developed into large cities. The 
main reason for the limitation of interviews obtained for the article is first and 
foremost the time constraint faced in a PhD project. Since this article was the last 
one conceived, there was limited time to develop contacts and trust in Daqing and 
CNPC. The second reason is the political climate currently in China (and in Daqing), 
which has become detectably more cautious even over the short time of this PhD 
project. It has been increasingly difficult to interview SOE and Party-state officials, 
and even at local level in Daqing, informants were wary and cautious about being 
interviewed, and asked not to be recorded. Issues concerning Party integration and 
leadership were, if not entirely off limits for inquiry, a touchy issue few wanted to 
talk about.95 A longer research stay in Daqing or another location with heavy 
industrial SOE presence would most certainly be helpful in confirming the findings of 
this paper. In terms of the archival materials used, this paper makes use of public 
documents (e.g. policy, company material, public announcements in press and Party-
state homepages), as well as secondary literature, and primary data collected on 
research stays in Beijing (several stays between 2013 and 1016) and in Daqing 
(2016).  
Reflecting the conceptual discussion presented in the introduction 
chapter of this thesis, this paper shows how CNPC straddles across the central-local 
dimension as a vertical business group, but at the same time in horizontally 
integrated and conducive to the political and socio-economic objectives of a 
hegemonic Party-state – its owner – at both central and local levels respectively. As 
such, this paper presents an innovative approach to study the multiple dimensions of 
a Chinese SOE. By way of an in-depth look at the local dimension of a national SOE, 
this paper also adds empirical knowledge to the muddled relationships of SOE 
holding (CNPC), main subsidiary (PetroChina), and their vast network of local 
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 One CNOOC official said early into the interview that: ”The State Council and the Party are two 
systems. […] But let us not overly discuss this issue.”(” 这个党国务院这是两个体系. […] 然后这个问
题就不想过多的讨论”), interview 1: (1-04-14). 
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subsidiaries, and how the restructurings of state-owned assets at the local level have 
played out.96 This local level illustrates how SOEs have yet to fully shed their former 
functions and institutional legacy as socioeconomic branches of a socialist Party-
state, and how these functions still are used to resolve some of the tensions brought 
about by economic development. The historically sensitive analysis shows how the 
danwei legacy of SOEs remains something that cannot be fully ejected for the sake of 
business profitability, even though capitalist modes of growth have entered the 
picture. The “social relations of Chinese State Capitalism” (Gallagher 2015) are sticky 
institutions manifest in a social contract between SOE and society, where a CPC-
integrated leadership have to negotiate capitalist redistribution reforms and social 
security maintenance, especially at the local level. Here SOEs remain not only an 
ideologically enshrined “backbone of the economy” (CPC 2013), but also an “integral 
part of the local economy” (Jiang 2012: 396), and even part of the identity of local 
societies that grew around danwei before they became for-profit businesses.  
In order to get a handle on the issues outlined above, I argue that 
understanding four interrelated dimensions of China’s SOEs is important: 
SOE/danwei history (1), current enterprise structure (2), their integration with the 
local economy on the one hand (3), and with the larger hegemonic project Party-
state on the other (4). This paper will proceed as follows. After providing a brief 
historical institutional backdrop of state-owned enterprise in China,97 illustrated by 
the development of CNPC from ministry to SOE, and of Daqing from danwei to city, 
the integration of CNPC with Party-state will be analyzed. The paper then provides a 
detailed discussion of some of the concrete ways the dual nature of CNPC, as SOE 
and as Party-state organization, unfolds in the case of CNPC’s local presence in 
Daqing.  
 
From Ministry to Business Group: CNPC in Historical Perspective: 
 
                                                        
96 As Jiang Binbin (2012: 389) points out: “it is unclear how much success the traditional PABs 
[Petroleum Administration Buros, such as the Daqing Petroleum Administration, the original Danwei 
in charge of Daqing’s oil industry] had with restructuring.” 
97
 A more detailed overview is given in the introduction chapter of the thesis. 
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This historical legacy of SOEs as work units, or danwei, is probably the most 
important factor when it comes to understanding the persisting social and public 
administration aspects of local SOEs, including the branches of national champions. 
Danwei were organized like small societies rather than simply enterprises in their 
structure, providing their designated population not only salary, but also cradle-to-
grave social and welfare services (Henderson and Cohen 1984; Lu and Perry (eds.) 
1997; Guo and Wang 2005; Xie and Wu 2008). Under the danwei system, which in 
the case of Daqing lasted up to 1997, workers and their families (like much of urban 
China) were organized in planned cradle-to-grave societies, with public services and 
welfare almost completely accounted for within the confines of the danwei (Lü and 
Perry (eds.) 1997; Zhang 2004). The gradual dismantling of this system meant for 
Daqing’s prestigious and large oil industry, that it went from being a powerful 
danwei under the Ministry of Petroleum, organized more like a small country than a 
firm (Zhang 2004), to devolve into branches under a central SOE, which took over 
most administrative powers and split it into a core business, and a non-core business 
tier. 
The Danwei as form of organization in fact has an institutional tradition 
extending to the republican period prior to 1949 (Solinger 1997; Bian 2008), and as 
institution the danwei continues to play a role in social organization and identity, 
also in Daqing.  Even though the danwei organization of social space and activity is 
far less important today than it was up to the 1990s (Bjorklund 1986), The multi-
layered structure of danwei with “mother” units and subordinated, subsidiary 
danwei (ibid.), strongly reminds of today’s diversified business group structure of 
SOEs.  Danwei affiliation and social identity too remain somewhat connected. 
Andrew Walder (1991) has shown, that danwei-affiliation had a role in the formation 
of protests of workers during the 1989 protests in China, and in a historical 
institutional approach, Corinna-Barbara Francis (1996) illustrated how even 
companies established in the 1990s tended to reproduce the long-established 
danwei institutions of employee welfare and benefits. It still is common today to ask 
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“what danwei are you working at” when asking about one’s employment,98 and 
given the direct descent of SOEs from danwei, and the prevailing role of the danwei, 
or more precisely the institution of a social contract between company and 
employees, it is therefore not surprising that some authors conflate danwei with SOE 
(e.g. Yang 2007; Hassard et al. 2006).  
Prior to the 1980s, CNPC did not exist in its current corporate form, but 
the industrial assets in the petrochemical industry were managed by ministries, 
mainly the Ministry of Oil Industry and the Ministry of Chemical Industry, formed in 
the 1950s and 60s (see introduction chapter). Daqing was singled out by Mao 
Zedong as model for industrial organization in 1964, and this “Learning about 
Industry from Daqing” (工业学大庆) campaign became emblematic for the type of 
“large and comprehensive” (大而全) organization of industrial danwei (CPC 1964; 
Hama 1980). The campaign drove not only workers to Daqing, but created a self-
contained micro-society around the core of a growing up-stream oil industry, which 
was “run like a little country” more than like a business (Zhang 2004: 76).99  
Local “oil administrations” (石油管理局), e.g. the still existing Daqing 
Petroleum Administration (大庆石油管理局, from hereon: DPA), were the 
production headquarters of China’s oil industry, and at the same time the 
administrative core of their danwei. They reported to Ministry of Oil Industry, while 
the State Council appointed the leadership, and the State Planning Commission 
drafted production plans. These administrations, of a non-corporatized and heavily 
administrative form existed in all major oil producing localities, and were 
reorganized only during the 1990s.    
The institutional change from danwei to corporatized SOEs has been gradual, 
and remains incomplete, in particular because of SOEs function as guardians of social 
and economic stability in troubled localities.  This process started in earnest after 
1994, when China adopted its Company Law in 1994 in order to clarify property 
                                                        
98
 Several interviewees were referring to their danwei when talking about their work place, and were 
referring to other companies as “that danwei” (那个单位). 
99
 See also the section on danwei above. Implied here is, that a large danwei such as the Daqing 
Petroleum Administration constituted its own centralized welfare system, including cradle-to-grave 
services for its members, i.e. employees and their family, and livelihood organized according to 
socialist planning. 
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rights, authorities, and responsibilities, and to establish a basic code for corporate 
governance. Prior to this, the first corporatizations of the state-owned sector during 
the 1980s were still rather irregular and experimental in form (Zhang 2004). Seeing 
the huge successes in terms of economic growth in the township and village 
enterprises, enterprises reform was seen as a necessary step to boost the inefficient 
and bloated industrial state-owned sector. The first SOE in the oil sector to be 
corporatized under the State Council’s “oil company” experiment, was China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) in 1982, when it was carved out of the 
Ministry of Oil Industry in order to develop offshore oil and gas reserves in 
cooperation with foreign companies (Kambara and Howe 2007). CNPC was at that 
time still managed by the Ministry of Oil Industry, and when the ministry was 
disbanded in 1988, CNPC was assembled from its industrial assets, while 
administrative authorities were placed in the newly established Ministry of Energy. 
Sinopec, another national oil giant, had in 1983 been formed as experimental 
company in the downstream petrochemical industry, from assets of the Ministries of 
Chemical Industry, Oil Industry, and Textiles Industry. CNPC joined the oil company 
experiment in 1989, starting to restructure the local oil administrations (石油管理局
), into business groups around the core of an oil company (Zhang 2004). 
By order of the State Council under Zhu Rongji (State Council 1998:14; 
China Oil Monthly 1998), “two extra-large oil companies” were established by 
merging and corporatizing existing assets in China’s domestic oil industry: Sinopec 
and CNPC (while CNOOC remained in charge of offshore oil assets). Both these new 
oil giants were structured as business groups in accord with the new Company Law. 
Geographically, the physical assets in the oil sector, including companies, 
infrastructure, capital, and human resources, were divided into two regions, with 
China’s 12 most Northern provinces going to CNPC, and the “Southern” parts 
(including Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanxi), going to Sinopec (State Council 1998:14). Two 
State Council orders followed, one for CNPC (State Council 1998:57), and one for 
Sinopec (State Council 1998:58), transferring 6 oil fields to Sinopec from the CNPC 
group, and 16 of Sinopec chemical facilities and refineries to CNPC, in order to create 
two “comprehensive” oil companies that could compete, also internationally (Wu 
2000). This consolidated the hitherto very fragmented oil sector, establishing a field 
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of three oil giants, and two smaller ones: Sinochem and China National Star 
Petroleum Corporation, and crated business groups out of the many local oil 
administrations as subsidiaries of Sinopec and CNPC. The latter two “lost” in terms of 
size and dominance in the oil sector during the restructuring from 1998-2003, and 
while National Star Petroleum was merged with Sinopec, Sinochem remains to be a 
producer and trader of petrochemicals.  
In the case of CNPC, 87 local oil production enterprises (plus their 
subsidiaries) were reorganized in a vertically integrated business group, directly 
overseen by the State Council. This new “national champion” took over local 
organizations and centralized authority and resources away from the local 
constituencies, which now were merely subsidiaries under a national holding. 
Intense negotiation between CNPC and local units over the amount of targeted 
profits to be handed over to the holding were common, and the proud centers of 
industry such as Daqing felt let down by this restructuring (Zhang 2004). However, 
given the size of the group and the lack of a watchdog inside or outside the CNPC 
group, little could CNPC do to tightly monitor and control budgets and investment 
plans of local branches. Although the central CNPC financial department was in 
charge of inspecting and monitoring annual budgets, even discussing them at annual 
budget conferences, prevailing soft budget constraints within the corporation, 
waste, and abuse of power remained a big problem between 1994 and 1998. The 
byzantine structure of the newly reorganized and immense conglomerates with 
multiple layers of legal persons, and poor managerial vertical alignment was 
addressed in the late 1990s and under the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission’s (SASAC) watch after 2003 (Wu 2000; Li 2015). 
  
CNPC Today:   
 
The transformation of China’s industrial sector since the early 1980s has been 
remarkable. Still, after nearly four decades of economic reforms, state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) still make up a significant portion of China’s economy. This is as 
much a choice as it is a historical legacy, and SOEs are seen as the motor behind 
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China’s developmental success story (e.g.: Lin et al. 2001; Naughton and Tsai (eds.) 
2015; Jefferson forthcoming). Even though private and foreign companies have 
made substantial inroads (Huang 2008; Lardy 2014), SOEs remain the designated 
“backbone” of the economy (CPC 2013), and they continue to dominate or even 
monopolize strategic sectors. Representing around one third of national GDP (US 
Dept. of State 2016), the approximately 114.000 existing SOEs at all levels (SASAC 
2015: 699), reported 63 trillion Yuan revenue in 2016, with the 102 central level 
SOEs accounting for more than half of that (MOF 2017). CNPC is one of them, 
ranking 2nd in size only after State Grid (Forbes 2017). Even though SOEs only 
account for less than 0.6% of the total number of companies registered in Chin (in 
2016, 26 million companies were registered, see: Xinhua 2017), SOEs should be seen 
as a strong economic base supported and prioritized by the political center.  
One important reason for this is their importance as employers. In 
2012, SOEs employed roughly 40 million people (SASAC 2013: 713), showing a steep 
increase in the size of the SOE workforce after the stimulus packages of 2009, 
reacting to the global financial crisis. Between 2002 and 2009, the number had 
remained relatively stable around 33 million (Burns 2006; SASAC 2010: 767). By 2012 
the SOE workforce thus accounted for around 5% of total employment. In recent 
years both the number of SOEs and of SOE employees has dropped significantly, 
likely an effect of the SOE reforms launched under Xi Jinping. While there were 
152.000 SOEs in 2012, employing 39 million, in 2014 the numbers had dropped to 
114.000 SOEs and 31 million employees (SASAC 2013: 713; SASAC 2015: 699). 
 Even though the numbers of private and self-employed people has 
risen dramatically over the last decade, with private unit employees tripled from 35 
in 2005 to 90 million in 2014, and self-employed swelling from 28 to 70 million, the 
number of those employed in SOEs remained relatively stable, continuing to be a 
bedrock of employment in spite of repeatedly announced market reforms, 
streamlining, and restructurings.100 CNPC, with its 1.5 million employees is even 
within this group of companies a large player. 
                                                        
100
 Given that China has a total workforce of around 800 million, (World Bank 2017), these numbers 
seem small and odd. On top of private and SOE employees, public servants and public service organ 
employees (shiye danwei) are a large group of estimated 40 million people (Brødsgaard and Gang 
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What many refer to as CNPC (中国石油天然气集团公司),101 is in fact 
only the holding company at the apex of a vast business group. 102  It is fully owned 
by the state, not listed, with SASAC formally in charge of exercising the state’s (i.e. 
State Council’s) ownership rights. As a whole, the CNPC group employs around 1.5 
million people in hundreds of subsidiaries and branches across China and globally. 
While CNPC forms the spearhead for economic as well as political decisions for the 
group, it seems to work more like a centralized headquarter, rather than a company, 
coordinating the group’s core business assets with its service (non-core business) 
assets, and linking it with strategic, political decision making in Beijing. While the 
CNPC group as a whole is a byzantine complex that makes generalizations about its 
features difficult, a pattern is visible in the way core business and non-core business 
are structurally kept in two distinct yet integrated silos.  
The holding company’s corporate governance structure is made up by a 
board of directors, an advisory board, and a Party group at the top. Chairman of the 
CPC group, at time of writing Wang Yilin, concurrently holds the position of director 
of the board. The General Manager, Zhang Jianhua, is vice-secretary of the Party 
group, and in this double leadership team, Wang formally ranks higher due to his 
CPC position. The appointment of the Party secretary/chairman is not made by the 
board, but by the CPC central organization department, and due to the bureaucratic 
rank of vice-minister equivalent it has to be confirmed by the Politburo (Brødsgaard 
2012; Cai 2014). 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
2014). The reliability of statistics in China remains a contentious issue, see Matthew Crabbe (2014), 
and albeit should be treated with care, can serve as good statistical indicators. As the findings of this 
paper suggest, there is also a large number of indirect or hidden employment, as well as in-house 
retirement, which could at least account for some of the remaining millions of employees in the 
balance. 
101 From hereon, when referring to CNPC, only the holding is meant. When referring to the entire 
CNPC conglomerate, including all its subsidiaries, I will write CNPC group. PetroChina is the main 
subsidiary of CNPC, and forms the top of the CNPC group’s core business assets. 
102 A business groups in the Chinese context (according to the relevant State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce regulation (1998)  is defined as a group, where the mother company must 
have a registered capital of at least 50 million RMB, it must have at least five affiliates, and a total 
registered group capital of at least 100 million RMB. Affiliation is included in the registration. 
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TABLE 1: CNPC corporate governance chart:  
Source: CNPC homepage (2017). 
  
Apart from the general office and the Party committee, 20 functional departments 
are in charge of various areas from retiree affairs to policy research (see table 1). 
Furthermore, CNPC has three specialized branches (分公司) each in charge of 
several companies within their respective technical area (seven companies in 
manufacturing, six in engineering and construction, and five in oilfield service). In 
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2012, at the first tier under the holding level there are 68 companies, including those 
18 under the specialized branches. Among these 68 subsidiaries, five are majority 
owned subsidiaries (one of them Petro China Co Ltd. (中国石油天然气股份有限公
司, hereafter: PetroChina). There are furthermore 9 corporatized oil and gas fields, 
10 refining and chemical companies, 8 overseas companies, 10 research institutes, 
and 8 classified as “others” in CNPC official material (CNPC 2012; 2015). Many of 
these 1st tier subsidiaries again have several subsidiaries, and this way a central SOE, 
that is the holding group company at the top, is often only the tip of the iceberg 
consisting of hundreds of subsidiaries in various business sectors and localities.103  
Moreover, five majority-owned holding companies under CNPC serve 
individual strategic purposes for the CNPC group as a whole. PetroChina is the main 
subsidiary in charge of the group’s core business, commercial and industrial 
operation of its oil and gas assets. China Petroleum Finance Co Ltd. (中油财务有限
责任公司), established in 1995, is responsible for the group’s overall financial 
management and strategy. CNPC Asset Management Co Ltd. (中油资产管理有限公
司) is responsible for overseeing the group’s vast amount of assets and investment 
portfolio, and finally, CNPC has its own bank and a financial leasing company, Bank 
of Kunlun (昆仑银行) and Kunlun Financial Leasing Co Ltd. (昆仑金融租债有限责任
公司). These last two were incorporated under CNPC in 2009 when CNPC acquired 
Karamay City Commercial Bank, and established the financial leasing company a year 
later, with 6 billion RMB in capital (CBRC 2010). 
As a result of the corporatization, meant to gear SOEs towards 
floatation after 1998 (重组上市), the CNPC group was reorganized in two vertical 
tiers, one for its core business (under PetroChina), and one for the remaining assets 
in non-core business sectors servicing the core businesses, but also including the 
remaining legacy operations such as hospitals, schools, power plants etc. While 
CNPC remains the holding company at the top of the conglomerate, all the main 
commercial and core business operations, also at local level, are therefore 
subsidiaries of PetroChina. This formal structural separation of companies 
                                                        
103
 For a graphic illustration of the complexity of another SOE group, Shenhua, see: Lin and Milhaupt 
2012.  Note that the web of relations in their illustration only includes listed firms, and not the 
dozens, if not hundreds, of unlisted non-core business firms 
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designated as core business organized under PetroChina, and operations designated 
as non-core business under CNPC and its branches (see corporate governance chart), 
masks a complex and muddled relationship among these companies at local levels. 
Many of them were one danwei now split into one company in charge of commercial 
activities, and one (or several) assisting its sibling with technology and service (see 
below and table 4). In practice the separation is less clear, and as sibling companies 
the core business units heavily rely on the service and assistance of the non-core 
units. In fact, as one interviewee pointed out, the rationality of the separation is 
more a “method of book keeping” (“记账方式”, interview 2), designating 
commercial value and profit to one tier, rather than strict separation of operations. 
This way, the corporatized core businesses are profitable businesses, while the non-
core businesses often run a deficit. 
 
Petro China Co Ltd. 
 
Petro China Co Ltd. is a holding company directly under CNPC and the main 
corporation of the CNPC group (see Table 2), forming the core business of the CNPC 
group by managing the bulk of the group’s oil-industry and commercial assets. CNPC 
is its majority owner, holding 86.5% of shares (Petro China 2015). PetroChina has, 
like CNPC, close to a dozen departments in charge of the various managerial and 
administrative tasks, including a CPC group, an international department, auditing 
etc. (CNPC 2012). Somewhat similar to CNPC, its main business operations are 
organized under five branch companies. These specialized branches cover the 
respective areas of exploration and production, refining and chemical industry, sales, 
pipelines, and finally international exploration and development. Under these 
branches, around 100 subsidiaries operate in a regional division of business 
operation. 
Under the 100 direct subsidiaries of PetroChina, hundreds of companies operate at 
several levels (see tables 2 and 3). One of the largest ones, The PetroChina subsidiary 
Daqing Oilfield Co. Ltd. (大庆油田有限责任公司, hereafter: Daqing Oilfield) for 
example, again has 54 subsidiaries, ranging from training institutions, drilling 
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companies, water supply, and hospitals, employing over 240.000 workers (Daqing 
Oilfield 2016).104  
The size and complexity of the CNPC group as a whole, illustrated by 
the interwoven organizational structure in these examples, is one of the more 
practical reasons of why reforming and streamlining SOEs is such a difficult task. SOE 
leaders often favor economically rational decisions, but political priorities are an 
overriding factor in decision-making (interview 1) 
 
 
 
Table 2: Structure of on selected branch of the CNPC group’s core business tier in 
Daqing: 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
104
 This suggests that the officially posted number of close to 1.5 million employees under CNPC does 
not account for the 3
rd
 tier and below (with CNPC as 1
st
, and PetroChina 2
nd
 tier). If one third tier 
subsidiary (Daqing Oilfield) alone has 240.000 employees, the number for total employees of the 
entire CNPC group is likely to be much higher. 
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Table 3: structure of one selected branch of the CNPC group’s non-core business 
tier in Daqing: 
 
Source: Authors own illustration. Numbers in grey circles are employees of the adjacent entity. 
 
 
Local Embeddedness: CNPC in Daqing:  
 
Looking at the business group structure of Petro China and CNPC, the complicated 
process of an evolutionary change from government-managed administration to 
corporation immediately becomes clear. Also the muddled outcomes of 
restructuring a vast, “large and comprehensive” danwei enterprise into a two-tier 
group (core and non-core business), become clear when looking at a local case such 
as Daqing. The development of the oil industry took off after oil was discovered, led 
to the growth of an entire society around it, and its industrialization around the 
Daqing Petroleum Administration, is a lucid illustration of how socio-political and 
politico-economic organization of localities and their SOEs can be extremely difficult 
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to separate. Daqing in effect does exist as city because of the oil field, and most of its 
infrastructure and public service was until the 1980s built and managed by the DPA 
and its branches. Still today, while some public services and administrative functions 
have been transferred to the local state, the DPA still owns and operates schools, 
electric power plants, water works etc. Like any other SOE, apart from its industrial 
branches the DPA was a comprehensive social service and welfare organization, in 
charge of everything from water supply, hospitals, housing etc. (Zhang 2004).  
This local “miniature government” with industrial arm was forced to 
devolve and reform after the establishment and corporatization of the CNPC group, 
and the subsequent subordination of the DPA under the central CNPC in 1998. Under 
the “restructuring and flotation” and “separation and separate establishment” (分开
分立), and “business group-ization” (集团化) programs the 1997/98 restructurings 
cut the danwei into two tiers, core-business assets such as Daqing Oilfield under 
PetroChina, and non-core assets under the DPA (Jin and Li 2004).  
A similar separation of core and non-core assets, and the vertical 
organization under respectively CNPC and PetroChina, also happened in other local 
branches of CNPC/PetroChina. In the Liaohe region (located in and around Panjin city 
in Liaoning Province), under the restructuring and floatation reform the local 
Petroleum Administration (Liaohe Oil Exploration Administration, 辽河石油勘探局) 
and its industrial branch established in 1980, the Liaohe Oil Field Company (辽河油
田公司), had their core-business assets carved out and merged under a new 
established corporation under Liaohe Oilfield Company, the Liaohe Jinma Co. Ltd. (辽
河金马油田股份有限公司). The separation here was carried out somewhat 
differently from Daqing. The local Petroleum Administration issued 110.000 shares 
of this new corporation, shifting majority control to PetroChina by transferring to it 
90.000 shares upon floatation (Jinma 1999). The Liaohe Oil Exploration 
Administration remains structurally organized under CNPC while Liaohe Oilfield 
Company is in the business tier by virtue of its oversight of Liaohe Jinma Co. Ltd. 
In principle, Daqing’s municipal Party-state administration and the local 
branches of CNPC in Daqing, being subordinates of Beijing in their respective 
regards, should feed into the policies/objectives handed down to them, i.e. energy 
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security and profitable energy business. The complex reality, however, is that both 
the SOE as a business group, and the Party-state have multiple dimensions and 
ambiguous objectives. The central Party-state incentivizes the central CNPC group to 
be a strategic player for energy security and generation of profit on energy markets, 
and the local Party-state uses the local CNPC branches to solve more immediate 
concerns of state-building and social stability nature. Vertical and horizontal 
alignment of singular objectives such as economic growth in SOEs such as CNPC thus 
becomes difficult, if not impossible, since the overriding hegemonic project of the 
Party-state, and with that stability, has priority before profitability. Recognizing SOEs 
also as Party-state organizations, with a still present danwei legacy therefore shows 
a complex and multi-leveled picture of SOEs, functioning as both socio-economic 
organizations and business groups at the same time. 
This split-up of core and non-core assets under respectively PetroChina and 
the mother company CNPC, is often also visible in the legal status of subsidiaries, 
with the, often listed, core business assets restructured as incorporated limited 
liability companies (“有限责任公司”), while assets in the CNPC tier often have 
retained their former names of “ordinary” company or even administrative titles (公
司, 局). The non-core business subsidiaries left with the economically non-viable 
assets fulfill service functions and technology assistance for their corporatized core 
business “sibling” (“兄弟企业”). Daqing Oilfield is one example of core business 
carved out of a former danwei, with the latter remaining non-core business group. 
This split is indicated in table x, showing the DPA in the blue tier under CNPC, and 
Daqing Oilfield in the blue tier under PetroChina.  
However, even though the DPA still is a non-core business Daqing Oilfield 
“sibling” (Daqing Oilfield 2010), the separation remains much clearer on paper than 
it is in reality, and linkages between core and non-core businesses units remain 
strong. According to one mid-level cadre at Daqing Oilfield’s subsidiary Daqing 1st Oil 
Extraction Company (大庆第一采油厂), the DPA and Oilfield companies were 
separated and merged twice since 1997, and ownership and operation 
responsibilities of public service organizations and utilities are in often still shared 
among the two, having been a single organization for decades prior to the 90s 
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(interview 2). Another employee at a Daqing Oilfield subsidiary confirmed the close 
cooperation and often only formal separation of his unit with the DPA (interview 4). 
Company material explains that the DPA works as a supporting unit for engineering 
technology, while Daqing Oilfield is in charge of business activities in exploration, 
upstream, and downstream operations. This means that the lucrative oil business 
falls squarely into the responsibilities of Daqing Oilfield, while DPA with its many 
public service units is left without many options for income. The fact that DPA and 
Daqing Oilfield were merged and separated repeatedly, and the fact that they are – 
although appearing separately in organization charts –listed as one unit in CNPC’s 
annual reports (CNPC 2012: 295), suggests that the two tiers at local level remain 
tightly connected, and that danwei-type integration of the oil industry in Daqing 
remains. 
DPA and Daqing Oilfield are themselves conglomerates with numerous 
subsidiaries, and their integration and embeddedness in local society runs deep. This 
is not only because oil is the main economic foundation of Daqing’s economy, but 
also because the industry is main provider of jobs. The DPA today has 111.000 
employees in 28 branches, including 8 business groups (down from 12 in 1998) in 
e.g. electricity generation, public heating, and schools and hospitals (Jin and Li 2004; 
Yu and Chen 2006). Also Daqing Oilfield, with more than 240.000 employees in 54 
subsidiaries, is a sizable business group (Daqing Petroleum Administration 2016; 
Daqing Oilfield 2016, see also table 2 and 3). One cadre of a Daqing Oilfield 
Subsidiary estimated that as many as 70% of Daqing’s population are directly or 
indirectly dependent on jobs in the oil industry, i.e. the CNPC group and its 
subsidiaries (interview 2). Others estimated similar numbers (interview 4, and 
anecdotal evidence from several informal discussions with Daqing residents).105 
While the actual number probably is lower, there is little question about the socio-
                                                        
105
 One bar owner of lamented that, after Xi Jinping had launched the anti-corruption campaign, and 
an inspection team had visited the city, many bars, karaoke parlors and restaurants had closed, 
because employees of the state-owned subsidiaries of CNPC were restricted from using public 
company funds (公款) for entertainment and in restaurants. In an ironic twist, this was a common 
complaint by many I talked to in the service industry, blaming Xi and the anti-corruption efforts for 
drying out the non-oil related local service sector, thereby sabotaging the local governments efforts 
to shift employment away from the increasingly weak oil sector. Anecdotal evidence such as this 
could indicate some of the problematic and at times contradictory roles the local state (including 
SOEs) has in its task to maintain hegemony and upkeep social and economic stability. 
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economic importance of the CNPC group as the prime force in the local economy, 
especially as employer. Table 2 and 3 show how large individual branches of the 
CNPC group (the Daqing red and blue tiers) can be. As shown, the selected 
subsidiaries are merely individual branches, and many of the other subsidiaries have 
equally sized chains of subsidiaries. One interesting point is the number of 
employees, indicated in the grey circles. If Daqing Oilfield already has 240.000 
employees, or one fourth of the number quoted by PetroChina, and bearing in mind 
that PetroChina has dozens of other large subsidiaries with their own local branches, 
it seem highly unlikely that the number of 1 million is enough. 
The weight on local CNPC as support mechanism for local society, was 
pointed out by what many informants referred to as local protectionism and 
”protecting local employment” (保护本地职业) (interview 2; 4). This means that the 
local, Daqing branches of the CNPC group are “looking after local [Daqing] residents 
and provides jobs to them”.106 One interviewee (4) said that he came back to Daqing 
after studying in Harbin, because he knew he would get a well-paid job easily, given 
his hukou (household) registration and family background in Daqing. He 
acknowledged that “outsiders”, i.e. people with non-Daqing hukou moving to Daqing 
would only in very few cases find employment, since jobs in the oil industry were in 
decline. To the question how locals could get jobs in this situation, she responded 
that because of local protectionism, “there will always be a job for a local”. Similar 
accounts were repeated during virtually all conversations about this matter in 
Daqing, both in formal and informal interview settings. Local residents could, 
according to these accounts, rely on jobs within the local CNPC branches effectively 
subsidizing local employment.107  
This practice is, so I argue, not only a matter of localism particular to 
Daqing and the CNPC group, but it is tolerated by the leadership because it is seen as 
an important support for the local Party-states interest in social stability, especially 
                                                        
106
 The interviewees in Daqing did not want to be recorded, and quotes here are from my notes taken 
during the interviews. 
107
 If and how kinship and personal connections play a role could not be assessed, but likely also have 
an impact. However, all local residents I talked to had family and friends working in the oil industry, 
and therefore virtually everyone from Daqing has connections to oil industry companies. 
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employment in an area where industrial layoffs are an acute threat.108 This state-
building or social responsibility function vested in SOEs is hardly a new phenomenon, 
and informal networks were commonly used to secure employment in danwei 
(Solinger 1997). Structurally, although exact numbers are hard to come by, large 
SOEs are known to have absorbed many of the laid-off workers during the 
restructurings in the late 1990s and after (Jiang 2012), and “internal retirement” (离
岗退养 or 内部退休), in which workers are retired but stay on the company payroll 
in internal retirement plans, has been a common practice to cut staff without 
disrupting social stability (Liu 2014; Wang and Zhang 2016).  
Considering how private and township village enterprises were vastly 
more efficient than SOEs, internal retirement was introduced as a policy to relieve 
SOE’s burden of labor cost and excess staff (State Council 1993: 111), giving the 
government more time to establish public pension schemes (Song 2011). During the 
1998 restructurings, however, internal retirement was widely used (or misused) to 
slash employees in a way that avoided overburdening the local government’s limited 
capacity to catch the large numbers of layoffs. This was also the case in Daqing, 
where core and non-core business were carved out of one danwei. In Daqing’s DPA 
the number of employees prior to restructuring in 1998 was around 500.000, and 
many of the 150.000 that were laid off subsequently went through an internal 
pension scheme (Yu and Chen 2006) One informant mentioned the example of his 
parents, where one was put on an internal retirement plan during the late 1990s, 
while the other parent, who was in a leadership position, was able to negotiate her 
continued full employment (interview 4). Also in other “post-danwei” societies such 
as Lanzhou (also part of the CNPC group), the split-up lead to close to 10.000 
employees on internal retirement, a number that only in 2014 was down at 1084 (Liu 
2014). 
 The long history of danwei organization and the strong identity of Daqing’s oil 
industry, the praxis of local protectionism point at the heart of the role of SOEs as 
not only economic enterprise, but also as safeguards of local, socio-economic 
stability, supporting the Party-state’s claim for a legitimate leadership position. This 
                                                        
108
 This claim needs to be backed by further investigation and evidence of similar practices in other 
local economies that are dominated by individual SOEs. 
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is not simply petty local politics taking place hidden from the far-away headquarters 
in Beijing, since the leader of the local main branches in Daqing DPA and Daqing 
Oilfield, who certainly knows about this practice, concurrently is a high ranking 
official in PetroChina. It indicates a strategic choice, tolerating employment safety in 
structurally weak areas such as Daqing as an imperative for company policy. The 
important point here is, that this type of “local protectionism” is not simply a case of 
misconduct at the cost of company efficiency, but it is a social function of a locally 
dominant SOE as a (Party-) state-owned organization. For the CPC’s concern about 
the legitimacy of its hegemonic position, maintaining a danwei-type of social security 
through local state-owned organizations is as much part of the “performance 
legitimacy” (Yang and Zhao 2015), as is economic growth and development. In order 
to ensure that the latter do not disrupt the social fabric in areas challenged by 
changes of the economic structure, the Party-state clings to its claim that an 
omnipresent Party leadership is indispensable. 
 
Leadership Integration: CNPC and the Party-state System: 
 
As a SOE, the CNPC leadership as well as that of its subsidiaries is not only supervised 
by the state administration (notably through organizations such as SASAC), but also 
closely integrated with the CPC. Just like any state administration, the leadership of 
SOEs, as discussed above, is made up by Party secretaries at the apex of the 
enterprise’s corporate governance structure, and party groups are in place in all its 
branches and affiliated organizations. And the degree of Party mobilization and 
organization of its (CNPC employed) members is not insignificant. In 2011, the 
646.223 Party members employed in the CNPC group were organized in 33.997 Party 
groups at all levels, illustrating just how deep the Party is integrated with the SOE. In 
these groups, which at the top level discuss important management issues even 
before they are formally discussed by the company board, everything from ethics, 
company management, career paths, and political issues are discussed, and they 
have an important influence on daily work routines, according to one interviewee 
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(interview 2). Also trainings, mandatory study sessions of Party policy, and voluntary 
work is organized by Party groups.  
One example illustrating how there is a strategic organizational and 
ideological function vested in Party groups, underlining an conceptualization of SOEs 
as embedded organizations spanning across society at large, is the formal mission 
statement of the CNPC Party groups’ work program of the “three big 
responsibilities”; economy, politics, society (CNPC 2012). The case of Daqing 
illustrates that this is not only a window dressing messages printed in annual reports, 
but a locally reproduced organizational policy (see section on Daqing Oilfield’s 
development plan below), not least because of the danwei legacy and the socio-
economic entanglement of SOE and local society. 
Structurally, CNPC is not only under the supervision of the central 
administration – its formal owner - but also tightly connected with the local Party-
state. Horizontally, this means a close integration of local SOE assets and Daqing’s 
local government. In a city that virtually grew around a SOE, enterprise management 
and city government remain in a interdependent relationship, and two of the 13 
highest ranking officials in Daqing’s municipal leadership concurrently serve as 
leading executives of local PetroChina subsidiaries (Wang Deyi is CEO of Daqing 
Petrochemical Company, and Wang Kun is Vice-Chairman of Daqing Oilfield Co. 
Ltd.).109 
There is a considerable integration of leadership between the entities of the 
CNPC group, indicating how corporatized (core business) and legacy units non-core 
business) are interconnected by way of leadership integration. The central level 
leadership team of PetroChina largely overlaps with CNPC’s (the holding), and Wang 
Yilin serves as Party Chairman and Chairman of the Board in both companies, 
alongside a few other board members who hold leading positions in both PetroChina 
and CNPC, such as Liu Hongbin, who is Executive Director (执行董事) in both 
                                                        
109
 There are of course practical implications of the overlap of not only managers within the CNPC 
group, but also local governments. This is a complex issue I cannot elaborate on here, not least 
because it would require significantly more detailed research and data, without which I don’t think 
one can draw sound conclusions. It suggests, however, that the danwei legacy of local SOEs remains 
an important factor in shaping the local political economy and socio-political policies. 
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companies. PetroChina does have its own CEO, 110 Wang Donjin, while 8 of the 10 
top leaders of CNPC concurrently hold positions in the top leadership of Petro China. 
The two exemptions of the “rule”, Zhang Jianhua and Xu Jiming, both entered the 
CNPC group only recently, coming from Sinopec and the National Audit Office 
respectively.  
At the local level, the integration of CNPC and PetroChina is 
exemplified by the case of Liu Hongbin and Sun Longde, whose careers shows how 
management of CNPC, PetroChina, and the two main subsidiaries in Daqing is 
connected. PetroChina’s Vice-President Sun Longde, is also General Manager (总经
理) of Daqing Oilfield Co. Ltd. and Director (局长) of the DAP (representing both the 
“blue” and the “red” tier at the first level under central level on table x), aligning the 
management of the two main units in Daqing of both CNPC and PetroChina (Daqing 
Daily 2016). Sun is also chairman of the “CNPC Heilongjiang- based company 
Coordination Group”, and Party group member in all the mentioned organizations. 
Sun’s case is not unusual, but seems to follow a common career pattern. Sun took 
over all mentioned posts in Daqing from Liu Hongbin in 2016 (see table 4), when Liu 
was promoted to become concurrently Vice President (VP) (副总经理) of CNPC, and 
                                                        
110
 The formal titles used for management in Chinese companies are somewhat difficult to translate 
into Western corporate governance categories, and managers have differing titles depending on 
whether or not the company is listed. In general, SOE top leadership consists of a Party Secretary, a 
General Manager (GM) or CEO, and a Chairman and a Director of the Board at the very top. They are 
followed by a number of Vice-Presidents (VPs), executive Director(s), and CFO (i.e. an equivalent 
Chinese title: 会计师). The highest ranking official, or “first hand”, is the Party Secretary (党书记), 
who also serves as Chairman of the Board (董事长).110 Under the top leader, there is a Director of 
Board (董事), and the equivalent of a CEO or General Manager. There seems to be a differentiation in 
the Chinese titles depending on whether or not a SOE is incorporated as limited liability company or 
not, and the translations of titles must be seen as approximations to the Western titles used in 
corporate governance. 总经理, mostly used in non-incorporated companies such as CNPC, is 
translated as GM (in a non-incorporated), and 总裁 as CEO (in a limited liability company such as 
Petro China), while both副总经理 and副总裁 are equivalent to VP. Under this second level there 
usually are a number of managers equivalent to Vice Presidents, 副总经理 in firms such as CNPC, and 
副总裁 in e.g. Petro China. Moreover, there are a few Executive Directors 执行董事 and Non-
Executive Directors (非执行董事).  
Most managers at this level have more than one title, and often serve top level 
positions in both mother company and a subsidiary, as the case of CNPC and Petro China illustrates. 
Importantly, the Party group of a company includes all the top managers, and the Party Chairman 
today has to be Chairman of the Board, according to CPC regulations. Moreover, important decisions 
are discussed in Party groups first, before they are discussed and decided upon in a company board 
(CPC 2015). The CPC thus is tightly integrated with the core of SOE leadership, not only through the 
power to appoint management, but also through this organizational integration with management 
and decision-making protocols. 
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Executive Director and VP (副总裁) of PetroChina. Before that, from 2014 Liu 
concurrently served not only as GM/Director of the two Daqing subsidiaries, but was 
also Executive Director and VP of Petro China. Liu has thus served in various 
managerial leadership functions in both Petro China’s and CNPC’s main subsidiary in 
Daqing, while also shuffling between posts in PetroChina and CNPC, serving 
concurrent positions in the companies’ leadership (CNPC website; Petro China 
website). Sun seems to follow a somewhat similar career path, hinting at the close 
integration of management across the top layer of the CNPC group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Lines mark the discontinuation of a position held above the line, and the start of a new 
position in the row below the line. 
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This interlinkage of leaders of the local core and non-core business units (i.e. red and 
blue) is not unusual, as most local operations of CNPC have the same person in 
charge of the main organization of both tiers. In Liaohe (in Liaoning Province) for 
example, Zhang Zhidong serves as director and Party secretary of Liaohe Oilfield 
Company as well as Liaohe Oil Exploration Administration (the latter is the former 
danwei equivalent to the DPA). Prior to this posting, Zhang had served as leader in 
the two main units (red and blue tier) in the Tulufan-Hami oilfield, and his 
predecessor in Liaohe, Xie Wenyan, was posted to head the two main companies of 
the red and blue tier in the Talimu (Tarim) oil region when Zhang Zhidong took over. 
This underlines the commonality of a coordinated, connected leadership structure of 
the core business and non-core business tiers in the local branches of CNPC.  
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Table 5: CNPC red and blue tiers in Daqing: 
 
DPA = Daqing Petroleum Administration; Sub = subsidiary. Some subsidiaries under both the DPA 
and Daqing oilfield shown as Sub x thru z (e.g. Daqing Electricity Generation Group (大庆电力集团
公司) under the DPA and Daqing First Oil Extraction plant (第一采油厂) under Daqing Oilfield)) 
are large enterprises with subsidiaries themselves. These are shown as Sub x1 thru z1.  
Bold arrows indicate relations of authority by way of rank (e.g. CNPC outranks PetroChina) or 
authority in cooperation, as suggested by informants in Daqing.  
Source: interviews, public material of the displayed organizations. 
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SOEs as Embedded Economic Institutions, or the Social Relations of 
Chinese Capitalism:  
 
Thus far, the paper has analyzed the structure of the CNPC group, its leadership 
integration both vertically (within the group) and horizontally (at local level) of 
cadres in red and blue tier balancing different objectives of the Party-state’s 
hegemonic project, and the institutional legacy of embeddedness of SOEs.  
The role of the CNPC group for China’s energy economy is obviously an 
important one, both at local and national level, and these two dimensions serve as 
illustration of the variegated nature of its organizational tasks. On the one hand 
CNPC’s core business part (blue tier, i.e. PetroChina and Daqing Oilfield Company 
and its subsidiaries) has a mission of generating revenue, working towards radically 
redistributive goals of e.g. the 18th CPC Congress’ third Plenum’s Decision, stating 
that SOEs by 2020 are to submit 30% of their profit as tax, and to operate according 
to “decisive” market logic (CPC 2013). On the other hand, through its legacy units in 
the non-core sector (red tier, i.e. DPA and its subsidiaries), the CNPC group’s 
branches remain caretakers of locally embedded institutions, pillars of the social 
contract that has defined the danwei for decades, and for which the state apparatus 
has not yet built sufficient social security capacity to supplant. Non-core business 
units are still involved in important social services, forming the CNPC group’s socio-
economic foundation, operating key infrastructure and public services, without 
which Daqing as a society would collapse.  
The embeddedness of the CNPC group in Daqing’s society is obvious by 
numbers. Together, DPA and Daqing Oilfield directly employ 350.000 people, making 
them quite important for most aspects of political, economic, and social policy. The 
importance of the CNPC group for Daqing as a socio-economic space also shines a 
different light on a SOE’s potential as a Party-state organization, than analyses that 
look at only economic performance and rationalities of an SOE as a firm suggest. 
First, the institutional path-dependence of SOEs as not only economic, but socio-
economic centers of gravity that are deeply embedded in local societies, and 
organizationally integrated across central-local and sectoral lines of economic and 
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social policy, illustrates the structural inertia of the state-owned sector in China, and 
its bureaucratic system. Second, when seen through the lens of the Party-state (see 
also introduction chapter), the utility, and, ideologically speaking, the core function 
of SOEs, is one of serving as vehicles for supporting Party-state hegemony, 
underlining why the Party is reluctant to release control over strategic SOEs, the 
commanding heights of the economy.  
Moreover, seen as a relationship between central and local Party-state, the 
flexibility, or “tethered relationships” between administrative units within the 
system (Blecher and Shue 1996), formally align local and central policy and 
incentives, while local government and decision-making in reality unfolds in ways 
that are bound by local socio-economic factors, priorities, and manipulation (ibid. p. 
89). This is not necessarily to be seen as detrimental to the (national) economic 
raison d’etre of SOEs, but the ability to use them as support for the local party-state, 
helping it to tackle challenges such as unemployment and ultimately social stability, 
is a conscious strategy of the “Gramscian” state view the Party presents us with (see 
also introduction). We can thus discern between different analytical gazes directed 
at SOEs, depending on whether we want to see them as national champions, 
international competitor, local industry, or socio-economic organizations of the 
Party-state.  
Employment in the two tiers of Daqing’s CNPC branches shows a 
disproportionate ratio in favor of the economically non-viable red tier (red:blue = 
2:1), defying a rational choice market logic of focusing on efficiency and profitable 
operations . The tiered function of SOEs is crucial for an understanding of Daqing’s 
(and China’s) political economy and, using Polanyi’s vocabulary, the embeddedness 
of economics under society, that is, SOEs’ economic gains under the Party-state’s 
socio-political objectives. The red tier is not merely institutional legacy, the social 
contract SOE’s inherited from their times as danwei, but it is also a consequence of 
the Party-state’s hegemonic projects demands for socio-political objectives such as 
social stability and security.  
 Applying a Polanyian reading, there is striking parallel in the way CNPC has 
kept a double-tiered structure of core and non-core business, reminiscent of 
Polanyi’s concepts of habitation (red tier) and improvement (blue tier). Economic 
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improvement, in Polanyi’s work, indicates a demand for growth and development, in 
his word the “improvement in the tools of production” (Polanyi [1944] 2001: 35). 
The blue tier of PetroChina is tasked with this economic growth objective, feeding 
both into the national growth and development agenda of the CNPC group, as well 
as local growth and development. Habitation is more loosely defined in Polanyi’s 
writing, pointing at the habitation of land, that is, social activity not for the sake of 
economic improvement, but as maintenance of people’s livelihood. Social security, 
welfare, and basic social service functions of the red tier can be attributed to this 
dimension, including the aforementioned practice of “local protectionism”, providing 
jobs to locals simply because they are members of Daqing as a society, and not 
based on an economic need to increase the labor force. Maintaining a red tier, i.e. 
habitation, also serves as a counterbalance to the tensions often brought about by 
economic improvement (Polanyi [1944] 2001:66-68; Watson 2009). 
Social stability, including the maintenance of basic welfare of the 
general populace, evidently is crucial to the Party-state’s hegemonic project, just as 
much as economic growth is. Priorities can be very different, responding to local 
conditions (Mulvad 2016). In absence of structures that can ensure the continued 
stability of the red tier (e.g. a fully developed “welfare state”), simply devolving the 
social contract of SOEs seems utterly unrealistic, given this structural legacy of 
danwei-based social security institutions in places such as Daqing. In local societies 
with such strong reliance on SOEs for employment and pensions, the consequence 
could be an implosion of the social infrastructure. Experience from mass lay-offs and 
disbandment of large enterprises’ non-core business during the late 1990s and early 
2000s had resulted in disruptive strong popular responses (Lee 2007), a 
consequence officials are rarely willing to take. The crucial point is, that as Party-
state organizations, SOEs are responsible for tasks falling into both habitation and 
improvement, i.e. both the economic development of China, and the maintenance of 
the stability of its social fabric.111 
                                                        
111
 It is worth mentioning that this is not merely the result of a mastermind CPC, but, as has been 
pointed out above, institutional inertia, the historic legacy of SOEs and ideological considerations all 
are at play. Yuen Yuen Ang (2015) has masterfully pointed out, that the development path of China 
must be understood as complex, and in constant adaptation, and the local embeddedness of CNPC is 
a clear example of how complexity creates its own logics.  
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How the embeddedness of a SOE such as CNPC in local society is not 
only a social reality detectable by scientific analysis, but in fact is conceptualized and 
reproduced by the formal organization of SOEs as Party-state organizations, is 
brilliantly illustrated in the official development plan published by Daqing Oilfield. 
The Daqing Oilfield Sustainable Development Program (Daqing Oilfield 2010) 
outlines the company’s responsibility to advance the “8 Daqings” (eight point 
program for Daqing), including the “Political Daqing”, “Economic Daqing”, “Social 
Daqing”, “Spirit of Daqing”, “Technological Daqing”, “Opening up”, “Harmonious 
Daqing”, and “Development of Daqing”. Especially the first three points clearly stress 
the nexus the company sees itself in, as supporter of the Party’s political project, 
China’s economic development, and its function as bedrock of local society (ibid.): 
 
  Political Daqing. Uphold Party leadership, follow the Party’s 
call, keep a high degree of consistency with the central Party 
in matters of political affairs, thought, and action; 
Comprehensively implement the scientific outlook on 
development, proactively explore ways of new 
industrialization, let Daqing’s red banner fly high. 
 
Economic Daqing. In order to sustain a high level of 
contributions to the development of the national economy, 
we make it our duty to ensure national strategic oil security, 
achieve stable crude oil production throughout all stages, try 
hard to increase natural gas production, submit more tax, 
consolidate and ensure the position of the important national 
energy production base. 
 
 
Social Daqing. Fully employ the function of big state-owned 
enterprises as mainstay and backbone [of the economy], the 
pull of regional economic development spreading outwards, 
the comprehensive carrying out of the “three big 
143 
 
responsibilities”,112 and establish a corporate image of 
responsibility.113 
 
Notably, these three points mirror the aforementioned “three responsibilities” of 
CNPC’s general program (CNPC 2012), making clear that these points are part of an 
integrated set of ideas, an ideology of organization. As a company policy paper, it 
reveals the way in which local socio-economic development, understood as 
economic improvement, a guarantee of habitation/social security, and Party 
hegemony are seen as both means and ends of the local CNPC structure. The 
instrumental role of SOEs as both for-profit business, and as policy tools with the 
capacity to deal with local challenges is presented as a programmatic element of the 
Party-state’s hegemonic project. Moreover, it expresses a deeply embedded social 
identity of the Daqing oil industry in a “Daqing Spirit” (sometimes the “Iron Man 
Spirit”, after the idolized oil worker Wang Jinxi),114 and conceptualized within the 
national setting of Party leadership and national development. 
Moreover, the development of Daqing Oilfield is presented to be tied 
intimately to the Party’s, and the nations embrace and wellbeing.115 This narrative 
illustrates how, on an ideological and theoretical level, the Party-state’s hegemonic 
project, state-owned enterprise, and local socio-economic development are 
conceptualized in an integrated way. The SOE here remains a transmission belt 
between government and society. Organizationally, SOEs such as CNPC are not a 
                                                        
112
 The three big responsibilities are stated by public material of CNPC as “politics, economics, and 
society,” and mirror the three points translated here. They emphasize the important functions of the 
CNPC group in all sectors of Chinese society at large, similar to the points in Daqing Oilfield’s program. 
See CNPC (2012: 235). 
113
 Author’s own translation. Original text: 政治大庆。坚持党的领导、听从党的召唤，在政治上、
思想上、行动上同党中央保持高度一致；全面落实科学发展观，积极探索新型工业化道路，让
大庆红旗高高飘扬。经济大庆。以保障国家石油战略安全为己任，实现原油分阶段持续稳产，
努力为国家多产油气、多缴利税，巩固和保持国家重要能源生产基地的地位，为国民经济发展
持续做出高水平贡献。社会大庆。充分发挥国有大企业的支柱、骨干作用，辐射拉动区域经济
社会发展，全面履行“三大责任”，树立负责任的大企业形象。 
114
 Virtually all the interviews and informal conversations with Daqing-born residents reflected a 
strong localism and a feeling of the Daqing “spirit”, along the lines of a proudness of being the 
nation’s “oil capital”, and the accomplishments of the early generations of oil workers founding the 
city. Even more so, there was a strong sense of disappointment towards the economic decline of the 
economy, following the decline of the oil industry, “the blood of Daqing has dried up” (“大庆血液流
干了”), a phrase often repeated in conversations). 
115 See Daqing Oilfield (2010): ”大庆油田的发展，始终得到党和国家的亲切关怀，始终同国家和
民族的前途命运紧密联系在一起.” 
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danwei anymore, but have become corporatized and specialized conglomerates. 
Nevertheless, the historical policy burden remains strong at local levels, and 
compartmentalized in the red tier. Reform and modernization of enterprises into 
entirely for-profit firms is complicated by the continuously strong integration of the 
conflicting objectives of SOEs as businesses on the one hand, and Party-state 
organizations (or agents) on the other. 
SOEs are not only large corporations based in Beijing, but they are local 
corporate citizens, and they have a dual nature as vertically integrated for-profit 
business, and as a state-owned organization that is utilized to support state-building 
objectives of the Party-state at all administrative level. This entails supporting the 
local Party-state by bolstering e.g. socio-economic stability through employment, 
subsidized public services etc. (Gallagher 2015; Rithmire 2015). The social contract is 
shaped historically and locally, depending on the structure of the local economy, 
where SOEs are key organizations that stretch throughout social layers (housing, 
work place, public service etc.), having economic, but also socio-political objectives 
and functions (Chai 2014).  
SOEs thus serve an important politically integrative function, by being a 
beltway for the Party-state’s hegemonic project in the sense that they connect 
economic activity with political and social organization, also across the central-local 
dimension. Moreover, as this paper argues, they can do this quite flexibly. In 
localities where socio-political issues are of more immediate concern for example, 
SOEs are expected to balance their profit maximization objectives with other aspects 
of the Party-state’s hegemonic project. Social stability, security, employment and 
welfare are all issues that are of concern to the local leadership as part of the 
broader hegemonic project of the CPC, and as part of that Party-state, it is for SOEs 
too. 
 
Conclusion: 
 
Using a “test drilling” case, this paper has revealed some of the more concrete 
effects of the embeddedness of Chinese SOEs in the political system and society at 
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large, providing some empirical detail to the literature. The case of CNPC in Daqing, 
it must be noted, is likely a representative case of localities where industrial SOEs 
have been the main pillar of employment for decades, which is the case in many 
cities of China’s “rustbelt” (the Northeast). However, future research needs to verify 
these effects of embeddedness and the functions of SOEs as political organizations, 
not only in other industrial centers, but also in areas with less concentrated SOE-
dependency regarding employment and social identity. Also the transition to a 
service- and knowledge-based economic model will effectuate shifts (and is already), 
putting the resilience and adaptive qualities of the Party-state order in structurally 
weak areas to a test. These areas should therefore be subject to more in-depth, 
qualitative and longitudinal research. This paper has raised some of these issues, and 
pointed out some of the central tensions at play.  
Applying a historical view, this paper has illuminated the hybrid social, 
political, and economic functions of a SOE such as CNPC. Apart from the economic 
rationale of SOEs, the paper points out the weight of the historical legacy vested in 
SOEs locally as former danwei, based on the necessity to maintain a certain degree 
of social stability as a function of Party-state hegemony. Just like the CPC as a 
political system, SOEs are a ”cultural artefact” (Zheng 2010: 17), politically deeply 
integrated with the Party-state structure, and embedded in local societies and 
economies. As such, large industrial SOEs have a double-layered relationship both 
vertically and horizontally. They stretch from central to local as vertically integrated 
business group, but also as organizations reproducing Party hegemony. Equally, they 
operate as both businesses and socio-political organizations at local levels, 
constituting “red” and “blue” tiers that organizationally maintain economic and 
social functions. 
This happens in a field where the “[…] foremost interest of the CCP is to 
maintain its domination over the state and society, and to reproduce and 
reconstruct such domination in accordance with changing socio-economic 
environments” (ibid. p. 23). SOEs must be seen as the commanding heights of the 
economy, ultimately underlying Party hegemony. This is not to say SOEs have no 
agency themselves. The ability of SOEs to influence, ignore, even sabotage policy at 
all levels has been discussed by various scholars. However, when it comes to core 
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interests of the Party-state, such as social stability are concerned, in the 
organizational reality of contemporary China SOEs ultimately have to adhere to the 
authority of a Party-state centered order. This SOE-Party-state runs both ways. Their 
deep embeddedness in local society renders them too important politically to be 
managed independently and with profit maximizing strategies in mind only, as 
disruptions would pose a threat to the CPC’s goal of solidifying its consent-based 
hegemony. At the same time, by way of their Party-integrated leadership, and the 
CPC Organization Department’s authority over evaluations, appointment, and 
promotion of the SOE leadership, there are structural top-down incentives for Party 
loyalty. 
The case of CNPC in Daqing illustrates how the local, social 
embeddedness and integration with Party-state objectives of the local operations of 
SOEs - the same yangqi often touted for their ability to ignore government policy – 
entangles them in hybrid functions, and as organizations they straddle across the 
political, social, and economic spheres, as well as the local and central dimensions. 
While CNPC or PetroChina might be able to evade tax or influence energy policy in 
Beijing, and thus potentially work against Party-state interest, they remain both 
dependent on (for oil) and hindered by (danwei legacy) their local branches. Their 
embeddedness also renders them far less independent and detached from Party-
state interests as it might seem when looking at the holding company at the apex of 
the CNPC group. It also illustrates how the reliance of the (local) Party-state on SOEs 
seems less irrational than some the literature focusing on inefficiency and lagging 
reform suggests. A bias towards social stability and security remain a vital interest 
and core of the hegemonic project of the Party-state, even if this entails the inability 
to devolve the social contract vested in SOEs, at the cost of efficiency and the 
market-focused elements of SOE reform. 
This reading of state-owned enterprise as an integral part of the Party-
state and the “socialist market economy”, brings forth the complex organizational 
nature of SOEs, and the socio-economic and political functions vested in them. The 
review of formal CPC discourse and organizational rationalization also lays bare an 
ontology, even a social theory, of a non-division between “state” and “market”, 
linking remnants of socialist institutions of redistribution of resources, and the 
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maintenance of the Party-state’s political control over the “commanding heights” of 
the economy (and in fact over society at large).The function of SOEs to serve as 
instruments for the Party-state’s core interests is reflected in the state theory and 
ideology of political organization practiced by the CPC (see introduction paper). The 
conscious integration of economy (i.e. the commanding heights of the economy) and 
society under the political leadership of the CPC, reveals an ontology of economic 
action of SOEs under the umbrella of social action at large, and not as a separate 
realm with its own rationality (i.e. market mechanism). Since the claim of hegemony 
by the CPC encompasses society at large, the social theory of the Party therefore 
naturally sees SOEs as reproducers and supporters of this hegemony. Moreover, 
according to the CPC’s formal ideology, being the core of the state apparatus, it has 
an almost natural right of leadership of the state, and thus of state-owned enterprise 
(People’s Daily 1989).  
The CPC’s hegemonic project of leading China towards “wealth and 
power” (富强),116 the “ideology of state capitalism” (Gallagher 2015: 238), requires 
both economic growth (Polanyi’s “improvement”), but also includes socialist ideals 
of redistribution. It also accepts the vital necessity of a minimum of social security to 
prevent the tensions brought about by economic growth from undermining social 
stability, and Party hegemony over the “common sense”. Here, the red- and blue-
tiered structure of SOEs has evolved as an instrument for the Party-state to limit 
potentially dangerous levels of disruption brought about by the effects of 
“improvement”, e.g. mass lay-offs or bankruptcies, when it comes to important 
pillars of local society’s economic socio-structure such as CNPC’s presence in Daqing. 
Together, the historical institutional approach, and the dissection of an 
industrial National Champion reveal the peculiar integration of economic, social, and 
political objectives vested in SOEs, which appear embedded in both society and 
Party-state, telling us a great deal about how contemporary Chinese capitalism 
works. It shows how the tensions under the surface of national accounts and the 
macro gaze on large SOE holdings at central level lead to a complex and negotiated 
patchwork, where employment and social stability in local areas remains important 
                                                        
116
 As presented in Xi Jinping’s The Governance of China (2014), but also discussed as a long held 
ambition predating the PRC by Orville Schell and John Delury (2013). 
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enough to challenge central reform priorities of growth end efficiency. The 
remaining elements of socialist ideology and redistribution, and the core interest of 
the Party-state to maintain its status as legitimate hegemon loom large in places 
where SOEs for decades have been the bedrock of society. Both the legacies of the 
danwei social contract, and a CPC’s striving to balance capitalist growth 
(improvement), and the maintenance of safe livelihoods (habitation), constitute a 
complex, negotiated local setup. Two main goals stated by the Party leadership 
visibly stand in contrast in Daqing. Economic development and growth is key 
objective of SOEs as economic organizations, yet the complicated structure of 
employment and social security in Daqing make a one-sided focus on reform 
towards economic ends infeasible, unless mass protest, social crisis, and therefore 
legitimacy are considered. The Polanyian tension between improvement and 
habitation becomes a striking reality in the case of Daqing, and a telling example of 
the reasons for stalled economic reforms in the case of energy and heavy industries, 
where socialist redistribution ideals and social stability are prioritized. In order to 
maintain consensual hegemony the Party-state leadership has little choice but to 
walk a middle way, preventing social disruption at the cost of surrendering 
maximum economic efficiency. 
A final word should be said about the structural features of the Chinese 
political system described in the papers on FA and on Leading Small Groups, the 
existence of both bureaucratic fragmentation, and integration through Party-state 
ideology and organization. The way by which CNPC is organized in vertical tiers as a 
business group, and yet being deeply integrated horizontally with local society and 
government, reminds of the basic tiao-kuai (条块) structure of Chinese Party-state 
bureaucracy.117 This tiao-kuai structure has been discussed (in the West) by the 
literature on fragmented authoritarianism (Oksenberg and Lieberthal 1988; Lampton 
and Lieberthal (eds.) 1992; Mertha 2009), and has since been described as a basic 
principle of organization in the Party-state (Brødsgaard (ed.) 2016). Structural 
fragmentation in the bureaucracy is of course also an issue discussed in China, and 
                                                        
117 Referring to vertical bureaucracy silos under ministries, and horizontal bureaucracies at one 
administrative level, a structure that has made decision-making and policy implementation and 
coordination difficult, see also paper 1. 
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already in the early 1980s scholars lamented the detrimental effect of vertical 
“ministerial ownership” (部门所有之) and horizontal “area ownership” (地区所有之
) on coordination of industrial policy (Jingji Guanli 1982; Gu 1983; Wu 1988). Even 
today academic discussions revolve around the right way to integrate tiao and kuai 
organizations in e.g. regional economic integration, or local development plans (e.g.: 
Liu 2007; Zhang 2014). Corresponding to the findings of paper 1 and 2, this paper 
confirms the existence of both the structural fragmentation of the administrative 
apparatus, of which industrial SOEs are a direct descendant, and the integrative 
force of of Party integrated organization and ideology.  
Overall, it becomes clear that these systemic issues still replicate in 
state-owned enterprise, and why it has been difficult to go forth with the repeatedly 
announced market reforms and structural disentanglement from the administration. 
In the light of these challenges of embeddedness, it also remains unclear how much 
restructuring – and with that socio-economic disruptions at local level – the Party-
state is able to swallow without real alternatives in place. 
 
 
 
 
Interviews: 
 
(1-04/14) Interview 1, personal assistant of a manager at CNOOC, in Beijing, April 
2014. 
 
(2-10/16) Interview 2, mid-level manager (副处级) at Daqing 1st Oil Extraction Plant, 
a direct subsidy of Daqing Oilfield, Daqing, October 2016. 
 
(3-04/14) Interview 3, leader of a research department at the Development Research 
Center of the State Council, Beijing, April 2014. 
 
(4.10/16) Interview 4, mid-level manager at Daqing Oil Drilling, a subsidiary of 
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Daqing Petroleum Administration, Daqing, October 2016. 
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Concluding remarks: 
 
The present dissertation is the result of more than four years of work. During these 
years, the angle and empirical focus has shifted from solely looking at state-owned 
business groups, to become both broader and deeper. Instead of looking at only one 
institution – state-owned enterprise (SOE) – it has become a richer project, looking 
at various facets and features of the institutional logic at the center of China’s 
contemporary political organization including SOE: CPC hegemony and the Party-
state order.  
 Assuming that China will continue to grow as economy and 
international actor, and that the Party-state in its current form more or less will 
remain stable, understanding the political institutions and the system’s organization 
better seems of import to not only academia. While the Chinese model, centered on 
CPC hegemony, might sound disheartening to proponents of a liberal democratic 
order, ignoring official Chinese self-understanding and the increasingly strong 
ideological and organizational reach of the CPC seems naive. This project does not 
intend to make normative assumptions for or against the Chinese model. Even 
though it presents us with an authoritarian, less liberal and participatory system 
than that of e.g. Denmark or Germany, many of the Chinese officials and cadres I 
have met and interviewed are genuinely vested in China’s development as nation, 
and the betterment of the livelihood of the Chinese people. Taking China’s political 
system and its state project seriously, and trying to understand how the CPC views 
China’s political organization as an ideal type, is therefore not a futile task. This 
dissertation is trying to contribute to this understanding. 
The CPC’s hegemonic project to restore China’s grandeur of past times 
is perhaps the largest social experiment in history (superlatives are in high favor in 
Beijing), and it has been remarkable to observe just the short period of 13 year I 
have “watched” China. We have a shared interest in better understanding how this 
process will play out, and what the institutional logics are that shape China’s 
development as a nation, and as a political system in the wider international 
community.  
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Research Contributions 
 
As a research project, this dissertation contributes to important debates taking place 
within the field of China Studies. Moreover, the three papers plus introduction 
address two general research interests in the contemporary literature: important 
structural features and dynamics of the Chinese political system, and the 
institutional logic of the Party-state.  
The dissertation has picked up and added empirical depth alongside a 
theoretic discussion of the literature on fragmented authoritarianism, which for 
some years now has been a widely respected framework for understanding of 
bureaucratic dynamics, and structural issues of the administrative system of China. It 
provides novel, systematic research on Leading Small Groups, which have become a 
hot topic over the last few years, corresponding to their rise in importance as central 
level decision-making institutions. Here, I have shown how these organizations have 
become the endogenous institutional fix for the structural fissures, contributing 
some important and so far unpublished background to the literature discussing 
decision-making in the Party-state. Lastly, providing a reading of state-owned 
enterprise as Party-state institution, I contribute to the literature on SOEs and the 
political economy with a new perspective on the embeddedness of SOEs in society, 
and more generally the social relations of Chinese capitalism, that is, the so-called 
Socialist Market Economy with Chinese Characteristics. Here, the more theoretic 
considerations presented in the introduction serve as conceptual backdrop, laying 
out a theory of the Party-state as a political system of order. I hope that these 
papers contribute to not only the field of China Studies, but also can inform other 
social scientists by lending empirical and historical depth to more comparative 
analysis including China as a case. 
 
Shortcomings and Future Research 
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There are, of course, also shortcomings and limitations to this project. Two main 
limitations that need to be addressed relate to the part of the project’s theoretic 
focus (1), and methodology (2).  
1: The dissertation as a whole has chosen, what effectively amounts to 
a state-centric view on China specifically, and political organization more generally. 
As discussed in the introduction this has its merits, especially in a system such as the 
Chinese, where state (i.e. Party-state) organizations are incorporated in virtually all 
major social organizations. It does; however, tend to overlook those aspects of the 
system that take place beyond the gaze of the Party-state. These actions might be 
consciously shirking or even opposing political control by the CPC (e.g. non-
governmental rights groups, interest groups and associations), or be of too little 
political importance to be more closely integrated with the political body (e.g. small 
private firms). 
Although the CNPC paper shows how Party-state and local society are 
embedded within each other, the ontology applied in the article has a strong bias 
towards focusing on the vector reaching from Party-state to society/economy. 
Bottom-up forces, more nuanced micro-dynamics taking place within SOEs at local 
level, the local government, and the impact of agents not representing Party-state 
organs (such as local business associations or ad hoc pressure groups) are weakly 
covered by this approach. At a theoretic level, this means that the top-down biased 
view is at risk of overstating the reach and actual force of CPC hegemony and policy 
implementation at local level. It regards political negotiation as a process of down-
stream adjustment to local conditions, and frames variation as flexibility instead of 
poor implementation or mission creep. While this may quite possibly be the right 
way to interpret local politics of the type discussed by this project, it should 
nevertheless be verified by more in-depth case study research, including longer 
fieldwork periods, more interviews, and more cases. 
To some extent, this also pertains to the paper on leading small groups, 
where more in-depth research on the concrete work of these groups is revealed. 
This is, however, immensely challenging, since the closed and secretive nature of the 
CPC does not allow any non- group member (i.e. ranking officials) to take part in 
their meetings. What we have is mainly structural information and historical records 
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of major groups, and in absence of the possibility of qualitative approaches such as 
participant observation or interviews, the historical institutional approach used in 
the paper is currently the best way to glean more systematic information about LSG 
as organizations, and as decision-making institutions. 
Nevertheless, the state-centered approach, and the developed model 
of the Party-state as an order was chosen because of its ability to highlight the 
historic and normative depth of the CPC as institutional core of the political system. 
Moreover, it speaks to and builds on newer literature using this Gramsci-inspired 
theorizing on the state, and a view on political organization and economy as an 
institutional order.  
2: The project is mainly comprised of textual research. While desk 
study is an important part of preparing and investigating any topic in China Studies, 
or Social Science, prior to any other qualitative methods, future research will have to 
verify and extend some of the analyses presented in this dissertation. Given the 
limitations of access to information on the issues studied here, abductive reasoning 
leads to conclusions that should be supported and verified as much as possible by 
fieldwork and in-depth case studies. This has not been exhausted to the fullest in this 
project, and future work needs to verify some of the conclusions, and not least, the 
value of a view of CPC hegemony as overarching institutional vector in China’s 
political system. Especially at local level, and within the vastly heterogeneous state-
owned sector, more case studies, and longitudinal research have to be conducted in 
order to learn more about the social relations of capitalism, and the embeddedness 
of SOEs as public institutions in society. 
Overall, however, I believe the dissertation contributes with new 
empirical material and theoretic perspectives to the respective academic debates 
addressed by the papers, and opens up new perspectives on topics of interest to 
contemporary China Studies. Methodologically, the historical institutional approach 
might seem somewhat dusty to some scholars who favor more sophisticated 
research techniques, it seems to me that as a first step, when discussing 
fundamental social institutions such as political organization, a relational, historical, 
and area-specific approach still is one of the best ways to learn about individual 
systems. Hopefully this has convincingly been done in this dissertation, and hopefully 
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it has been able to point out some perspectives worthy of future research also by 
others.  
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